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James M. Giarelli
Harvey Siegel
Catherine Z. Elgin
William B. Stanley &
Spencer J. Maxcy
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The *Journal of Thought* is a quarterly publication devoted to encouraging scholars of diverse disciplines, nationalities, languages and cultures to examine the significant educational issues and problems from the perspective of their various disciplines. The Editors solicit material that treats the more comprehensive issues and problems confronting education throughout the world. Interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars is encouraged.

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The Scribe

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A Public Philosophical Perspective On Teacher Education Reform*

I. *Introduction*

In a world of ever-changing, new and improved crises, it is nice to know that some old crises will always be there. Part of what it means to be a modern American is knowing that somewhere, someone is talking or writing about the crisis in teacher education and proposing an alternative. Competency-based programs, performance-based programs, grounded theory-based programs, field-based programs, liberal arts-based programs, paideia proposals—all these have been suggested in the last few years, and the list goes on. This is as it should be.

In this essay, rather than focusing on any particular existing or proposed teacher education program, I want to suggest a perspective from which teacher education debate can be viewed—a perspective which sees educational debate at the core of a cultural conversation about what our public life is to be about and what it means. I want to call this a public philosophical perspective. Jonas Soltis writes that public philosophizing about education is everybody's business and springs from being "deeply concerned and thoughtfully reflective about fundamental aspects of educating in our time."[1]

More specifically, William Sullivan writes:

> A public philosophy could provide expression for the meaning and worth of the political commitments embodied in republican institutions and mores . . . At its deepest level, a public philosophy is a tradition of interpreting and delineating the common understandings of what the political association is about and what it aims to achieve . . . Finally, a public philosophy is both a cause and an effect of awakened discussion of those things most important and at issue in the life of the nation.

> What is ultimately at issue is the radical question of what is a worthwhile life.[2]

A public philosophical perspective on teacher education, then, strives to understand and critique the connection between the way we educate our teachers and the way we think about and act in our life in the political community. From this perspective, debate about teacher education "reform" or "reorganization" is always political. As Lawrence Cremin writes:

> There are those, I fear who have always tended to regard such controversy [over teacher education] with a vague sense of impropriety, holding that true professionals ought somehow to be able to resolve their differences through research instead of debate. I myself believe that continuing debate is at the heart of the matter. For as a society makes up its mind about the education of its teachers, it is really undertaking to define its own future. And while research can doubtless inform that enterprise, it can never replace the political process that is its essence.[3]

That is my point. Educational reform is intensely and significantly political, for it is about the un-making and re-making of worlds of meaning and, ultimately, worlds of action, for it is through these worlds of meaning that we develop a public philosophy—a sense of political direction, commitment, and understanding. Without this meaning, we don't know who we are or how we are going to act. From this public philosophical perspective, following Aristotle, if politics is the mastercraft, the teacher is the mastercraftsman.

To focus this public philosophical perspective, I will offer a short selective sketch of modern commentaries on teacher education, from Dewey to Counts to Conant to Elshtain. My aim, then, is not to be comprehensive but rather to show how a public philosophical perspective can help us understand the continuity and contradiction in the history of teacher education debate and provide a context for critically considering and participating in conversations about current proposals for teacher education reform.

II. *Commentary on Teacher Education: Dewey (1907) to Elshtain (1982)*

First, I want to recall briefly some commentary on teacher education from just after the turn of the century. In some ways, of course, the situation is enormously different. In 1907, looking back over the ten years since Teachers College became officially a part of Columbia, the then Dean James E. Russell describes a situation in New York State in which only 7% of teachers were college graduates and less than 20% had even attended a normal school—and these figures were lower in the nation as a whole. On other

matters, though, the discussion is similar. The average teacher's yearly salary was $736, a poor inducement for young people to go into teaching and an even poorer one for investing in college preparation in education. And for those who had received college preparation in education, "the college graduate has been carefully weighed these many years past, and too frequently he has been found wanting. The specialist and the normal-school graduate have also been tested and the popular verdict is that they, too, are poor craftsmen."[4] The solution, Russell believes, lies in reform of teacher education.

> Our only hope lies in the introduction of a new factor more powerful than any now existing—the professionally trained teacher specially fitted for his work . . . No professional school tries to equip its students with all they may need in professional life, but it should strive to systematize the body of knowledge employed in professional service in accordance with the highest professional ideals and the best scientific principles. . . .[5]

Here we find the foundations of the twentieth-century effort to professionalize teachers through the scientific study of education and the inculcation of the human service ideal.

In an accompanying article, Dewey makes a case for education as a university discipline. After arguing that the school is a social institution charged with conducting the most important business of society, the conversation and re-creation of culture, Dewey asks whether the problems occasioned in carrying out these tasks are not appropriate and significant for university study. "Unless such matters somewhere are made the objects of systematic study, they will continue to be settled in the future, as in the past, by clamor, rule-of-thumb, and the interests of ward politicians."[6] To avoid this kind of haphazard and partisan influence, it is essential for educators to develop a knowledge base capable of scientific determination with which "the professed leaders of public education should be competent to direct and form public opinion."[7] Without the development of a science of education and a professionalized conception of teacher preparation,

> the growth of the helpless infancy into trained maturity . . . is left to go its own way subject only to custom, to caprice and to the display of superior power. Yet upon the course it takes depends the direction that the course of society takes. Either there is no possibility of any deliberate, conscious direction, or else scientific study, the type of study that is at home in the university, must supply it.[8]

Dewey's final purpose in this article is to connect the development of a science and profession of education with political democracy. Democratic

political and social traditions historically have resisted the centralized control of education in governmental centers and bureaucracies. For educational institutions to provide opportunities for the development of individuality, self-responsibility, and self-initiative, they must remain flexible and experimental in their organization. But the school has a wider social function and aim which requires a more general perspective than local communities or districts possess. Where will this come from?

> Whether one regret or approve, our educational systems are in need of some sort of direction from expert sources. If it does not come with coercion, it must come voluntarily. If it is not undertaken with the authority of a bureaucracy, it must be with the authority of science and philosophy and history. The universities are the natural centers of such free and sympathetic organization. It is for them to gather and focus the best that emerges in the practices of the present; it is for them to experiment in the development of more adequate conceptions of subject matter, and to issue the results to the school with the *imprimatur* not of officialdom, but of intelligence. Through education of leaders, through the avenues of persuasion and conviction, they must perform the task of selection and of organization, which ministers of education effect under more autocratically centralized schemes.[9]

The development of a science of education and a professionalized university preparation of teachers, then, will act as a guardian of democracy by preventing the control of the school by the bureaucracy of the state or the coercive authority of the powerful. The essential condition for the development, maintenance, and extension of democratic institutions is the free exercise of intelligence, and thus democracy in education is to be achieved by creating centers for intelligent educational thought and for the preparation of intelligent educators.

Dewey's argument here is characteristically "Progressive." Better politics are to be achieved through de-politicization. The development of scientifically grounded professional expertise will stand as a counterforce to uninformed public opinion and political partisanship. Democracy is social intelligence directed by experts. Eight years later in 1915, writing on a specific issue of state or city control of the New York schools, Dewey is still reticent to argue in favor of state control, although he recognizes that, in theory, education is a concern of the whole society in a way that, say, playgrounds, are not, and that it would be easier for the state "to achieve a broad intellectual outlook, to free educational endeavor from the ruts and prejudices of local custom, to undertake well planned experiments, and to secure a progressively developing educational tradition."[10] However, in practice state authority has been used more for control than for community

betterment. Left with local control, then, Dewey proposes "the elimination of the Board of Education, and the establishment of a paid expert educational department. . . ."[11]

By 1922, seven years later, however, Dewey is much less optimistic about the schools as a bulwark for democracy and especially about the professionally prepared teacher.

> The specialist in any one of the traditional lines is as likely to fall for social bunk even in its extreme form of economic and nationalistic propaganda as the unschooled person; in fact his credulity is the more dangerous because he is so much more vociferous in his proclamation and so much more dogmatic in its assertion.[12]

Where the teacher was once to defend democracy with the authority of science, history, and philosophy, now it is a "spirit of criticism," an ability to discriminate between the ways things are and the way they are taught, and a conscious engagement in social life that mark the well-prepared teacher.

I am not suggesting a radical turnabout for Dewey in this discussion. We all know he never argued for the intrinsic value of any subject matter, judging all curricula in terms of their potential for adding to the qualitative transformation of experience. Yet the shift is obvious. No longer is education the antidote to politics; no longer is the scientifically prepared professional teacher the director of public opinion from above, the one issuing expert knowledge to schools. Rather,

> What will happen if teachers become sufficiently courageous and emancipated to insist that education means the creation of a discriminating mind, a mind that prefers not to dupe itself or to be the dupe of others? . . . When this happens schools will be the dangerous outposts of a humane civilization. But they will also begin to be supremely interesting places. For it will then have come about that education and politics are one and the same thing. . . .[13]

By 1935 the university-based teacher education programs grounded in the norms of science and professionalism had become the rule, so much so that George Counts in *The Social Frontier* thought it necessary to "break the teacher-training lockstep" in order to educate teachers with a democratic social vision. In Counts's view, the reform of teacher education had been limited to extending the time spent in preparation.

> This time extension . . . obviously cannot be depended upon markedly to raise the qualitative level of teaching. It has, however, been hailed by many educators as the final answer to all the criticisms leveled at the inadequacy of the teaching in American public schools. . . . It was

> easily assumed that the main fault with the traditional teacher-training program was its briefness. Thus the cause for the reported poor quality of teaching was shifted from the *nature* of the training which candidates received to the *shortness* of the training period. The remedy which naturally enough suggested itself was more years of the same kind of training.[14] (Emphasis in original.)

For Counts, however, tinkering with the traditional elements of teacher education, "orientation courses, subject matter courses, theory courses, observation courses, and practice-teaching assignments" will, at best, produce "only a minor refinement added to something fundamentally inadequate."[15] For Counts, the essential qualities of a good teacher can be attained in an educational curriculum consisting "entirely of cultural material, especially selected and communicated, to promote mellow wisdom, imaginative vision, and a driving educative zeal" and in "carefully planned and extended interneship service under master teachers in particular studies or at particular educational levels."[16] The standardized routine of narrow training in educational science and professionalism must be broken in favor of an education grounded in broad cultural understanding and guided practical experience.

The tendencies toward standardization, emphasis on technique, and separation of teacher preparation from broad-based cultural study and real-world experience continued in the following years, fueled by the claims of researchers, mainly psychologists, to have discovered the scientific basis of teaching and of scientists to have discovered the logical basis of subject matter. Finally in 1963 in *The Education of American Teachers*[17] even the conservative James B. Conant could echo the criticisms of social reconstructionist critics like Counts with his charge that because of the domination of state requirements, teacher education was rigid, overly standardized, and dull. Conant's solution was to break the teacher-training lockstep by putting more emphasis on liberal arts preparation and less on pedagogical science and method and, although the education professoriate saw this as a right-wing attack, Conant's criticism, though not his remedy, was basically a continuation of the critique of teacher education begun by Dewey and Counts.

To conclude, if not complete, this brief sketch of commentary on teacher education, I refer to a recent article by Jean Bethke Elshtain titled "Time to Politicize the Schools."[18] Elshtain, a political scientist and writer on public issues, notes the continuity between right-wing and left-wing critics of public education. "What unites them is the belief that public schools are not what they claim to be, namely, impartial disseminators of knowledge and dispassionate arbiters of the controversies generated by cultural pluralism."[19] After summarizing the litany of statistics and complaints which give

evidence of a "serious and deepening crisis of confidence in public education," Elshtain asks, "Who, or what, is to blame?"[20] Recognizing the importance of structural problems such as racism and poverty, Elshtain nevertheless places a major source of the blame with the professional educational establishment. In their quest for scientifically grounded educational theory, and with that, professional respectability, the educational establishment has lost sight of its primary public purpose—the teaching of values, "both individual moral beliefs and shared principles of civility and democratic citizenship. And it can be argued that the parental revolt against public education has tapped this more elusive failure."[21] The schools' response in the form of values clarification and/or moral reasoning curricula has been inadequate. This kind of approach "precludes debate about social values that can be brought to bear on the political dilemmas of our day."[22] This is the main justification for a system of public education and is more important than ever before. "As American society has become more rigid and social fragmentation has deepened, the school's function as a catalyst for change and a bulwark of democratic values has largely collapsed."[23]

This collapse, in turn, is largely a product of the professionalization of the teaching force led by the guidance of depoliticized educational researchers. Whereas questions of teaching method, curricula, and the like properly belong to the "sphere of politics and public debate," they have become captured "by the growing army of educational 'experts' who, conveniently enough, are guided by a theory that celebrates their own expertise."[24] Likewise, the schools are depoliticized, with questions of their purpose and methods made by a protected bureaucracy largely shielded from significant popular control. "Vital matters of educational policy were turned into problems for 'scientific' management. In following this course, the schools were adopting the anti-democratic ideas that were in the ascendant in American life, and which called for a technocratic politics, controlled by social engineers."[25]

What is to be done? For those who cling to the notion that the schools must foster the values of a civic political morality, Elshtain proposes four steps toward a solution. I will rearrange her order and merely state the first three so as to concentrate on the one most relevant for this discussion. The steps are (1) decentralize, (2) increase parental involvement and participation, (3) finance public education more equitably, and (4) phase out schools of education. Obviously, the last is the most controversial; therefore, I'll quote Elshtain at some length.

> Why do we need schools of education? Why are accreditation requirements and procedures so rigid? Would not students be better served by teachers who are knowledgeable and enthusiastic about their subjects? The mechanics of classroom dynamics and teaching methods are not

> only a waste of time; they have become a substitute for substance. Students don't need "facilitators," group dynamics experts, amateur therapists or grown-up pals. They need teachers who know and love what they teach. Given the overwhelming dissatisfaction on the part of both parents and students with the overall quality of teaching, the conclusion that educators ought to be better educated is inescapable.[26]

Now, Elshtain's argument raises more questions than it settles. She assumes, problematically, that teachers trained in schools of education are not "knowledgeable and enthusiastic about their subjects," and implies that those trained in discipline or content areas are. And, of course, all education professors are not facilitators, therapists, or pals. More importantly, it would be difficult to argue that those who teach and have developed the modern university liberal arts disciplines have thought of their task in terms of the development of the values of civic political morality. Elshtain's own discipline, political science, is probably the best case in point. The history of political science as a university-based discipline, as it has gone from political philosophy to political theory to political science to public administration, has been one of flight from and assault on the idea of politics as an educative process of acquiring individual meaning and social definition.

But Elshtain's view is popularly held, not only by arts and science faculty, but increasingly by the general public. Thus, we return to the public significance of the continuing crisis in teacher education.

III. *Teacher Education as a Public Philosophical Problem*

What has happened in the seventy-five years between Dewey's arguments that a teacher preparation program based on the university study of education as a scientifically grounded and professionally oriented discipline would function as a protector of democracy against the forces of political power and control, and Elshtain's arguments that a professionally organized and scientifically grounded educational establishment, especially as it acts to train and certify teachers and control school content and method, is profoundly anti-democratic and a cause of the crisis of confidence in public education? I cannot pretend to answer this question, but I do think the problem must be seen from a public philosophical perspective. By a public philosophy I mean a system of beliefs and communicative practices through which a society can develop and maintain a widely shared sense of political meaning and direction. A public philosophy provides for the expression of the meaning and worth of the political commitments embodied in democratic institutions and norms. Thus, a public philosophical perspective provides the context for discussing the dynamic interaction of the elements emerging in the above analysis and question: education, politics, and ethics.

In brief, I believe the difference between Dewey and Elshtain lies in the profound change over the last seventy-five years in the relationship of the educational system to the state. For Dewey, the preservation of democracy depended on the protection of democratic institutions from state or centralized control. He believed that placing authority in the hands of those informed by intelligent inquiry and motivated by the ideals of public service, whom he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be on the side of the public interest, would work to the benefit of democratic education. For Elshtain, the preservation of democracy also depends on the protection of democratic institutions from state or centralized control, but since the educational system and establishment are so clearly identified with and serve the state's interest in maintaining a status quo dominated by political and economic elites, authority must be wrested from it and placed back directly with the public. Thus, both Dewey and Elshtain ground their arguments in the sense of democracy as *the* critique of centralized institutional power or authority, but for Elshtain, and for us, this democratic sense involves a critique of the centralized authority of state-controlled education. I am not suggesting a kind of anarchism here as a public philosophy, for anarchism, in its radical individualism, seeks to destroy all power and what it means to be "a people," whereas democracy refers to a public situation in which the people have power.[27] Democracy, then, as the source of government power, not as a consequence of state-granted rights and privileges, makes a distinction between the people and the state.

Dewey provides the framework for this distinction in *The Public and Its Problems* by recognizing the difference between the state and other forms of social life. Although the state grows out of the need to regulate public transactions, the public is ever-changing while political forms become rigid.

> Inherited political agencies . . . obstruct the organization of a new public. They prevent that development of new forms of the state which might grow up rapidly were social life more fluid, less precipitated into set political and legal molds. *To form itself, the public has to break existing political forms.*[28] (Emphasis added.)

Here Dewey helps us to understand the different meanings of "public" education. First, "public" refers to those being served by education, the constituency. Second, "public" refers to the methods and verification procedures by which knowledge claims transmitted in education must be grounded. And third, "public" refers to that which is to be formed, the development through discussion and persuasion of a common sense, literally, the practical wisdom necessary to live in a community. This third meaning and function of public education reveals the connection noted by both Dewey and Elshtain between public education and political democracy.

For if the existing political form of the state is seen as anti-democratic, and if the educational system is seen as the ideological apparatus through which the state's interest in maintaining a status quo dominated by political and economic elites is served, then for public education to reassert its connection to political democracy, educational debate must be politicized. This involves a direct confrontation with the state-educational establishment that controls what is done in the schools and who does it.

IV. *A Concluding Note*

I have seemed to come a long way from teacher education, but to return to my premise with Cremin, if controversy over teacher education is essentially political, then reform of teacher education must be seen as a political process in which the future of public education, and our public life, are at stake. And, should we wish for the extension of the democratic ethos into our education and our lives, such reform must be seen as a struggle in which existing political forms must be broken. This does not necessarily imply a rejection of state-supported schools. However, it does suggest that the nature of the relationship between the state's interest and the public good must be seen as problematic, a matter to be analyzed and inquired into rather than assumed. The aim of teacher preparation programs in a democracy is the development of the cognitive and socio-moral competencies of public educators, not agents of the state or technical experts. What these competencies involve in practice is less a matter of scientific research and bureaucratic-professional judgment than democratic political debate. There is no more important conversation on our public agenda.

Notes

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Philosophy of Education Society (Southeast Region) Meeting, Gainesville, Florida, February 1983. I would like to thank my friend and colleague J. J. Chambliss for his helpful suggestions.

[1] Jonas Soltis, "Philosophy of Education Since Mid-Century," *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 81, no. 2 (Winter, 1979), p. 128.

[2] William M. Sullivan, *Reconstructing Public Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 9–10.

[3] Lawrence Cremin, "Foreword" in Merle L. Borrowman, Ed., *Teacher Education in America* (New York: Teachers College Pess, 1965), p. viii.

[4] James E. Russell, "Standards of Scholarship and the Professional Spirit in Teachers College," *Columbia University Quarterly*, Vol. 9, no. 3 (June, 1907), p. 278.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 279–280.

[6] John Dewey, "Education as a University Discipline," *Columbia University Quarterly*, Vol. 9, no. 3 (June, 1907), p. 285.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[10] John Dewey, "State or City Control of Schools?" *New Republic*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (March 20, 1915), p. 179.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 180.
[12] John Dewey, "Education as Politics," *New Republic*, Vol. 32, no. 409 (October 4, 1922), p. 140.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[14] George S. Counts, "Break the Teacher-Training Lockstep," *The Social Frontier*, Vol. I, no. 9 (June, 1935), p. 6.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] James B. Conant, *The Education of American Teachers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).
[18] Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Time to Politicize the Schools," *Nation*, Vol. 235, no. 9 (September 25, 1982), pp. 257, 267–271.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 257.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 267
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 269.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 271.
[27] Charles Douglas Lummis, "The Radicalism of Democracy," *Democracy*, Vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall, 1982), pp. 11–12.
[28] John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954), p. 31.

Margins of Precision—Introduction

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The Promise of Objectivity: Realism Vs. Relativism

Logical positivism and the objective certainty it sought has long been out of fashion with philosophers and physical scientists. Social scientists, on the other hand, still seem enamored with positivism and its associated theories such as operationalism and the nomothetic-deductive method of scientific investigation.

In this issue's "Margins of Precision," the possibility of constructing an objective account of the world is again reviewed. Professor Harvey Siegel in his essay "Relativism, Realism and Rightness" champions the cause of objectivism in scientific practice by attacking the relativism of Nelson Goodman. Siegel's choice of opponent is most apropos, since Professor Goodman is singularly the most influential American philosopher to challenge the logical positivist position during its heyday of success. Goodman's persistent attacks on the positivists' attempt to achieve objective certainty in science made the philosophical community recognize that objective ontological certainty in science may well be beyond the reach of human knowing mechanisms.

In books such as *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, *Philosophical Problems and Projects*, *Structure of Appearance*, and *Ways of Worldmaking*, Goodman again and again strikes out at the idea that we humans can construct theories that objectively mirror the arrangement of nature's furniture. Professor Siegel takes up Goodman's challenge directly. While not espousing the position of logical positivism, Siegel assures us that Goodman is wrong in denying both the possibility of epistemic certainty and the possibility of ontological certainty. Siegel believes that it is wrongheaded to deny wholly the experiences of our senses, which testify to the fact that there is an objective world that we humans have systematically learned to describe and manipulate.

In defense of Goodman, Professor Catherine Elgin of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill and Harvard points out that Siegel is guilty of attributing to Goodman far more than Goodman himself espouses. As a result Siegel convicts Goodman of sins he never committed. Goodman does not deny that there is an objective world to be known; rather, he denies merely that we are the sorts of creatures that can know it with certainty. Instead, we construct theories that help us know it well enough that we can then manipulate it for our purposes.

The exchange between Siegel and Elgin is most informative, and it represents the renewal of a debate that is increasingly gaining attention in the scientific and philosophical worlds—and also in the sometimes over-protected world of the social scientist. I think the readers of *J of T* will find in the current "Margins of Precision" an exciting display of philosophical conviction and rigorous argument.

In future editions, "Margins of Precision" will include articles by Max Black, Kurt Baier, Matt Lipman, Chris Lucas, Gareth Matthews, Gerald Gutek, Bill Bondeson, and Fred Finley. The topics will range from current work in professional ethics to science education. We think you will find our essays exciting, state-of-the-art, and characteristic of a truly inter-disciplinary journal.

Margins of Precision—Essay

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Relativism, Realism, and Rightness: Notes on Goodmanian Worldmaking

Nelson Goodman's work is universally regarded as pioneering and fundamental, and his attempts to clarify the nature of induction, symbol systems, art, theorizing, and scientific understanding have received and continue to receive great attention. Central to that work is a view Goodman describes as "radically relativist." Goodman's unusual brand of relativism, however, has yet to be carefully delineated and studied. In this paper I will develop a more detailed and elaborate account of the relativist position Goodman develops in his most recent book, *Ways of Worldmaking*.[1] In *WW*, Goodman conceives of his position as "a radical relativism under rigorous restraints, that eventuates in something akin to irrealism."[2] Goodman's relativism is thus linked with the issue of realism, and in what follows some attention will be paid to this link and to Goodman's espousal of "irrealism." But my main concern will be with relativism. Because Goodman's relativism is significantly different from more traditional accounts of relativism, I will attempt to shed light on Goodmanian relativism by contrasting it with those more traditional accounts. Finally, I will argue that there is a crucial ambiguity in Goodman's portrayal and defense of relativism, having to do with the role of "criteria of rightness" in Goodman's system, and that this ambiguity licenses two quite distinct versions of Goodmanian relativism. I will argue that the weak version of relativism is defensible and important, but that the strong, or "radical," relativist position suffers from a fatal flaw. My hope is that the paper will serve to clarify not only Goodman's position, but epistemological relativism more generally.

A Brief History of the Development of Goodmanian Relativism

Goodman, in *The Structure of Appearance*[3], writes that in his view that structure is not unique; rather, he says, in his characterization of appearance "relativism runs throughout."[4] The relativism that runs throughout *SA* is a *systematizational* one—the view, as one interpreter of Goodman puts it, that

"conflicting systematizations can be found for any prephilosophical subject matter."[5] There is, according to Goodman, no privileged system which has any special priority—epistemological or otherwise—in the task of describing reality. Rather, there may be many purposes for constructing such descriptions, and a system that suits one purpose may well be inferior to another system with respect to some other purpose. Moreover, questions of ontology are relative to system. What is "fundamental" in one system need not be in another. Thus the pursuit of a basic ontology of the world is for Goodman a pointless endeavor.[6] Choice of system is relative to pragmatic considerations. In other words, there is no system-neutral answer to the question "what is there?"[7]

It is important to note that Goodmanian relativism in *SA* does not come to the view that all systems are equally worthwhile. Given pragmatic constraints and specific purposes, one system may, relative to those constraints and purposes, be preferable to another. Thus if one wants a characterization of a theory that does not contain "theoretical" predicates, but does not mind an infinity of axioms, one can characterize the theory by the Craig method; whereas if one's purposes require theoretical predicates but not an infinite number of axioms, then the Craig systematization is less acceptable than some other. In short, it is possible for pragmatic considerations to function as trans-system criteria by which objective evaluations of the worth of alternative systematizations can, relative to those considerations, be made. I shall return to this point below.

Goodmanian relativism is developed further in his essay, "The Way the World Is."[8] Here Goodman makes plain his view that there is no one way the world, or even some small part of the world, is, but rather that there are as many ways the world is as there are true descriptions of it:

> There are very many different equally true descriptions of the world, and their truth is the only standard of their faithfulness. And when we say of them that they all involve conventionalizations, we are saying that no one of these different descriptions is *exclusively* true, since the others are also true. None of them tells us *the* way the world is, but each of them tells us *a* way the world is.
>
> If I were asked what is *the food* for men, I should have to answer "none." For there are many foods. And if I am asked what is the way the world is, I must likewise answer, "none." For the world is many ways. The mystic holds that there is some way the world is and that this way is not captured by any description. For me, there is no way that is the way the world is; and so of course no description can capture it. But there are many ways the world is, and every true description captures one of them. The difference between my friend [the mystic] and me is, in sum, the enormous difference between absolutism and relativism.[9] (Emphasis in original.)

Here Goodmanian relativism again underscores the point that alternative systematizations are possible, and that there is no "privileged" absolutist framework which better serves to organize our descriptions than other frameworks. If a description is true, it describes a way the world is, even though it is made relative to some system or framework.[10] Relativity of framework thus does not preclude

objective characterization of the world. Goodman sees truth here as a system-neutral or trans-system notion by means of which descriptions can be sorted. Truth is, at least in *WWI*, not system-relative, and Goodmanian relativism amounts only to the rejection of any absolute, privileged system in terms of which all descriptions must be made.

So, for the Goodman of *WWI*, there are many ways the world is; many true descriptions of the world. But there are also many ways the world *is not*; many false descriptions of the world. Goodman is here committed to there being system-neutral criteria by which system-relative descriptions of the world can be judged. He is also committed to the notion of a system-independent *world*. If one asks, "Is description *d* true? Is *d* a way the world is?" a "yes" answer to the former necessitates the same answer to the latter. *d* is a way the world is if *d* is a true description. Thus the *WWI* version of Goodmanian relativism countenances talk of "the world." However, later versions of Goodmanian relativism are not so clear on this point.

Ways of Worldmaking: *Irrealism, Rightness, and Relativism*

Ways of Worldmaking is Goodman's most recent articulation of his long-standing view that a fundamental sort of epistemic activity is construction—we *make* things (objects, paintings, theories, etc.) which are both the expression and the object of judgment and understanding. We construct world-versions by manipulating symbols in ways Goodman has long studied.[11] We make worlds in making versions, and right versions afford true descriptions. One is tempted to say "true descriptions *of the world*," but *WW* does not clearly license the locution, for it seems to reject the notion that there is a world except insofar as one is constructed by a right version. We are immediately confronted with the exegetical task of explaining the sense in which Goodman asserts that there are many worlds, all constructed by us "worldmakers." Goodman recognizes the need for attention to this problem on the very first page of *WW*.[12] Unfortunately his attention results in puzzlement, rather than clarification, because Goodman seems to hold that (a) the question "one or many worlds?" is a pseudo-question which "tends to evaporate under analysis,"[13] that (b) there is nevertheless an important sense in which there are many worlds, and that (c) the notion of a single "really real" world which underlies and is described by true descriptions is best forgotten. Since, on the surface at least, these are mutually incompatible, we must probe more deeply.

Irrealism

Do we make worlds, or versions? The answer to this question is, unfortunately, not entirely clear. On the one hand, Goodman takes the strong line that, when we create versions, we create *actual* worlds.[14] On this line, to describe something rightly in terms of a comprehensive system or version is to create the object of that description. On the other hand, Goodman frequently retreats to a weaker position, according to which it is versions (or descriptions or frameworks) which are created, not the worlds which are depicted by those

versions.[15] On yet a third hand, Goodman suggests that this question is not an important one, because the difference between the claims that we create actual worlds and that we create versions is itself merely a difference of convention:

> To speak of worlds as made by versions often offends both by its implicit pluralism and by its sabotage of what I have called 'something stolid underneath.' Let me offer what comfort I can. *While I stress the multiplicity of right world-versions, I by no means insist that there are many worlds—or indeed any*; for as I have already suggested, the question whether two versions are of the same world has as many good answers as there are good interpretations of the words "versions of the same world." The monist can always contend that two versions need only be right to be accounted versions of the same world. The pluralist can always reply by asking what the world is like apart from all versions. . . .
>
> The message, I take it, is simply this: never mind mind, essence is not essential, and matter doesn't matter. We do better to focus on versions rather than worlds.[16]
>
> While we may speak of determining what versions are right as 'learning abut the world,' 'the world' supposedly being that which all right versions describe, all we learn about the world is contained in right versions of it; and while the underlying world, bereft of these, need not be denied to those who love it, it is perhaps on the whole a world well lost.[17]

In these passages Goodman is not denying the existence of a single world, which all right versions describe; nor is he claiming that each right version creates an actual world. Rather, he is claiming that this dichotomy is not an important one and that it is up to us to decide whether our purposes are best served by one way of speaking or the other. This is Goodman's doctrine of "irrealism,"[18] according to which reality itself is relative[19]—to our purposes, and to our habitual ways of seeing and categorizing.

Goodman's irrealism appears to be philosophically motivated by, and to depend upon, his analyses of descriptions and of facts.[20] Goodman has long rejected the given; his constructionalism, his emphasis on our *making* versions, leads him to reject the world as something which exists independently of our descriptions of it:

> If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it is apart from all frames, what can you say? We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described. Our universe, so to speak, consists of these ways rather than of a world or of worlds.[21]

Goodman's point, presumably, is that we cannot describe the world except by offering descriptions of it. There is no descriptionless description of the world. This seems right, and trivially so. But Goodman suggests that it follows from this truism that the world itself (if there be such) comes into being only in virtue of our descriptions of it—or, at least, if a world independent of description can be said to exist, it is not a world worth noting:

> Shouldn't we now return to sanity from all this mad proliferation of worlds? Shouldn't we stop speaking of right versions as if each were, or had, its own world, and recognize all as versions of one and the same neutral and underlying world? The world thus regained . . . is a world without kinds or order or motion or rest or pattern—a world not worth fighting for or against.[22]

This seems to me too hasty. Granted that we cannot note features of the world without describing it thusly, does it follow that the undescribed world is featureless, or that "world" is vacuous? I think not. Our not being able to describe features of the world without describing them does not render those features non-existent, nor does it render them non-important. Goodman has not given us any reason to deny that, e.g., the world had structure or pattern until we came along and described it so. We did not make that structure or pattern; it did not come into existence as our description did. The world can have properties independently of our descriptions of them. We just cannot note them without describing them. Thus, we can grant Goodman both his rejection of the given and his constructionalism while rejecting his irrealism. To return to the penultimate citation of *WW*, we can agree that "we are confined to ways of describing whatever is described," but can nevertheless deny that the universe consists only of those descriptions. We must describe in order to describe; it does not follow that the universe is non-existent or devoid of features until we create its existence or its features by our descriptions.[23]

Goodman seeks to support his irrealist position not only in terms of descriptions, but also (and relatedly) in terms of facts. He argues that facts are *made*, not found, and chides the "fundamentalists" who "know very well that facts are found not made, that facts constitute the one and only real world, and that knowledge consists of believing the fact."[24] According to Goodman facts are made by our making versions. Facts are features of versions, not of the versionless world. Echoing Hanson, one might say that for Goodman facts are "version-laden"[25] in an extreme way: strip away all the features of the version, and nothing "purely factual" remains.[26] We have no choice but to construct versions, which "fabricate" facts; such construction is inescapable if we are to think. Thus there are no version-neutral facts. Facts, rather, are made in our making of versions.

Here Goodman's analysis faces a difficulty similar to the difficulty noted above concerning descriptions. Goodman suggests that to recognize that facts are made is to "give up our futile search for the aboriginal world."[27] Now this could mean one of two things: (a) that we cannot articulate a version-less world, for to articulate is to articulate a version; or (b) that there simply is no version-less world, that the world itself and everything in it comes into being with the bringing of our version of it into being. I take (a) to be akin to the earlier truism that we cannot have a description-less description: we cannot have a version-less version. But this is a much weaker claim than (b), which suggests that there is nothing unless we create it by creating a verision in which it is said to exist. This seems patently absurd—are we to say that the Grand Canyon exists only in virtue of our creating a version which includes it, or that electrons exist in virtue of the

fact that the particle physicists of the last one hundred years or so constructed a version of the atom which included them? Goodman's argument at best supports interpretation (a) of the fabrication of facts doctrine, not the more radical interpretation (b). For what the argument shows is simply that we cannot give an account of the facts in a version-less way. It does not show that the facts themselves (if there be such) are fabricated in our version construction.[28] Our version of the aboriginal world is a version of our making, but it does not follow that the aboriginal world itself is of our making. And, as we have seen, (b) leads to highly implausible claims: for example, that electrons have ontological status only in virtue of the version-construction of the last one hundred or so years; and the big bang, the neutrino, and perhaps quarks in virtue of even more recent construction. As Scheffler suggests, Goodman "mistakes a feature of discourse for a feature of the subject of discourse."[29] That is, he argues that we construct versions, therefore we construct the subject of versions. Goodman seems to suggest that this mistake is not properly construed as a mistake, since we give the subjects of versions the features they have in creating those versions: "The uniformity of nature we marvel at or the unreliability we protest belongs to a world of our own making."[30] It seems a mistake nonetheless; a mistake, in fact, that Goodman elsewhere recognizes as such.[31]

In his recent reply to Scheffler,[32] Goodman acknowledges the difference between a right version and its world—"A version that there is a star up there is not itself bright or far off, and the star is not made up of letters"[33]—and yet insists nonetheless that we make worlds in making versions. He writes:

> Scheffler contends that we cannot have made the stars. I ask him which features of the stars we did not make, and challenge him to state how these differ from features clearly dependent on discourse. Does he ask how we can have made anything older than we are? Plainly, by making a space and time that contains those stars.[34]

Taking up Goodman's challenge, let us say that the stars' evolution is a feature of stars that we did not make. We do not make stars collapse, explode, turn red, etc. Such evolutionary activity has, we think, been going on for a much longer time than worldmakers like us have been around to describe it. Have we then *made* a time-span long enough for stellar evolution to take place, as Goodman suggests? Here we come face to face with the difficulty, highlighted by Scheffler, of Goodman's discussion. For what we make in our development of a conception of time is the *conception*, not the time. Goodman's talk of making worlds obscures the distinction between conception (or description) and thing conceived (or described), despite his honoring the distinction in the penultimate citation. When making worlds we make conceptions, not objects conceived. Thus to return to Scheffler's original point, Goodman needs to construe worldmaking as versional, not objectual. In any case, Goodman's response to Scheffler here seems inadequate to defuse Scheffler's complaint.

There are some additional, related problems with Goodman's "irrealism" that deserve brief mention. First, given the necessity of operating from some conceptual framework and, in addition, a fair degree of arbitrariness as to the

categories, predicates, etc. that the framework employs, it has not been shown that objective description of the world cannot be had. That is, granting for the sake of argument both the arbitrariness and the multiplicity of schemes and systems, objective description of the world remains a possibility. The point is well made by Geoffrey Hellman:

> . . . why is it insufficient to grant the Kantian point concerning conceptualization, but hold to the view that *by means* of a certain, in many ways arbitrary, selection and organization process we achieve objective reference and prediction *in a language*, and that no further relativization is called for; and that truly to describe the world, of necessity from within a certain framework, way of taking, etc., is as objective an enterprise as any realist requires?[35] (Emphasis in original.)

In short, despite appearances to the contrary, Goodman's specific theses concerning versions, construction, fabrication, etc. are entirely compatible with realism, and so his irrealism does not follow from those theses. As we noted earlier with respect to the Goodmanian relativism of *WWI*, relativity of framework does not preclude objective characterization of the world, here understood as the "one real world" of the realist.

Second, realism (the existence of the one real world of the realist) serves an *explanatory* purpose. It explains why so many of our versions are the same in so many respects; it accounts for what Hempel refers to as "the stubbornness of facts" which are not determined by version themselves and which themselves determine (in part) the acceptability of various versions. Indeed, it explains our conviction that scientific versions, at any rate, are *empirical*—a conviction not readily made sense of along Goodmanian lines.[36] *Sans* realism, then, the challenge becomes: How to explain what realism explains. How is it, for example, that without exception all versions of boiling water have it boiling at (the equivalent of) 212 degrees Fahrenheit and turning into steam, not milk or cement? It is not clear that the irrealist can provide explanations here.

Third, Goodman appears to have assumed realism in order to argue against it. For example, Goodman's argument for the "fabrication of facts" thesis depends heavily on the results of Paul Kolers's experiments concerning apparent motion.[37] But if that thesis rests on those experiments, then those experiments, and in particular the results of those experiments, had better have been as Goodman reports. Otherwise, we have no good reason for taking them seriously, and so, no good reason for adopting the thesis which depends upon them. In short, Goodman's argument for the "non-factualness" of facts appears to depend on there being a fact of the matter concerning certain experimental events and results. The difficulty for Goodman's position here is both patent and serious: those lights had better have flashed as Kolers described them if Goodman's argument for "fabrication" is to be persuasive—but if we take the flashes as factual, then the argument seems to be undermined. Goodman must explain how it is that experimental results which are themselves fabrications (and so not factual in the "fundamentalist's" sense) should have any more force in shaping versions than alternative, incompatible fabrications.

These considerations raise an obvious question: why take Goodman's version, according to which facts are fabricated and the world of the realist well lost, seriously? Goodman raises the question himself when he writes "My outline of the facts concerning the fabrication of facts is of course itself a fabrication."[38] But Goodman is emphatic in rejecting the conclusion that since his outline of the facts is a fabrication, it is no more worthy than any other fabrication. On the contrary, Goodman is insistent that it is not his view that "everything goes":

> Willingness to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as good as short ones, [or] that truths are no longer distinguished from falsehoods. . . .[39]

So versions can be true or false, right or wrong; even though truth or rightness cannot be conceived as "correspondence with a ready-made world,"[40] still there are standards of rightness which it now becomes crucial to uncover and articulate. This becomes the central task of Goodman's inquiry:

> We must, then, inquire into the standards, compatible with such multiplicity [of worlds], of rightness of renderings of all sorts, in all media, in symbol systems of every variety. This strikes me as one of the most pressing problems of present-day philosophy . . .[41]

So Goodman's irrealism leads to a consideration of standards of rightness. For, given that we create worlds (or versions), Goodman is centrally interested in distinguishing genuine from spurious worlds, true from false descriptions, right from wrong versions. The standards of rightness Goodman seeks constitute the "rigorous restraints" on his "radical relativism." The task now is to come to grips with rightness.

Rightness

The first thing to note is that rightness cannot be construed as truth. A version may be right but not true; incompatible versions may both be right; and to some right versions standards of truth are not even applicable: "Truth is often inapplicable, is seldom sufficient, and must sometimes give way to competing criteria."[42] The competing criteria are, of course, criteria of rightness, which outstrip considerations of truth:

> . . . with our view of worldmaking expanded far beyond denotation even, to include versions and visions metaphorical as well as literal, pictorial and mystical as well as describing and depicting, the distinction between right and wrong versions.[43]

How then do we so distinguish? What are the "standards of acceptability"[44] which sometimes supplement, sometimes compete with, and sometimes replace considerations of truth in determining the acceptability of versions? Goodman's enigmatic solution is fit:[45]

> A statement is true, and a description or representation right, for a world if fits.[46]

> . . . truth of statements and rightness of descriptions, representations, exemplifications, expressions . . . is primarily a matter of fit: fit to what is referred to in one way or another, or to other renderings or to modes and manners of organization.[47]

Rightness most generally is "a matter of fit with practice."[48] Rightness of categorization is a matter of that categorization successfully organizing practice; rightness of deductive inference is a matter of fit with deductive practice; and similarly for rightness of inductive inference and sampling technique.[49] Likewise, the rightness of a painting, or a novel, or a dance, or a simple descriptive statement, is also a matter of fit with practice:

> Whether a picture is rightly designed or a statement correctly describes is tested by examination and reexamination of the picture or statement and what it refers to in one way or another, by trying its fit in varied applications and with other patterns and statement.[50]

I must confess that I find Goodman's discussion of "fit" somewhat obscure, and not without its difficulties. What is it to "fit with practice"? Even if we assume that this notion is clear, does it not give too much weight to practice? Surely there are cases in which what fits, fits into a practice which is itself open to challenge. In such cases, where the fit is good but the practice not, it seems inappropriate to label such versions "right." Consider, for example, a mathematical proof challenged on intuitionist grounds: the proof fits standard deductive practice, but that practice is itself challenged by the intuitionist. Is it not question-begging against the intuitionist to call the proof right, even though it "fits with practice"? Or consider the ill-informed auto mechanic in some remote part of the globe, whose garage is equipped with air compressor and some pneumatic hand tools, but not the pneumatic "gun" for removing/fastening lug nuts when changing tires. Her practice is of removing lug nuts by hand. She hears of, and adopts, a new wrench which improves leverage, and so makes such removal easier. Is the new method right? According to Goodman's discussion, it is—even though the original practice is in obvious need of the pneumuatic gun, in the advent of which the new wrench would be otiose. Here again it seems unfortunate to label a version which fits with practice "right," when the practice itself is open to challenge and improvement. Indeed, it seems that anything can be right in that it can be seen to fit some practice, if we are only perverse enough, or liberal enough, in our consideration of practices. Of course Goodman allows that practice and habit can be amended and improved.[51] But how do we know what constitutes improvement? In order to make such assessments, we must be able to criticize practices—for Goodman, presumably, this would be done in terms of our purposes—but then our purposes must themselves be subject to critical assessment, or else our perverse purposes would sanction our perverse practices. Moreover, to appeal to some criterion for assessing practices is to unhinge Goodman's analysis of rightness in terms of fit with practice, for that practice itself must then be right in order for fit with it to count as a condition of rightness.[52]

So I am not satisfied that Goodman's account of rightness is adequate for his purposes. At a minimum, much more needs to be said concerning rightness and fit for these notions to do the work Goodman wants them to do in his system.[53] However, whatever the inadequacies in Goodman's account of rightness, I propose to ignore them from here on in, for the most interesting questions raised by this account involve its relation to Goodman's thesis of "radical relativism under rigorous restraints." It is to a consideraton of Goodmanian relativism that we now turn.

Relativism

Goodman's version of relativism (henceforth *GR*) is a unique and perplexing one. He calls it a radical relativism, which it seems to be, based as it is on his theses that facts are fabricated; that worlds are made, not found; and that contrary versions, conflicting truths, and unreconcilable theories can all be right.[54] Truth itself is relative, on Goodman's current picture,[55] as is rightness.[56] This is a radical relativism, in which, it seems, anything goes. But Goodman places "rigorous restraints" on relativism, and emphatically denies that anything goes:

> That right versions and actual worlds are many does not obliterate the distinction between right and wrong versions, does not recognize merely possible worlds answering to wrong versions, and does not imply that all right alternatives are equally good for every or indeed for any purpose.[57]

> . . . but severe restraints are imposed. Willingness to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as good as short ones, [or] that truths are no longer distinguished from falsehoods. . . . The multiple worlds I countenance are just the actual worlds made by and answering to true or right versions. Worlds possible or impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no place in my philosophy.[58]

Here *GR* seems not radical at all, since "what goes" must meet Goodman's criteria of rightness. The restraints on acceptable versions are indeed rigorous and severe.

Or are they? *GR* is restrained by criteria of rightness, but rightness is itself relative and a version can be right in one system but wrong in another. Rightness is relative to system. Systems themselves are neither true nor false, right nor wrong; they are judged solely in terms of their "efficacy in worldmaking,"[59] and efficacy is itself relative to system. So rightness is relative to system, and systems cannot be wrong. If any version can be right, given an appropriate system, and if there are no constraints on appropriate systems save our ingenuity in concocting system-relative "efficacious" ones, then doesn't "everything go"? Do Goodman's restraints dissolve, so that *GR* is an extreme and radical relativism after all?

I will argue that *GR* admits of both a weak and a strong (radical) version. The radical version of *GR* is untenable, for it succumbs to difficulties of a general sort, which defeat any radically relativist view. The task at hand is to clarify *GR*—to delineate the weak and strong versions of *GR*—and to assess those

versions. This task will be facilitated by comparing *GR* with the relativism of Thomas Kuhn.

As is well known, Kuhn's view (despite his disclaimers[60])is widely regarded as a relativistic one. Kuhn's view is taken to be relativistic in that it holds that the acceptance of one theory over another has nothing to do with evaluation according to neutral, objective criteria of evaluation. Proponents of competing paradigms each judge their own paradigm to be superior to its rivals, according to criteria their own paradigm dictates. Consequently, a given paradigm (P_1) is held to be superior according to the criteria dictated by P_1, by the proponents of P_1; while a rival paradigm (P_2) is held to be superior according to the criteria dictated by P_2, by the proponents of P_2. This renders paradigm-evaluation relativistic in the following sense: which paradigm is judged to be superior depends on which set of criteria of evaluation one judges by. P_1 is superior relative to the criteria dictated by P_1, but not relative to those dictated by P_2. P_2 is superior relative to the criteria dictated by P_2, but not relative to those dictated by P_1. Since Kuhn argues that there are no neutral criteria available, evaluation is therefore relative to the criteria, hence the paradigm, appealed to. This is the sense in which his view is relativistic.

Kuhn's is a classic "radical" relativism. Evaluation can be done only from within some framework; there simply is no ground for neutrally evaluating alternative frameworks or paradigms. Evaluation of paradigms, and claims more generally, is thus inevitably and inescapably relative. For Kuhn, this result follows straightforwardly from incommensurability, which ultimately comes to the thesis that there are no neutral criteria by which paradigms (or systems, or frameworks) can themselves be judged.[61] In short: incommensurability implies relativism.

If Kuhn's relativism is classic, so is the standard objection to it.[62] Let us formulate the radical relativist (called hereafter *RR*) thesis as follows:

> (*RR*) For any knowledge-claim *p*, *p* can be evaluated (assessed, established, etc.) only according to (with reference to) a set of background principles and criteria of evaluation $C_1 \ldots C_n$; and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles and criteria $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$, there is no neutral (that is, neutral with respect to the two [or more] alternative sets of principles and criteria) way of choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in evaluating *p*.

It immediately follows from *RR* that if *p* is evaluated differently according to the two different sets of principles and criteria—that is, for example, if *p* is true (probably true, highly confirmed) according to $C_1 \ldots C_n$, but false (probably false, poorly confirmed) according to $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$—there is no way to evaulate these conflicting evaluations. *p* is true relative to $C_1 \ldots C_n$, and false relative to $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$. Since there is no neutral way of evaluating $C_1 \ldots C_n$ *vis-a-vis* $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$, there is no neutral way of evaluating conflicting evaluations of *p*. Such evaluations (of *p*) can only be carried out relative to one or another set of principles and criteria of evaluation.

The problem with *RR* is simple and straightforward: it leads to a *reductio*. If *RR* is true, then (by substituting *RR* for *p* in the original formulation):

> (*RR'*) For any knowledge-claim *RR*, *RR* can be evaluated (assessed, established, etc.) only according to (with reference to) a set of background principles and criteria of evaluation $C_1 \ldots C_n$; and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles and criteria $C_1' \ldots C_n'$, there is no neutral (that is, neutral with respect to the two [or more] alternative sets of principles and criteria) way of choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in evaluating *RR*.

If *RR* is true, then, as *RR'* states, *RR* is itself relative to alternative, and equally legitimate, sets of background principles and criteria of evaluation. Since these alternative sets will suggest differing evaluations of *RR*, and since there is no way to pick one evaluation neutrally over and against any others, it follows that, if *RR* is true, then *RR*'s truth will vary according to the principles and criteria by which *RR* is evaluated. In particular, it follows that if, according to some set of criteria $C_1 \ldots C_n$, *RR* is judged to be false (probably false, poorly confirmed), then if *RR* is true, (at least according to that set of criteria $C_1 \ldots C_n$) *RR* is false.

The *reductio* can be generalized as follows: Assume (radical) relativism correct. Then the relativist position has strong, indeed compelling justification—it is a rationally justifiable position. Justification involves good reasons. But good reasons cannot be biased or non-neutral or arbitrary or framework-bound (by definition of "good reason"). Therefore, if we are justified in holding that relativism is correct, there must be some non-arbitrary, neutral, "absolute" framework or ground from which we can make that judgment. Thus relativism, which denies the possibility of such a framework, is incorrect. In short, if relativism is true, it must have a non-relativistic ground, which possibility it denies. Thus relativism, if true, is false. Thus, relativism is false.[63]

For the Kuhnian relativist, then, for whom relativism results from incommensurability (understood as a lack of neutral criteria by which to judge alternative claims or versions), the *reductio* just sketched is a powerful refutation. In fact, the radical relativist seems to be at a loss even to articulate her position, since she seems to have to assert that it is non-relatively the case that relativism is true. Here relativism of the sort we have been considering collapses into incoherence.[64]

To regain the thread of the present study: to what extent is Goodman a relativist of the Kuhnian sort, and so subject to the *reductio*? Is *GR* self-defeating? For Goodman, is it possible to "commense," i.e., to neutrally compare and evaluate alternative versions?

Goodmanian Relativism

Our answers to these questions will turn on the status of criteria of rightness in Goodman's view. Radical relativism ultimately fails because of its denial of neutral criteria by which alternative claims or versions can be judged. Does

Goodman similarly deny the existence of such criteria? Unfortunately, there is a systematic ambiguity in *WW* which makes a straightforward answer to this question impossible. *WW* actually gives us *two* relativisms: a weak one (henceforth GR_1) according to which there are version-neutral criteria of rightness by which alternative versions can be judged; and a strong one (GR_2) according to which criteria of rightness are version-bound. Goodman thinks rightness is relative because alternative contrary versions can be right in different systems:

> . . . Rightness of design and truth of statement are alike relative to system: a design that is wrong in Raphael's world may be right in Seurat's, much as a description of the stewardess' motion that is wrong from the control tower may be right from the passenger's seat. . . .[65]

As he stresses thoughout *WW*, though, this does not mean that "everything goes": given a system, a version's rightness is an objective matter,[66] determinable by appeal to criteria of rightness.[67] Thus versions can be wrong as well as right. Criteria of rightness are taken here to be version- and system-neutral, and so capable of guiding the objective evaluation of versions. This I want to call GR_1, or weak relativism, for in no way does it preclude objective evaluation. On the contrary, it explicitly aims for such evaluation. According to GR_1, there are many ways the world is; many true descriptions of the world. But there are also many ways that the world *is not*; many false descriptions of the world. Moreover, thanks to recourse to criteria of rightness, we can differentiate between right and wrong, and true and false, versions. Goodman here wants to say: "Since we are relativists about the appropriateness of alternative frameworks, and the truth of alternative versions, it is important to worry about and try to establish general criteria for determining the rightness of versions." GR_1, then, in its acknowledgement of version-neutral criteria by which versions can be judged, is a relativism of a much weaker sort than the relativism stemming, e.g., from Kuhn's incommensurability thesis.[68]

If this were all Goodman said about relativism, there would be no problem with *GR*. But there is a problem yet to be dealt with. As we have seen, Goodman escapes a Kuhnian radical relativism with *GR*, because according to GR_1 there are version- and system-neutral criteria of rightness by which versions can be objectively evaluated. However, can Goodman consistently hold that his criteria of rightness are in the relevant sense neutral? It appears that he cannot.

The crucial point is that the argument formulated in *WW* is itself a version concerning versions, systems, facts, etc. *WW* presents, we might say, a meta-version: a version of versions. In Goodman's meta-version, there are version-neutral criteria of rightness by which versions can be judged. But, as Goodman recognizes, his meta-version is itself only one of countless possible meta-versions.[69] So the restraints on radical relativism which keep it from being the case that "everything goes" in GR_1 are themselves relative to Goodman's meta-version. Relativity of versions re-arises at the level of meta-version. In short, it is not the case that in Goodman's meta-version "everything goes." And since Goodman allows that his is only one among incompatible meta-versions, he must also allow the equal legitimacy of meta-versions with alternative criteria

of rightness, as well as meta-versions with no criteria of rightness at all. Thus Goodman's criteria of rightness cannot stand, as in GR_1, as version-neutral criteria. Rather, those criteria are relative to Goodman's meta-version, and alternative, incompatible meta-versions, which do not recognize Goodman's criteria, must be countenanced.

But of course if those alternatives are countenanced, then the rightness of versions is relative to the criteria of rightness (if there be such) employed by the meta-version from which the judgment of rightness is made. Alternative meta-versions will license alternative judgments of rightness. Some may even deny the legitimacy or meaningfulness of such judgments. And on Goodman's view all such meta-versions must be countenanced.

Thus on Goodman's meta-version a version cannot simply be right "for a world it fits,"[70] for whether or not it fits, and indeed whether or not fitness is the proper determiner of rightness, depends on the meta-version one judges from. Goodman is thus committed to a radical relativism according to which neutral evaluation of versions is impossible. This strong or radical form of *GR*—call it GR_2—is very much like the Kuhnian relativism discussed earlier. For if criteria of rightness are relative, then, while in Goodman's version it is not the case that everything goes, it nevertheless remains that in rival versions anything might go, and in any case there will be no way to judge meta-versions, and so no way to choose from among incompatible judgments of rightness which flow from incompatible meta-versions. Thus the fundamentalist, the Goodmanian, and anyone else with a meta-version will be on an equal footing with respect to judgments of rightness.

Goodman presumbaly wants to say that his meta-version is *right*—not just in the sense that it satisfies his criteria of rightness, but that it is in some sense cognitively superior to rival meta-versions. The problem is that he cannot say this, given his meta-version's insistence that countless alternative and conflicting meta-versions must be recognized as legitimate and cannot be appropriately evaluated by appeal to the criteria of evaluation of his own meta-version.[71]

Of course Goodman does not want this to be the upshot of his meta-version. He thinks his meta-version is better than the fundamentalist's. Nevertheless, once it is recognized that his meta-version is itself a version, his account of criteria of rightness is only one among countless incompatible alternatives. By his own scheme, those restraints, those criteria cannot be seen as version-neutral, but rather must be seen as part of his meta-version—and so cannot non-question-beggingly pick out his version as right. Radical relativism, Goodman style (GR_2), remains.

Besides the problem just noted, there are additional difficulties with GR_2. First, it succumbs to the *reductio* discussed earlier in connection with Kuhn. If all meta-versions are on an equal footing, according to GR_2, then meta-versions which are incompatible with GR_2, and which hold that all meta-versions are not on an equal footing, are to be taken as seriously as GR_2. Thus if GR_2 is right with respect to the status of alternative meta-versions, it is wrong from the perspective of those same alternatives. Second, it is not clear that GR_2 can be even coherently articulated. Goodman, in order to defend GR_2, seems to have to say that it is

version-neutrally the case that rightness is relative to versions. But this is incoherent, since if rightness is relative to versions, it cannot be the case that this particular claim is itself version-neutrally right (or true). Indeed, it is not even clear that we can refer to versions or systems as we have been doing, since, given GR_2, what counts as a version or system must depend on some meta-version.[72] Thus here again the simple articulability of GR_2 is problematic.

If GR_2 is impossible to articulate, let alone defend, what shall we say of Goodman's efforts in *WW* to provide a radical relativist position? The answer is clear: Goodman can escape the difficulties of GR_2 by retreating to GR_1. Since GR_1 is a position he wants to hold, all Goodman need do is patch up his system to avoid its yielding GR_2. He needs to avoid the dissolution of the "rigorous restraints" he has placed upon his relativism. That dissolution and its avoidance depend entirely on the status of those restraints: namely, the status of Goodman's criteria of rightness. If those criteria are taken to be version-bound, then the unacceptable GR_2 results, and the rigorous restraints on relativism collapse. But if those criteria are taken to be version-neutral and to afford the possibility of objective evaluation of versions, then GR_1 results. This weaker sort of relativism avoids the self-destructive character of GR_2. Goodman needs to take more seriously his own view that criteria of rightness afford the possibility of objective evaluation of versions.

This last point becomes obvious if we consider for a moment the nature of criteria. What is it to be a criterion? A necessary condition of something's successfully functioning as a criterion is that it discriminate or differentiate between items which meet it and items which do not. A dictionary can serve as a criterion of correct spelling at a spelling bee only because it can discriminate between words spelled correctly (i.e., spelled as the dictionary spells them) and words spelled incorrectly. Similarly, the U.S.D.A.'s criteria for meat-grading function as criteria because they can consistently and routinely differentiate between cuts which are "prime," "choice," "standard," "commerical," "utility," "cutter," and "canner" (in terms of fat content, degree of marbleization, tenderness, juiciness, flavor, etc.). So, a putative criterion purports to discriminate or differentiate, a successfully functioning criterion does so. Consider now Goodman's criteria of rightness. In GR_2, they fail to discriminate between right versions and wrong versions, since at best they do so only from the perspective of Goodman's meta-version, and according to GR_2 alternative contrary meta-versions, which may yield alternative judgments of rightness (or deny the legitimacy of the category altogether), are to be equally countenanced. This is analogous to our judging a spelling bee by appealing to a dictionary which countenances all spellings of every word, or to our grading a piece of meat by appealing to a grading system that allows any piece of meat to be of any grade. In all these cases, the purported criteria fail to discriminate, and so fail to function successfully as criteria. We could say, then, that in GR_2 Goodman's criteria of rightness fail to discriminate between right and wrong versions, and so fail to constitute rigorous restraints upon relativism. Goodman's criteria of rightness, in short, do not meet the criteria of criteria: they do not discriminate or differentiate, and so do not function successfully as criteria. Another way to put

the point is that criteria must be taken to be version-neutral in order to have any force *as criteria* at all.

Goodman clearly wants his criteria of rightness to afford a means of legitimate evaluation of versions. He does not want to be committed to the view that "everything goes," that all versions are equally acceptable. This undesired (and undesirable) result follows if we understand *GR* as GR_2, but it is avoided if we take *GR* as GR_1. Goodman has opined that he views inquiry "into the standards . . . of rightness of renderings of all sorts . . . as one of the most pressing problems of present day philosophy . . . ."[73] If so, he had better be advocating GR_1. For if he is advocating GR_2, general standards of rightness are in principle unachievable. Holding to GR_2 undermines the inquiry into standards of rightness that Goodman regards as centrally important.

Putnam, in his commentary on *WW*,[74] recognizes the problem for Goodman here. He worries about the case in which "right" means "right for me," and notes the possibility of a culture's holding a radically relativist position (as Putnam says, "the young in California *do* say 'true for me' ").[75] And in his closing he urges Goodmanians to avoid the radical relativist position and to work toward the establishment of "rigorous standards for distinguishing right from wrong."[76] However, in his reply to Putnam, Goodman resists Putnam's attempt to short-circuit GR_2. He writes, "standards of credibility do not vary with individual opinion; they are constant in the world of worlds sketched in my book but may vary from one world of worlds to another."[77] Here Goodman wants the impossible. For if standards may vary from one world of worlds—i.e., meta-version—to another, then they may well vary with individual opinion. At least, they will if individuals espouse alternative meta-versions (worlds of worlds). In short, if meta-versions can vary with individual opinion, so, contrary to Goodman, can standards of credibility and of rightness. Thus, Goodman's reply does not alleviate Putnam's worry[78] discussed above.

Conclusion

It must be enphasized that (at least in some passages) Goodman does take his constraints on relativism seriously, and so rejects the sort of (Kuhnian) radical relativism in which "anything goes." In contrast with Kuhn, Goodman does not regard alternative versions as incomparable.[79] This Goodman—the Goodman of GR_1—I regard as an ally in the battle against radical relativism. My aim in this paper, however, is to point out that other passages of *WW* seem to commit Goodman to the sort of radical relativism (i.e. GR_2) that he elsewhere rejects, and to argue that this latter sort of relativism is subject to the same sorts of difficulties as other forms of radical relativism. There is a tension in *WW* between relativisms of different strains and strengths. It is this ambiguity in *GR* which I have endeavored to point out; I have argued, in addition, that while one strand of *GR* is perfectly defensible, the other is not. It is this latter strand that has been the focus of my critical comments. The object of my criticism is not Goodmanian relativism as such, but only the radical form of it (GR_2) which aligns *GR* with other untenable versions of radical relativism.

If what has been said thus far is correct, then Goodman had best be advocating GR_1, not GR_2. GR_1, which is a pluralist rather than a radical relativist position, is sufficient to underwrite Goodman's central investigations into version-making through symbols and the general nature of symbol systems. In fact, Goodman had better hold GR_1, and not GR_2, if he wishes to investigate the nature of general standards of rightness of renderings, since, as we have seen, on GR_2 such standards are impossible to substantiate.

WW is without doubt a rich and suggestive book, and is certain to spur research along the lines of Goodman's philosophical project. Nevertheless, as it stands there are specific difficulties with Goodman's rendition of irrealism, rightness, and relativism which call for rigorous restraint in affirming the rightness of Goodman's rendering.[80]

Notes

[1] Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1978). Henceforth referred to as *WW*.

[2] *WW*, p. x.

[3] Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance*, Third Edition (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977). First published in 1951. Henceforth referred to as *SA*.

[4] *SA*, p. xiii.

[5] Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," *Synthese* 45 (1980), pp. 201–209. Citation is from p. 201.

[6] Thus Goodman's ontological relativism differs markedly from Quine's, since for Quine there *is* a privileged system, namely that of physical theory, and so a basic (though relative) ontology, namely that of current physical theory.

[7] *SA*, pp. 99–104.

[8] "The Way the World Is" (henceforth referred to as *WWI*), reprinted in Nelson Goodman, *Problems and Projects* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp. 24–32 (henceforth referred to as *PP*). Originally published in *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 14 (1960), pp. 48–56.

[9] *WWI*, pp. 30–31.

[10] Goodman does not claim (rightly, I think) that truth is itself a criterion by which descriptions are judged. Rather, truth for Goodman is the upshot of a description's meeting various other criteria. Goodman does not offer a special analysis of criteria of truth, so far as I am aware (though he does discuss tests of truth in *WW*, chapter 7). Indeed, if I understand him, there can be no such criteria (*of* truth), but only criteria of, e.g., credibility, or simplicity, such that, if a description met those criteria, that fact would tend to point to that description's being true.

[11] In addition to *WW*, cf. also Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

[12] Chapter One of *WW* is Goodman's essay, "Words, Works, Worlds," originally published in *Erkenntnis* 9 (1975), pp. 57–73 (henceforth *WWW*).

[13] *WW*, p. 2.

[14] *WW*, p. 2; "Replies," *Erkenntnis* 12, 1 (1978), p. 159.

[15] *WW*, p. 4.

[16] *WW*, p. 96. Emphasis added. Cf. also p. 119.

[17] *WW*, p. 4.

[18] *WW*, p. x.

[19] *WW*, pp. 20–21. In fact, in his response to Hempel ("On Starmaking," *Synthese* 45 [1980], p. 214), Goodman writes: "In the Foreword [to *WW*], realism and idealism, empiricism

and rationalism, and many another doctrine are dismissed in favor of what I call irrealism, which is not one more doctrine—does not say that everything or indeed anything is unreal—but is rather an attitude of unconcern with most issues between such doctrines."

[20] In what follows I am indebted to Israel Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman."

[21] *WW*, pp. 2–3. Cf. also *PP*, pp. 3, 9.

[22] *WW*, p. 20.

[23] A similar objection is raised by Hartry Field with reference to Putnam's "internal realism," a doctrine very much akin to Goodman's irrealism. Cf. Field, "Realism and Relativism," *Journal of Philosophy* LXXIX, 1982, pp. 553–567, esp. pp. 555–557.

[24] *WW*, p. 91.

[25] *WW*, pp. 96–97.

[26] *WW*, p. 118.

[27] *WW*, p. 100.

[28] Cf. Field, "Realism and Relativism."

[29] Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," p. 205.

[30] *WW*, p. 10.

[31] *PP*, p. 24. Noted in Scheffler, "The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman," note 6, p. 209.

[32] Goodman, "On Starmaking," pp. 212–213.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 212. Goodman discusses this problem in his "Notes on the Well-Made World," *Erkenntnis* 19 (1983), pp. 99–107. While his discussion here "reaffirmed some of [the] paradoxes" of *WW* (*WW*, p. 99), it does not help to avoid the difficulties delineated herein.

[34] Nelson Goodman, "On Starmaking," p. 213.

[35] Geoffrey Hellman, "Introduction" to *SA*, p. xlii.

[36] Carl G. Hempel, "Comments on Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*," *Synthese* 45 (1980), pp. 193–199. Cf. also Richard N. Boyd, "On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism," *Erkenntnis* 19, 1983, pp. 45–90. In this and the next paragraph I am indebted to discussions with Corrine Bedecarre, whose boiling water example I borrow.

[37] *WW*, chapters 5 and 6.

[38] *WW*, p. 107.

[39] *WW*, p. 94.

[40] *WW*, p. 94.

[41] Nelson Goodman, "Replies," *Erkenntnis* 12, 1, 1978, p. 159.

[42] *WW*, p. 107.

[43] *WW*, p. 109.

[44] *WW*, p. 110.

[45] It is perhaps worth pointing out the affinities between Goodman's discussion of "fit" and that of Hilary Putnam, in *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[46] *WW*, p. 132.

[47] *WW*, p. 138.

[48] *WW*, p. 138.

[49] *WW*, pp. 125–40.

[50] *WW*, p. 139.

[51] *WW*, pp. 128, 135–37.

[52] I am here challenging Goodman's account of justification in terms of mutual accommodation of theory and practice (which Rawls labels "reflective equilibrium"). Cf. Goodman, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), fourth edition, pp. 62–66.

[53] It must be noted that Goodman presents his discussion of rightness as tentative and preliminary. Consequently my remarks here should be taken as a call for further clarification, rather than as a final critique of a fully worked-out position.

[54] *WW*, pp. 109–10.

[55] Note that the relativity of truth held in *WW* is a shift from the view put forth in *WWI* that truth is not relative.

[56] *WW*, p. 139.

[57] The point is formulated slighly differently in its original presentation in *WWW*, pp. 70–71.

[58] *WW*, p. 94.

[59] *WW*, p. 129.

[60] Cf. my "Objectivity, Rationality, Incommensurability, and More," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 31 (1980), pp. 359–375, from which the following paragraph in the text is largely taken (p. 368).

[61] Cf. Harvey Siegel, "Objectivity, Rationality, Incommensurability, and More."

[62] The following two paragraphs are taken from "Epistemological Relativism in its Latest Form," *Inquiry* 23 (1980), pp. 115–116.

[63] It must be pointed out that the *reductio* does not unfairly assume the existence of absolute criteria. It rather points out that the relativist must appeal to such criteria in order to make the case for relativism. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of relativism's coherence, cf. my "Relativism, Truth, and Incoherence," (unpublished).

[64] Cf. Roger Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), chapter 1, and Harvey Siegel, "Objectivity, Rationality, Incommensurability and More."

[65] *WW*, p. 139.

[66] *WW*, p. 139.

[67] Cf. Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, p. 123.

[68] Cf. Geoffrey Hellman, "Introduction" to *SA*, pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.

[69] *WW*, p. 107.

[70] *WW*, p. 132.

[71] There is an additional difficulty here, which underscores the problematic nature of Goodman's criterion of "fit." For suppose we could somehow overcome the problem just noted, and figure out a way for Goodman to claim that his meta-version is cognitively superior to or espistemically more worthy than rival meta-versions. Any argument in support of this claim would depend on the criteria his meta-version sets out, i.e. on his meta-version's "fit with practice." But (a) his meta-version in fact does *not* fit well, since our practice includes many assumptions of "absolutism"—we typically act, for example, as if there *is* a real world which exists independently of us and our versions, and that there are facts of the matter with respect to all sorts of questions and matters which might be found, but are not made, by us. Moreover (b) this just-mentioned fact illustrates the difficulty (noted earlier) stemming from the emphasis and weight Goodman's criteria put on fit with *practice*. For Goodman should want to hold, in arguing for the worthiness and preferability of his meta-version, that if his meta-version does not fit with our practice, it may nevertheless *still be right* or preferable to meta-versions which more closely fit our practice. Thus practice must itself admit of evaluation, in terms other than fit with itself, or else new practices and new views (such as Goodman's) could never turn out to be rationally preferable to or superior to their ancestors.

[72] This last point is well made in Geoffrey Hellman, "Introduction" to *SA*, p. xlii.

[73] Nelson Goodman, "Replies," *Erkenntnis* 12 (1978), p. 159. Cf. also *WW*, p. 107.

[74] Hilary Putnam, "Reflections on Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*," *Journal of Philosophy* LXXVI, 1979, pp. 603–618.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 617.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 618, citing *WW*, footnote, pp. 109–110.

[77] Goodman, "Credence, Credibility, Comprehension," *Journal of Philosophy* LXXVI, 1979, pp. 618–619. Citation is from p. 619.

[78] In his fuller reply to Putnam ("On Starmaking," pp. 211–212), Goodman extends the just-cited quote, and concludes that "Relativity goes all the way up." (p. 211) Here again

Goodman needlessly invites the difficulties that plague GR_2. If relativity occurs at the meta-level, then his rigorous restraints on radical relativism dissolve.

[79] I am grateful to Catherine Z. Elgin for reminding me of this.

[80] I am grateful to Nicolas Burbules, Catherine Z. Elgin, Sophie Haroutunian, Geoffrey Hellman, Edward Mooney, Dennis Phillips, Israel Scheffler, Anthony Stigliano, and Joseph Ullian for insightful commentary on and incisive criticism of earlier drafts of this paper. I must emphatically point out that my expression of gratitude should not be taken as an indication of these commentators' endorsement of the substantive theses advanced above.

For a short discussion with a somewhat similar focus see my "Goodmanian Relativism," forthcoming in *The Monist*.

Margins of Precision—Response to the Essay

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Goodman's Rigorous Relativism

In "Relativism, Realism, and Rightness,"* Harvey Siegel expounds and criticizes a philosophical position that he attributes to Nelson Goodman. Siegel contends that Goodman's irrealism is unwarranted, his pluralism about rightness untenable, and his radical relativism incoherent. Although I cannot hope to do justice to the detail of Siegel's argument here, I want to sketch some of the reasons for thinking that his critique of Goodman is ineffective.

Realists and non-realists alike concede that at any given time a number of apparently conflicting descriptions and representations are individually warranted. Such descriptions and representations are separately tenable, but jointly untenable. Light, for example, can be construed as a series of waves or as a stream of particles, but it cannot be construed as both at once. As inquiry proceeds, some conflicts among warranted descriptions and representations will be resolved, but others will inevitably arise to replace them. Our criteria of justification are simply too weak to identify the uniquely best account of any range of phenomena. Moreover, we know of no way to strengthen those criteria so that a single contender is guaranteed to emerge victorious. We have every reason to believe that if any comprehensive description or representation—any world version—proves totally and permanently credible, several will do so. This being so, Goodman contends, we have no basis for insisting that one is right, the rest wrong, for we have no way to distinguish the "right" one from its equally acceptable rivals. Instead, he suggests, we should accept every acceptable version.[1]

* Page number references in this "Response to the Essay" refer to Harvey Siegel's preceding "Margins of Precision" essay, "Relativism, Realism and Rightness: Notes on Goodmanian Worldmaking" in this issue of *J of T*, found on pages 16 through 35.

This does not amount to acknowledging that all versions are acceptable. To be acceptable, a version must satisfy the highest cognitive or epistemic standards. Goodman's pluralism consists in his recognition that more than one version does so.

A version is a network of symbols (verbal or non-verbal) that orders, classifies, and categorizes the items in its domain. It thereby reveals characteristics of and connections among the referents of its constituent symbols. Different versions organize differently, supplying divergent categories in terms of which things are organized. Thus, e.g., a version that classifies on the basis of species counts butterflies and caterpillars alike; one that differentiates between flying insects and crawling insects counts them as different. Plainly, both versions have their uses, so neither should be discarded. But whether a butterfly is the same kind of thing as a caterpillar cannot be determined until we ascertain which version is in play.

Siegel recognizes that we make versions, and that versions differ drastically from one another. But there is, he insists, no reason to think that such versions have different objects, or that by constructing such a version we construct a world that answers to it. (pp. 20–21)

To be sure, in some cases competing systems do apply to the same objects. E.g., the Dewey decimal system and the Library of Congress system provide alternative ways to organize a library. Different relations among books are evident under the two systems. But the books themselves are identifiable independently, and their identities are unaffected by their classification under the two systems.

Siegel apparently thinks that alternative versions function the way that competing cataloguing systems do—but as a general thesis this is untenable, for criteria of individuation are themselves version-dependent. What counts as an individual according to one version may not count as an individual according to another. One version may take a caterpillar at t_0 and a butterfly at t_1 to be the same individual. Another may take them to be distinct individuals. According to the former, the same individual has separate phases characterized by radically different physiological features. According to the latter, two individuals with radically different physiological features are so related that the end of one marks the beginning of the other. Both, then, can account for the metamorphosis of a caterpillar into a butterfly. Indeed, the two seem in some sense equivalent. But they individuate differently. So they disagree about the number of things in their domain, about the changes a thing can undergo and retain its identity, and about the respects in which things must be alike to belong to the same kind. They disagree, that is, over the classical metaphysical issues of the one and the many, permanence and change, identity and diversity of individuals and of kinds. If we insist that they are, nevertheless, about the same things, we

must concede that there is no determining what those things are. For the set of conditions on the identity of their objects is one of the issues on which the versions disagree.

Siegel notes (pp. 20–21) that this doesn't prove that such versions describe different worlds, and he is quite right. But where does the burden of proof lie? If there is no way to identify a common world to which conflicting right versions answer, then that world, if it exists, is noumenal, and the contention that there is such a thing is unfounded. Moreover, if individuation is version-dependent, then only from within a version can things be counted. There is no version-independent way to count a world (noumenal or not) as one.

It does not follow, as Siegel suggests (pp. 20–22), that the world was featureless until we described it. For "featureless" is as much a description, and hence as version-dependent, as "featured." The question "What, if any, features does a world have?" has no determinate answer—indeed, does not even make sense—except where there is a distinction between the featured and the featureless. And it is versions we construct that supply such distinctions.

Nor does it follow, as Siegel seems to think (pp. 21–23), that if we recognize that worlds are constructed and facts fabricated, we can construct any worlds and fabricate any facts we please. We cannot, for example, construct a world in which metamorphosis transforms a caterpillar into a crocodile. Why not? The answer is, simply, because it doesn't. To make sense of this answer, let us look first at a more familiar type of construction.

We could certainly construct something so flimsy that it would collapse under the slightest pressure. But we could not construct such a flimsy chair, because no construction that flimsy would count as a chair. Prior to construction we have certain convictions about what it takes to be a chair, and these guide our work, limiting our options regarding materials, design, and workmanship. But they do not determine every aspect of our construction, for chairs, as we know, can take many forms.

Likewise in world building, prior convictions guide and restrict our constructions. A vast number of right versions might be constructed to accommodate our understanding of metamorphosis, but none can contend that the process transforms caterpillars into crocodiles, for such a version would so deviate from our prior convictions about the subject that its referents would not count as caterpillars, crocodiles, metamorphosis. The convictions we start with can be corrected or amended in the process of world building, but they cannot be completely ignored—for if we ignore them, we lose all touch with our subject.

Where do these convictions come from? They are products of earlier constructions. The knowledge we have gained through earlier efforts at world building serves as the raw material for further constructions.[2]

In terms of what kind of cognitive or epistemic standards is the acceptability of our various versions to be determined? According to Goodman, all and only right versions are acceptable. And rightness is a matter of fit.[3] But "fit" itself can be understood in different ways. When trying on shoes, for example, the problem is to fit shoes to feet whose size and shape are taken as fixed. To get a good fit, we are prepared to modify a shoe in a number of ways (e.g., by stretching it), or to replace it with a shoe of a different size. But we do not consider the foot to be likewise subject to modification. Lopping off a couple of toes to get the foot to conform to the shoe does not suggest itself as an option.

Fitting the family at the table for Thanksgiving dinner may be a different sort of problem. Rather than construing it as a matter of fitting one thing to another, we might construe it as a matter of fitting a variety of things together. Then our alternatives are not restricted to the various ways these precise people can be seated around this very table. We are free to consider such alternatives as using a larger table, feeding the children separately, even judiciously paring the guest list. Any of several solutions might be satisfactory, even if none is ideal. Still, success is not guaranteed, and some putative solutions are plainly inadequate. We cannot, e.g., refuse to feed the children altogether, insist that the grandparents eat standing up, or scrap the whole thing in favor of a picnic in the park.

Siegel thinks the problem of getting a version to fit is like the problem of getting a shoe to fit. He concludes that, since rightness is a matter of fit with practice, Goodman's system provides no way to find a practice wrong (pp. 23–25). But Siegel's objection rests on a misinterpretation. For Goodman, fitting version with practice is like fitting the family at Thanksgiving dinner. The general scheme of the solution is reasonably clear, but a number of factors are involved, and a variety of modifications in any of them might be made to accommodate them to one another. This is evident in his discussion of the justification of deduction.

> [R]ules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other. *A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.* The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences.[4]

Nowhere does Goodman suggest that our practices are immune to criticism. Some of the inferences we accept are undoubtedly invalid. Still, from among those we accept in practice, we can identify a class of inferences about which we are particularly confident. We expect the members of this class to turn

out valid according to any acceptable logic. And that expectation guides the construction of a logical system. The inferences about which we are particularly confident serve as touchstones to measure the adequacy of any proposed logic. Other things being equal, a logic that accords with our antecedent judgments about validity is preferable to one that does not.

But not even the antecedently acceptable inferences are above reproach, for we can discover that our confidence was misplaced. If, despite our best efforts, we are unable to construct a consistent logic that comprehends all of them, we eventually conclude that they are mutually inconsistent. We then reconstitute the class of inferences against which our logic is to be evaluated. And if a substantially more powerful, more elegant, or more economical logic can be constructed by ignoring or modifying some of the inferences we originally deemed acceptable, we may decide that the price is worth paying. For example, prior to the construction of a logic, we might expect the inference from

All ravens are black

to

Some ravens are black

to be valid. When we discover the difficulties such inferences engender, however, we reconsider our commitment to them. We concede that on balance a better logic emerges if we sacrifice an inference pattern that seemed, *prima facie*, to be acceptable.

Through a process of mutual accommodation, principle and practice are brought into accord. The same process is involved in the construction of pictorial, perceptual, and scientific versions. In such cases, of course, different combinations of principles and practices need to be accommodated to one another.

The process leaves room for legitimate disagreement on a number of counts. We might disagree, e.g., about which practices should serve as touchstones in the construction of a version, about what methods can be used to extend a version beyond the clear cases, or about how competing claims should be adjudicated. Parties to such disagreements construct competing versions. And the versions they construct are right if an adequate fit among principles, practices, and goals is achieved.

Intuitionism, then, is no counter-example to Goodman's theory. For the intuitionist accepts *some* mathematical practices as adequate and constructs a system based upon them. He is willing to sacrifice the law of excluded middle so that mathematical truth and provability will coincide. The classical mathematician is not. He accepts the law and pays the price: recognizing the existence of mathematical claims whose truth value is unknowable. A trade-off is involved. And different systems result depending on which

alternative is favored. Goodmanian pluralism seems an advantage here. Rather than insisting that one position is exclusively correct, Goodman recommends that we consider each on its own merits—as a way of systematizing, extending, and correcting mathematical practice—and that we recognize that finding one adequate does not preclude discovering that the other is adequate as well.

But it does not follow, as Siegel contends, that "anything can be right in that it can be seen to fit some practice, if we are only perverse enough, or liberal enough, in our consideration of practices" (p. 24). No mathematician is prepared to countenance the rejection of the law of non-contradiction, even though an embarrassingly large proportion of uncritical mathematical practice is plagued by inconsistency, for such practice, however common, is known to be mathematically defective. It is incapable of serving the cognitive goals of mathematics or the cognitive and practical goals of the various enterprises to which mathematics contributes.

Goodman recognizes that the arguments that lead to pluralism at the object-level do likewise at the meta-level. There are a number of independently warranted systems of criteria in terms of which rightness is evaluated. In some cases criteria applicable to one type of version are simply inapplicable to another. Logical consistency, e.g., is required of every acceptable verbal version, but it is inapplicable to pictorial versions. In other cases, criteria that may be applicable are nevertheless inappropriate. The sort of rigor that is required of an acceptable mathematical or physical version may be inappropriate in a version with the resources for writing grocery lists, social histories, or love letters. But we do not deny that "cake mix" is a reasonable entry on a grocery list, that "petit bourgeois" is a reasonable characterization of a social class, or that "dearest love" is a reasonable salutation on a love letter, despite the recognition that none of these expressions marks out a category of entities recognized as a natural kind by physics. Goodman contends, then, that there are a vareity of systems of criteria of rightness to which our versions are subject, and he recognizes that the rightness of any particular version will vary depending on the criteria in terms of which it is evaluated. Rightness of a version is relative to a system of criteria, and there is more than one acceptable system.

Siegel considers the acceptance of multiple, competing criteria of rightness to be fatal to Goodman's program. "Since Goodman allows that his is only one among incompatible meta-versions, he must also allow meta-versions with alternative criteria of rightness as well as meta-versions with no criteria of rightness at all. . . . On Goodman's view all such meta-versions must be countenanced" (pp. 28–29). The reasoning here is simply invalid. From the admission that there are *some* alternative acceptable versions, it does not follow that *all* versions are acceptable. And from the admission that

there are *some* alternative admissible criteria of rightness, it does not follow that *all* criteria of rightness are admissible. A fundamental defect of Siegel's discussion of relativism is his failure to recognize that from

Some s is p

it does not follow that

All s is p.

Goodman can recognize that there are some meta-versions whose criteria of rightness differ from his without being committed to the view that all meta-versions are admissible.

One of Siegel's own examples works against him here. We can stipulate that a particular dictionary is to be authoritative in a spelling bee, even though we acknowledge that some words have alternate spellings, and that rival dictionaries might differ over which spelling is correct. Having stipulated that the *American Heritage Dictionary* is to be authoritative, and that only preferred spellings are to be accepted, we rule "honor" correct and "honour" incorrect. We do so, even though we recognize that had we taken the *Oxford English Dictionary* to be our authority, the verdict would have been different. So the capacity to serve as a criterion does not require the denial that there are alternatives, or even the denial that our choice among acceptable alternatives is ultimately arbitrary. Nor does the recognition of such alternative ways of deciding correct spelling amount to the admission that there might be a dictionary or other criterion according to which any word can be spelled any way, so that there is no genuine difference between correct and incorrect spelling.

Moreover, it is not the case, as Siegel suggests, that because rightness is a matter of fitting version, criteria, and practice together, success is guaranteed. A meta-version that allows for set theoretical constructions sanctions a variety of different versions—namely, all those that yield acceptable set theories. Such versions can conflict with one another. E.g., some of them accept the axiom of choice; others do not. But the meta-version does *not* admit all putative set theories. Any one that generates the Russell paradox is *ipso facto* unacceptable. This is so even if, as seems likely, our naive, unthinking practice might be accommodated by such a theory. And it is so despite the fact that there are other meta-versions that disallow set theoretical constructions altogether. A meta-version then consists of criteria of rightness that its versions might fail to satisfy.

Siegel contends that radical relativism leads to a *reductio ad absurdum*. He formulates the thesis of radical relativism as follows:

> (*RR*) For any knowledge-claim p, p can be evaluated . . . only according to . . . a set of background principles and criteria of evalution $C_1 \ldots C_n$; and, given a different set of background principles and

> criteria $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$, there is no neutral . . . way of choosing between the two alternative sets in evaluating *p*. (pp. 26–27)

He then argues that if we substitute *RR* for *p*,

> it follows that if *RR* is true, then *RR*'s truth will vary according to the principles and criteria by which *RR* is evaluated. In particular, it follows that if, according to some set of criteria $C_1 \ldots C_n$ *RR* is judged to be false . . . , then if *RR* is true, (at least according to the set of criteria $C_1 \ldots C_n$) *RR* is false. (p. 27)

Siegel's argument is flawed. *RR* states that *p* can be evaluated *only* according to criteria $C_1 \ldots C_n$. It follows that no other set of criteria $C'_1 \ldots C'_n$ can be used to evaluate *p*. Thus, according to *RR*, there are no conflicting evaluations of *p*. A relativism like Kuhn's may be untenable, but Siegel has not shown it to be logically defective.

Suppose we omit the "only" from *RR*. Then several systems may apply to *p*, and their evaluations might conflict. But even then we have no contradiction. E.g., "*q* or not-*q*" is true according to the criteria of classical logic, false according to those of intuitionistic logic. But it does not follow that the formula is both true and false (hence, contradictory), for any ascription of truth value to the formula involves explicit or tacit appeal to a system of logical principles. Relative to one system, it is true; relative to another, false. But relative to no acceptable system of principles is it both true and false. Likewise, *RR* itself may be true relative to one set of standards and false relative to another, without being both true and false absolutely, or true and false relative to any single set of standards. To get a *reductio*, Siegel has to eliminate relativization of a statement or version to the system in terms of which it is to be evaluated. And he has shown no reason to think that "true relative to *s*" and "false relative to *t*" are respectively equivalent to "true" and "false" *simpliciter*.[5]

Siegel argues,

> Goodman presumably wants to say that his meta-version is *right*—not just in the sense that it satisfies his criteria of rightness, but that it is in some sense cognitively superior to rival meta-versions. The problem is that he cannot say this, given his meta-version's insistence that countless alternative and conflicting meta-versions must be recognized as legitimate and cannot be appropriately evaluated by appeal to the criteria of evaluation of his own meta-version. (p. 29)

Indeed, Goodman *does* want to say that his meta-version is right. But it does not follow that he wants to say that *all* rival meta-versions are wrong. He acknowledges, e.g., the tenability of a platonist meta-version such as

Quine's, even though his commitment to nominalism prevents him from admitting set theoretical constructions into his own meta-version.[6] But, of course, Goodman does not consider *all* rival meta-versions tenable. And he thinks his meta-version is cognitively superior to those that are untenable. Siegel apparently thinks that the admission that there are countless conflicting right meta-versions amounts to the conviction that there is no basis for finding any meta-version wrong. But

All *s* is *p*

does not follow from

Some *s* is *p*

at the meta-level, any more than it does at the object-level. Goodman is convinced that there are countless wrong meta-versions as well as countless right ones.

In particular, Goodman considers his meta-version cognitively superior to that of the "fundamentalist," for the fundamentalist insists that there is exactly one right world-version, and exactly one right system of standards for evaluating versions, even though he cannot tell how to identify either the version or the system of standards in question. Goodman suggests that unless we can find some way to distinguish the right one from among the several alternatives that satisfy our cognitive standards, it is dogmatic to insist that only one of them is right.

Moreover, if there is exactly one right version, only what is included in that version is right. So if, e.g., a physicalist version is right, then the insight or information we apparently gain from phenomenalist, aesthetic, or normative versions must be accounted for in physicalist terms, or dismissed as illusory. And if a verbal version is exclusively right, then any apparent insight or information conveyed by pictures must be captured by sentences of that verbal version or dismissed as illusory. In fact, no single version can account for the understanding such other versions provide. And the failure of reductionism suggests that future versions will fare no better. We are forced, if we are fundamentalists, to deny that more than one version can yield understanding. Unless they are reducible to the one right version, and satisfy the criteria of the one right meta-version, the fundamentalist considers works of history, psychology, painting, and philosophy to be cognitively bankrupt. Goodman indeed takes his meta-version to be superior to one that denies that our understanding is enhanced by looking at things from a variety of perspectives, classifying them in terms of a variety of categories, representing them in a variety of symbol systems, and evaluating them by a variety of criteria. Nothing in Siegel's paper shows that he is wrong to do so.

Notes

[1] Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 109–120, and *passim*.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 6
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 138.
[4] Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 64.
[5] *Ways of Worldmaking*, p. 120.
[6] Nelson Goodman, *Of Mind and Other Matters* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 50–53.

Controversy—Article

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Teaching About Problems and Problem-Solving in Social Education: Re-examining the Issues

The study of problems and problem-solving has been a major focus of social educators through most of this century; however, a considerable amount of controversy has surrounded the question of what constitutes a social problem and how it ought to be incorporated into the curriculum. Recently, social educators Shermis and Barth have noted the inconsistency between general verbal commitments to inquire reflectively into social problems versus the indoctrination into and closed study of such problems in social studies classrooms.[1] They argue that this inconsistency may be explained, to a large extent, by tracing the origins of models used in the teaching of social problems. Contrary to common belief, ". . . the model used by most social educators in the twentieth century derived not from Dewey but rather from nineteenth century sociologists who were themselves tutored in the assumptions of Comtean positivism."[2] The notion of problem, as conceived by these positivists, became a central part of the content and process of social education. Textbooks, course outlines, and teacher notes came to be dominated by this orientation.

Paradoxically, this view reigned at a time when John Dewey's philosophic ideas on problems and problem-solving (i.e. that problems ought to be integral to the lives and thoughts of students) was also gaining wide acceptance. According to Shermis and Barth, it was the language of Dewey but the content of the positivist sociologists which came to prevail in the field of social education. Thus, the current situation came about—social educators

today pay lip service to the theories of Dewey, while teaching students academically predetermined problems and solutions.

We believe that Shermis and Barth's research has made important contributions to the field of social education where they point up the serious disparity between theory and practice relative to problems and problem-solving that permeates most social studies classrooms. However, we also believe that they have misunderstood the disparity issue and made a number of unwarranted inferences and conclusions. The result has been a muddying of the waters rather than a clarification.

While there are certain critical difficulties with the claim regarding the influence of the nineteenth-century positivist sociologists, let us for the sake of argument grant it validity. What then of the Shermis and Barth explanation of the Deweyan interpretation of problems and problem-solving and its relationship to other theoretical positions that have occurred in the literature?

According to Shermis and Barth, a "true" problem possesses certain prerequisites: i.e., such problems arise ". . . out of the individual's perception of emotional conflict, inconsistency or lack of insight" and ". . . when a previously settled state of affairs becomes disrupted and the resulting tension requires the individual to 'clear things up.' "[3] But, even more critically, ". . . a problem exists only when an individual internalizes a sense of puzzlement or wonderment."[4] This is to say that if one does not internalize, feel, or "own" a problem, ". . . a problem does not exist."[5] The authors go on to say that few social educators since Bode have adhered to such an approach: most have merely mouthed the jargon and done something quite different in practice.

One should note that the definition of "problem" described here is rather restrictive and causes certain problems, as we will explain shortly. In contrast to the Shermis and Barth view, the typical problem-solving approach utilized in today's social studies classroom is characterized by teacher-initiation in tandem with all relevant data needed for student analysis.[6] As such, problems are not likely to be felt or internalized in the way the authors suggest, and the supplying of all the data and possible solutions short-circuits the inquiry process. The result is pseudo-problem solving.

Two additional prerequisites are postulated by Shermis and Barth for the identification of real problems in this Deweyan sense: such problems must indicate ". . . a departure from a norm . . ." or a ". . . sense of value conflict . . . ."[7] The first criterion generates some difficulty for their larger argument, owing to the fact that they also assert that one school of positivist sociologists did conceive of social problems in terms of norm-deviance from American rural traditions.[8] We think this internal contradiction in their argument further points up Shermis and Barth's misunderstanding of the

positivist tradition and its impact on social education. However, our concern is with the Deweyan interpretation here.

The second criterion, value conflict, seems interesting but hardly necessary for a social problem to inhere. For example, let us assume a student believes that a certain group is intellectually inferior. The teacher confronts him with data contradicting that belief. It is quite possible that the student might come to see this problem as it grew out of his cognitive dissonance. Such a contradiction need not be a value conflict in the strict sense, but merely an invalid belief corrected by more adequate data. Hence, while value conflicts are certainly fruitful occasions for developing problem-acceptance, they need not be a requirement for a social education problem to occur.

Shermis and Barth go on to expand their conception of problem by posting a taxonomic array. At the top is the "real" Deweyan type problems as detailed above, followed by four others: *social problems*, or problems ". . . identified by a large and/or influential number of persons within a given society and are considered problematic precisely because, in some way not usually clear or obvious, the problematic behavior departs from what is taken to be desirable social norms, values or standards";[9] *disciplinary problems*, or ". . . statements, questions or topics which scholars within a discipline consider important"; *policy problems*, which are a subset of social problems, related to the best manner in which to resolve matters identified as social problems; and *problem exercises*, which consist of opportunities to execute or practice certain skills (e.g. using latitude or longitude).

We are led to believe that the Deweyan problem-solving process is real and the above taxonomy of other problems is less preferred. But this separation is misleading. Many of the latter problem models could become "real" if presented to students in such a way as to invoke interest and internalization. Consequently, it may be argued that all of these kinds of problems (with the possible exception of "problem exercises") have the potential to be felt in a Deweyan sense.

This brings us to the most serious weakness in the Shermis and Barth analysis: How ought we to decide which problems are to be studied in social studies classrooms? In general, these two scholars ignore the fuller range of matters associated with this question. They imply, on the one hand, that only felt problems should be studied, while, on the other, chastizing teachers who introduce students to predetermined problem-solution scenarios. The issue at stake here is far more complex that this.

Typically, there are three basic elements in the teaching of problems in social education: a) the selection process, b) the teaching and analysis phase, and c) the techniques utilized to help students identify or internalize the

problematic situation. All three are related to practice, but they have yielded countervailing theories. For example, Hunt and Metcalf argue that we should have students study the "closed areas" of our society or culture because these are more likely to be controversial and hence more likely to be internalized by students. Moreover, these "closed areas" are usually overlooked in totalitarian societies, and, unless such areas are explored in a democratic society, totalitarian thinking may result. Thus, social educators may perform a valuable social function by getting students to consider such problems.

Interestingly, Hunt and Metcalf agree that only felt problems should be studied, but they allow for these to be drawn from a list of problems determined by "experts" or scholars in the discipline. So long as these problems relate to the closed areas of culture, they are legitimate. The point is that the student's capacity to *feel* the problem is necessary but not a sufficient condition for its study.

Other social education theorists even question whether the felt criterion is really necessary. Massialas and Cox note that sound pedagogy demands a wider application of method than that of reflective inquiry, whether applied to student-felt problems or closed areas. Guided discussion, it is argued, is necessary on occasion to enable a student to conduct reflective inquiry successfully on his own.[10] Nor can we always be certain that selected problems will be felt by students, despite our belief that they are the most desirable kinds of problems. Thus, feelings may be an insufficient criterion for content selection in social education.

Even John Dewey, his concern for felt problems notwithstanding, would not have students determine the school curriculum. As he stated it, the teacher

> . . . has not only the right but the duty to suggest lines of activity, and to show that there need not be any fear of adult imposition provided the teacher knows children as well as subjects, their import is not exhausted in bringing out this fact.[11]

On occasion we may choose to elect problems for guided discussion even though they are not directly related to the students' experience, for there is a wide range of problems that affect students' lives even if it is not perceived so by students. As Massialas and Cox state,

> While some of these problems may be 'socially controversial' eliciting an emotional response, they need not be. . . . Many questions are noncontroversial simply because no one has studied them in a probing way that identifies the alternatives.[12]

Thus, as we have seen, it is too restrictive to contend, as Shermis and Barth do, that the only real problems are those felt by students. Hunt and Metcalf, Massialas, Cox, and John Dewey himself offer alternative theoretical justifications for treating subject matter and problems in social education. Furthermore, it is reductionist to imply, as do Shermis and Barth, that *all* attempts to impose problems and hypothetical solutions on students are reflections of nineteenth-century positivism. We wish to conclude that some matters are problems in the sense of significantly affecting people regardless of whether or not they are primarily perceived or internalized.

Perhaps one way out of the corner into which Shermis and Barth have painted themselves is to be found in recasting the notion of *interest* as it is related to social education problems. We would like to argue that a case may be made for the claim that people have both subjective and objective interests.[13] Thus, while Shermis and Barth appear to see interest only in its subjective meaning, there is a whole world that exists outside of any student's personal interests. The subjective meaning of interest refers to those matters which people find interesting or perceive to be in their own interest. The criterion for determining interest here is people's states of mind (i.e., their sense that something is of interest to them or that they are affected by it). This notion of subjective interest is analagous to the students' feeling the problem.

The objective notion of interest is quite different. Here, interest refers to those matters which might affect a person or persons, but of which any individual person could be unaware. Moreover, it is possible to determine what some of these interests are because there is data for them (observable, measurable, etc.). Such a determination could be external to any individual's consciousness.[14]

Now, both conceptions of interest are essential for the adequate analysis of problems in social education classrooms. Subjective interests alone lead to a kind of problematic-narcissism; while objective interests isolated from subjective perceptions leave students unaware or unconscious of the problem. But we must understand that ". . . it is precisely the presence of 'objective' interests which prompts the emergence of subjective awareness."[15] In short, consciousness is the consequence of converting objective interests into subjective ones: *false* consciousness is the failure to do so.[16]

It is our contention that part of the role of social educators is to aid students in the development of a subjective awareness of objective interests, and that this injunction has been one of the keystones of formal education. Failure to perceive objective interests and turn them into subjective ones leads to a social education program of little effect. Unless we take courage in efforts to cast genuine objectively held social problems along with alternative hypothetical solutions before social studies students, how can we know

whether this violates their subjective interests ("feelings") in the inquiry process or not? Moreover, one can never be certain that subjective awareness will not develop some time after the study of a selected problem. If our grounds for problem selection are sound, is this potential for long-term effect not worth the risk on occasion? Furthermore, we almost never teach fully homogeneous classes. Thus some students are always unlikely to feel the problem when it is presented. Kohlberg's research is relevant in this regard.[17] He contends that students need to be confronted with problematic situations they do not fully comprehend in an effort to "gradually" raise their level of moral reasoning and awareness.

In conclusion, we share Shermis and Barth's concern that social education ought to aim to use open inquiry to study problems that are internalized by students. We also believe that their basic criticism of the practices going on in many social studies classrooms is correct (i.e. that social educators tend to impose artificial problems and solutions on students in an effort to get them to conform unreflectively to reified social norms and values). Finally, their analysis of the root cause of our current approaches to teaching about problems and problem-solving provides valuable insight into the development of the field. Unfortunately, they have misunderstood the matter of problem, stated or implied, of unwarranted inferences and conclusions relative to the selection and presentation of problems in social education, and gone well beyond the data in their arguments. We hope our comments and reservations will help clarify to some extent this highly important issue.

Notes

[1] S. Samuel Shermis and James L. Barth, "Problem Definition, Problem-Solving and Social Problems: Reconceptualizing the Thought Process in Education," *Journal of Thought* (Winter, 1983) 18, p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–91.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 81–82.

[10] Byron G. Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox, *Inquiry in Social Studies* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 50–54.

[11] John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," *Progressive Education V* (1928) in Dworkin, Ed., *Dewey on Education: Selections* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1959), p. 124.

[12] Massialas and Cox, *Inquiry in The Social Studies*, p. 52.

[13] Issac D. Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," *Politics and Society* (February, 1972) 1, p. 2.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[15] Flatham, *The Public Interest* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
[16] Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," p. 153.
[17] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-developmental Approach to Moral Education," *Phi Delta Kappa* (June, 1975), p. 56.

Controversy—Response to Professors Stanley & Maxcy

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Our thanks and appreciation go to Professors Stanley and Maxcy for their thoughtful critique of our article on the philosophical history of social problems and problem-solving in social studies. While the author has done an admirably accurate and concise job of summarizing our position, we must take issue with their criticism: it fails to distinguish between what we said and their own point of view.

First, let us consider what Professors Stanley and Maxcy call our "restrictive" approach to problem definition. He says that a "typical" problem-solving approach in social studies classrooms is ". . . characterized by teacher-initiation in tandem with all relevant data needed for student analysis." The "restrictive" approach happens to be that of John Dewey. The "teacher-initiated" approach, in which students are *told* that a problem exists and provided with bits of information is not Dewey but rather a traditional practice that has always been prevalent in the social studies. It was Dewey, writing in *How We Think* in 1910, who argued in his classic "forked-road" analogy that unless an individual internalizes, perceives, or owns a problem, the problem—*at least in one critical sense*—does not exist. Teachers may call—and in fact over the years have called—topics and subjects "problems." However, serious, consecutive, and systematic thought does not follow a non-problem. One does not engage in thought—which Dewey equated with "clearing up" confusion, a puzzle, or a barrier—unless there is first the perception of confusion, puzzles, or barriers. If this approach to problem definition is restrictive, so be it. The restriction is that which Dewey imposed on his own definition.

Second, Professors Stanley and Maxcy maintain that "value conflict," while an "interesting thought," is "hardly necessary for a social problem to inhere." There is a reason why it is necessary, that is, necessary according to

a thought line which begins with John Dewey and continues through Boyd Bode, H. Gordon Hullfish, Allen Griffin, Maurice P. Hunt, and Lawrence Metcalf.[1] One needs to review a few central assumptions before the "necessity" is perceived.

Cultural patterns in our society are neither clear nor consistent. They are rather a disharmonious melange of practices, theories, and ideas that derive from Judeo-Christian theology, Greek assumptions, Democratic theory, laissez faire axioms, and a variety of indigenous traditions. An individual born and enculturated into such a society absorbs inconsistent values, beliefs, and attitudes in a thoroughly unconscious fashion. That is, according to those who have written about political socialization, before the age of five, children have internalized a good many cultural precepts. Faced with a serious and significant question, students are likely to say that:

- This is a land of opportunity where all are entitled to go where they wish, work as they will, and live where they want, BUT some people ought to know their place and stay in it.
- The practice of capital punishment is a vengeful, arbitrary, and barbaric medieval remnant, BUT murderers and rapists deserve to hang, burn, or asphyxiate.
- There should be a wall of separation between church and state, just as it says in the First Amendment, BUT a little prayer couldn't possibly hurt and anyway God belongs in the public school.
- We must restrict population growth in order to conserve finite natural resources, BUT people should be free to reproduce as they wish.
- Automobile and other manufacturers connive, scheme, and cut corners and thereby sell dangerous and shoddy products to unsuspecting consumers and this should be stopped, BUT government best fulfills its purpose by getting off the backs of the people.

We can continue to enumerate dozens of other inconsistent beliefs held by a large number of Americans. The point, however, is that many varieties of inquiry problems arise when students become aware that their belief structure is inconsistent. That is, they begin to feel that they entertain value conflicts. Dewey and the Ohio State group, absorbing much of their point of view from the writings of social psychologists and cultural anthropologists, perceived that to be enculturated to our cultural patterns *is* to grow up with conflicting, disharmonious, and contradictory beliefs and outlooks. They conceived the teacher's role as, in large part, helping students to identify

problems in order to develop a more consistent, systematic, and harmonious outlook.

Third, Professors Stanley and Maxcy argue that "we are led to believe that the Deweyan problem-solving process is real and the above taxonomy of other problems is less preferred." We apologize to anyone who was led to believe this. Our intention in creating a five-part taxonomy was not to arrange problems on a hierarchical basis with the Deweyan inquiry problem heading the list as a "more real" problem. Indeed, we thought we had made it clear that all of these problems are real. A disciplinary problem is just as real as a policy problem, which is just as real as a social problem which is just as real as a problem exercise. Our purpose in organizing such a taxonomy was to identify 70 or so years of semantic confusion.

When social studies educators who subscribe to a social science methodology talk about problems, they invariably refer to those problems which have gained favor in the disciplines they represent and in which they were trained. Many teachers (whom we label Citizenship Transmitters) ordinarily make use of problem exercises. A problem exercise, as we attempted to say, consists of an opportunity for someone to practice a skill, demonstrate a technique, or provide evidence of an internalized value or acquisition of driblets of knowledge. Neither of these kinds of problems has anything in common with Dewey's inquiry problem. The point of our research on problem identification is not to argue that one kind of problem is more real than another. Rather, we argue that there are different kinds of problems. We contend that lack of awareness of distinctions in the theoretical language educators employ leads to haphazard practice, confusion, ineffective teaching, and an utter inability of the social studies to change.

Fourth and finally, we shall review the complex relationship of a social problem to an internalized inquiry problem. The first premise is that our culture is rich in conflicting and unclear cultural patterns. If children learn inconsistent beliefs, values, and attitudes, they internalize a confused and fragmented belief structure. This tends to generate unresolved conflict and the inability to pursue a course of action without guilt or ambivalence. In this sense, then, we point to *internalized* problems. However, problems also exist on a larger scale. We talk about the "drug problem," "the problem of poverty," "the abortion issue," and many others. Such problems, we happily concede, have an *objective* status. They certainly appear to exist quite apart from individuals. Someone growing up in central Idaho who has never laid eyes on a black, Mexican, Chinese, or Jew is likely to be blissfully unaware that there is a problem of racial and religious bigotry in our society. But regardless of individuals who may not perceive a given social problem, the problem exists as an objective datum of reality. It has effects on

individuals. We are, then, led to conclude that in one sense a problem exists independent of the perception of individuals. But the shape, meaning, and definition of a given social problem does not exist outside the perception of a given person. To say that problem exists as both a social problem AND as an individual, perceived problem is not a violation of Aristotle's excluded middle. It is a more complex way of defining how certain educators have thought about problems.

This probably lies at the basis of our disagreement with Professors Stanley and Maxcy. We do not suggest that students should "determine" the social studies curriculum, for, as we have seen, a Deweyan problem-oriented curriculum arises out of the perception of students that a problem exists in their thinking and that this problem is a reflection of a larger problem within our society. We do not suggest that one problem is more real than another; merely that they are different. We thank Professors Stanley and Maxcy for raising these questions which have also been raised by other colleagues. We appreciate the opportunity afforded us to clarify our position.

Note

[1] Aside from Dewey, who did his most creative work in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia, the others studied or taught at Ohio State University.

Authors and Articles

Aesthetic Reconstructionism: The New Deal and the Fine Arts

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The early 1930s were pivotal in American history. General Douglas MacArthur routed the "Bonus Army" from Washington while "Hoovervilles" sprang up in other towns. Nearly fifteen hundred banks failed, farm deeds continued changing hands on the auctioneer's block, wage and salary cuts were widespread, and teachers in several places were being paid in scrip. Educator George S. Counts had already dared teachers to build a new social order. Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover for the presidency of the United States. Soup lines were growing longer as unemployment climbed.

In the midst of this social and economic upheaval, there was a long line of a different sort that signified a change as fundamental as any that would occur in the New Deal. As people lined up at Michigan and Adams in Chicago, they were not waiting for food; they wanted to view a painting by an unknown artist from Iowa. In the center was a single elongated window in a frame house. In the foreground, flanking the window, stood a man and his daughter with lengthened somber faces, holding an upturned pitchfork. The artist, Grant Wood, titled the painting "American Gothic." It was destined to become the most copied and parodied painting in history, not even excepting Leonardo's "Mona Lisa."[1]

What has a painting to do with the economic depression of the thirties? Just this: before the following year ended, the Roosevelt administration would inaugurate the Public Works of Art Project (PWAP), forerunner of Project One—perhaps the boldest and certainly one of the most criticized

parts of the New Deal. Grant Wood not only joined the program early; his democratic philosophy of art epitomized the project.

I

> It commonly happens that, in ages of privilege, the practice of almost all the arts becomes a privilege. . . . Such is no longer the case when, all privileges being abolished, ranks are intermingled, and men are forever rising or sinking upon the social scale.
>
> —Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

As the winter of 1933 approached with unemployment at an unprecedented high, the new Roosevelt administration began a series of stopgap measures aimed at relief and reform. Among the thirteen to fifteen million unemployed were several thousand actors, musicians, painters, sculptors, dancers, writers, and others connected with the fine arts. Most had been without work since 1929, some even longer because of the displacement caused by sound motion pictures.

George Biddle, artist and friend of the Roosevelts, first suggested that jobs for artists be included in the temporary Civil Works Administration (CWA). Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, who was heading up the CWA, seem to have been primarily responsible for talking a reluctant President into trying the idea. "Hell, they've got to eat just like other people," Hopkins said.[2]

Although Roosevelt liked artists, he cared little for art and he feared adverse public reaction. He apparently shared, at least at first, the widely held view that art was a luxury rather than a necessity. He finally consented because the paintings—the program was designed primarily for people in the graphic arts—would probably look better on office walls than old photographs and calendars. This was no ringing defense for democratizing the arts, but a tacit admission that artists had as much right to live and pursue their professions as bricklayers. Hiring was to be based on merit alone rather than need, but many of those employed had been on relief.[3]

Hungry artists read their own meanings into the new program. Edward Bruce, who played a key advisory role in the project, saw the measure as "a step up in our civilization." The artists who received jobs under the plan experienced a powerful emotional catharsis. The society from which they had so long felt alienated and which had driven some of the most talented Americans to Europe was finally according them recognition. The following comment is typical of many contained in letters written by artists: "This job . . . has made me feel that for the first time I am functioning as a regular worker with a definite place as an artist in the present economic system." Another said, "It is as if, for many of us, an invitation to project ourselves

through our work into the highly exciting and stimulating world has broken the walls of our isolation."[4] The artists agreed with a fellow worker in Georgia who declared, "It is not a New Deal. It is a fresh deck of cards. A new game."[5]

When the CWA ended in the spring of 1934, Roosevelt asked Hopkins to begin making plans for the Works Progress Administration, a new agency which would be based on the CWA experience. It was to be larger, better planned, and somewhat more permanent. Because of the success of the art projects under the CWA and because of his own democratic philosophy of art, Hopkins included projects for writing, music, playwriting and theater, and painting and sculpture. (Demonstrations by writers demanding inclusion probably helped him decide to broaden the program.) So far as Congress and, at least officially, the President were concerned, these projects were strictly for the unemployed and could be cut or abolished on short notice. But what had passed Congress as a purely relief measure was already being transformed by Hopkins and associates like Jacob Baker into a new concept of support for the arts.

II

> A few generations ago, the people of this country were often taught . . . to believe that art was something foreign to America and to themselves—something imported from another continent, something from an age which was not theirs—something they had no part in, save to see in some guarded room on holidays or Sundays. . . . The people of this country know now . . . that art is not a treasure in the past or an importation from another land, but part of the present life of all the living and creating people—all who make and build.
>
> —Franklin D. Roosevelt, accepting the National Art Gallery from Andrew Mellon, 17 March 1941

Nikolai Sokolov agreed to head the music program; Holger Cahill, the section for painting, sculpture, and other graphic arts; and Henry Alsberg, the writers' project. Hopkins asked Hallie Flanagan, an undergraduate schoolmate at Grinnell and in 1935 director of Vassar's Experimental Theater, to oversee the theatrical section. She demurred, but Hopkins insisted that she at least talk to Eleanor Roosevelt about it. She left Mrs. Roosevelt "feeling that a great new social plan was under way and eager to help work it out." But after reviewing suggestions for a theater project, she told Hopkins he needed a social worker and asked to drop out. Hopkins insisted she come to an informal session at Henry Alsberg's house.[6]

Five years later Hallie Flanagan recalled the occasion as "one of those

evenings in which everything seemed possible." The air was full of electrifying ideas. Holger Cahill, who had read Grant Wood's *Revolt Against the City*, imbued the whole group with his conviction that "government subsidy was the next logical step in the development of American art, not an art which would be an occasional unrelated accompaniment to everyday existence, but a functioning part of our national life." By the time the party broke up, those responsible for directing the four arts projects had agreed upon a vision of what they wanted. Hallie Flanagan said it well:

> The art projects were being set up to deal with physical hunger, but was there not another form of hunger with which we could rightly be concerned, the hunger of millions of Americans for music, plays, pictures, and books? Were not these two aspects of hunger a part of the same equation which it was our job to solve?[7]

Response to the new program was out of proportion to its relative size. Despite initial skepticism by many that the government could ever do anything more than inspire some sort of desultory mental leaf raking, the four directors set out with determination, vigor, and patience. Within a short while, about four thousand people had been hired—almost all of them from local relief rolls.

Some relief applicants could not qualify under Federal One's rather generous rules, but there were more than enough who met the specified standards to fill all the quotas. It quickly became apparent, in fact, that the real problem, at least with regard to relief, was an insufficient allotment of jobs. Administrators found themselves faced with the unpleasant task of telling long lines of hungry, dejected applicants that there were no more openings. In a few instances desperate job hunters refused to leave the premises after hearing the news and had to be forcibly ejected. A Federal Writers' Project executive in New York City suffered lacerations of the face, burns on both arms, and loss of two teeth when a disappointed job seeker attacked him.[8]

Hiring people was one thing; designing projects of real value which could effectively utilize the diverse talents, and in some cases non-talents, of thousands of disparate individuals was another. In the case of the music project, it was relatively easy to audition musicians and get them to playing concerts. In painting and sculpture, too, it was not difficult to get people promptly to work on group and individual tasks. The theater project was much harder put to find places for thousands of actors and performers of every imaginable kind. In addition to doing regular productions, Hallie Flanagan hit upon the idea of Living Newspapers—plays based on current events which would not only require a large number of performers for each production, but would also dramatize major issues of the time. On the

Writers' Project, "hacks, bohemians and local eccentrics jostled elbows with highly trained specialists and creative artists.[9]" Most of these went to work on a monumental plan to provide the country with its first truly American guidebooks. Called *The American Guide*, the series consisted of a volume on each state, several major cities, and finally on each of six regions. Most of the regional guides, however, did not make it into print.

All the arts programs had three elements in common: 1) They emphasized *American* content. Grant Wood and other artists stressed regional themes. Writers for *The American Guide* series went in search of authentic local color. There was a definite break from the earlier cultural colonialism that held Europe superior to America and New York superior to the rest of America. 2) To the extent that political orientations showed through, these tended to be proletarian and anti-big business. 3) They encouraged group creative activity. This was especially so in the Writers' Project, but it was also true of the visual arts. Most murals involved several people, sometimes in the medieval tradition of a master supervising apprentices.

What the four programs accomplished staggers credulity. Overall statistics provide a general, although in some respects irrelevant, impression. The graphic arts project resulted in an estimated 700,000 works; the music project played 250,000 performances before an aggregate of over 158 million people. The Federal Writers' Project turned out nearly 400 books and pamphlets and saved much cultural and historical material which, although still not published, is potentially useful to scholars. The Federal Theater gave well over sixty thousand performances before more than thirty million people in four years, for the approximate cost, someone wryly observed, of one battleship.[10]

Beyond the impressive numbers, however, is the poignancy of what the projects did for people—not just those for whom they provided jobs, but the millions who heard the music; saw the plays, paintings, and sculpture; and read the books. Less than a year after the program started, a writer for *Fortune*, in one of the best articles to appear on the projects, asserted, "whatever else may be said of the government's flyer in art . . . it has produced, one way or another, a greater human response than anything the government has done in generations." It had already, the writer thought, worked "a sort of cultural revolution in America."[11] What was important was not the abundance of red tape or the frayed nerves or sporadic attempts at censorship. It was not even that valuable skills were preserved, although all those things had a significance of their own. What the arts projects did, as Horace Kallen noted, was to give "a genuine lift of the consumatory level of the national life in things of the spirit."[12]

Federally sponsored art was a play about steel by a Birmingham author performed before packed houses in Atlanta. It was free music classes for

fifteen million people—people like the woman from New York City's East Side who said, "I play in a band and now I am a person." It was people like Herbert Price charging madly over the Black Belt, scratching chiggers, and encouraging people to sing songs, make up plays about their lives, and enact them. It was three thousand children a month filing through the Children's Federal Art Gallery in Washington, D.C., looking at paintings done by other children. It was a thousand people a week during three summers ferrying to Roanoke Island to see *The Lost Colony*, a dramatization of the ill-fated early English attempt to settle this country. It was theatre for the blind in Muskogee, Oklahoma. It was ten thousand San Franciscans hurrying through dinner to "swarm down" to Exposition Auditorium because Wagner, Tschaikowsky, and Bach were being offered at a dime a seat. It was forty impromptu performances for fifteen thousand flood victims in Cincinnati—while some of the performers' homes washed down the river. It was living art for millions of Americans who could not have afforded it otherwise.[13]

But it was also frustration, censorship, and finally defeat.

III

> And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, . . . differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art, . . . making them his judges, . . . necessity . . . will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good.
>
> —Socrates (Plato), *The Republic*

All four of the programs suffered under difficulties. There was the never ending problem of reconciling relief work with professional skill. Policy makers had to create projects that were general enough to fit the training, talent, and idiosyncrasies of people on relief. For the workers there was the plaguing uncertainty of knowing the job might end any time.

Administrators had the additional difficulty of trying to build good staffs while encouraging private employers to hire their most talented and skilled workers. And, in some places, non-arts WPA administrators (usually state directors) were decidedly out of sympathy with the program. Finally there was continual worry in the Roosevelt Administration that the arts projects were political liabilities.

This fear of political animosity was not altogether without foundation. Many conservatives found the projects especially odious.[14] The Writers' and Theater projects were particularly abrasive to conservative sensibilities.

Some of the plays demonstrated the advantages of unionization; others questioned whether private financial interests, such as power companies and tenement house owners, had been as devoted to the public good as their pronouncements maintained; and some suggested that racial equality was desirable—blacks and whites even performed together at times.[15] A number of the guidebooks indicated that black Americans had not received a square deal; several mentioned bad industrial working conditions. Others offended in various ways. When the Massachusetts guide, for example, suggested that Sacco and Vanzetti had not received a fair trial, Governor Hurley declared that foreign agitators had infiltrated the project, and ex-governor Ely insisted "the whole edition be burned on Boston Commons." When a Virginia section of the Writers' Project found evidence that Captain John Smith gave an English youth to Chief Powhatan as a part of a business deal, chambers of commerce all over the state wired Washington. A mural in the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Federal District Courthouse raised so much controversy that it was finally painted over by court order. It showed Christ chopping up a cross and also a hanging next to a jury box.[16]

Opponents of the New Deal particularly hated Federal One. They found their weapon in two House committees—the Subcommittee on Appropriations of the Seventy-Sixth Congress, chaired by Clifton A. Woodrum, and the House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities (HUAC), headed by Martin Dies. The art projects offered a fertile hunting ground for the HUAC because there were a number of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the programs. This is not surprising in view of the general flight to the left by intellectuals during the twenties and early thirties. Because the Communist Party of the United States was legal, WPA officials could not legitimately inquire of their employees whether they belonged to it. Hence, a small minority of party members were on the projects, especially in New York. What the Dies Committee and many other Americans did not realize, and perhaps did not want to realize, was that even as they met, Communism was losing its power in America. The Communist Party, which had polled only one hundred thousand votes at the height of the depression, had already lost half of those by the time of the commitees' hearings.[17] As Murray Kempton noted in *Part of Our Time*, most of the people who flirted with Communism in the 1930s did so out of frustration and generally without lasting commitment. Most drifted away within a relatively short time.[18]

One cannot objectively read the proceedings of either committee without being overwhelmed with the almost pathological drive on the part of most of the key members to prove, in the words of Congressman Dies, that the "W.P.A. was the greatest financial boon which ever came to the Communists in the United States."[19] Both committees ignored usual rules of

evidence, refused to allow people to confront their accusers, and placed unbounded confidence in witnesses whose information was of dubious value.

The Woodrum and Dies committees repeatedly elicited the wildest allegations from people who were obviously speculating and axe-grinding. The records of both have a Kafkaesque aura about them. There was Miss Sallie Saunders before the Dies Committee, whose total evidence of subversion was having been asked for a date by a black fellow worker. She requested a transfer, which was granted, but felt so injured she could not stop telling people. Finally a secretary at her new job observed that there was nothing bad in being asked out by a Negro. Miss Saunders rushed to the Dies Committee. This was clear evidence, she intimated, of a Communist plot to mongrelize the race. The Committee gravely thanked her for the valuable information.[20]

Mr. H. Ralph Burton, chief investigator for the Woodrum committee in New York, was too embarrassed to read aloud some of the language from the play *Sing for Your Supper* because it was "quite off color." He did, however, have inserted in the record an example in which three old men sing a song containing the lines: "I don't want to be intellectual—I want to be sexual."[21]

Joseph Thomas Barrett told the Woodrum Committee that 70 to 75 percent of the Writers' Project was infected with Communism. Asked for names of books produced by the project which were Communistic, he replied:

> There is *Panorama of New York* which will indicate that class angle and class hatred is in it; and there is another book which I never read, and I cannot recall the name of the book.
>
> Mr. Woodrum. *American Stuff*?
>
> Mr. Barrett. *American Stuff*, yes. That is another one that is reeking with Communism.[22]

Finally Representative Joseph Starnes of the Dies Committee cross-examined Hallie Flanagan, who got to testify after months of requesting an opportunity to answer charges brought against the Federal Theater.

> Mr. Starnes. You are quoting from this Marlowe. Is he a Communist?
>
> Mrs. Flanagan. I am very sorry. I was quoting from Christopher Marlowe.
>
> Mr. Starnes. Tell us who Marlowe is, so we can get the proper reference.[23]

Mrs. Flanagan told him.

Of the more than one thousand plays produced by the Federal Theater, the Dies Committee questioned only twenty-six, and most of the members of the Committee had neither read nor seen any of them. But the House was absolutely determined to demolish at least the Federal Theater. Over the protests of ten thousand people in Hollywood and petitioners all over the country, it struck out all appropriations for the Federal Theater and reduced those of the other three programs. The remaining projects gradually faded with the coming of the war, though they did not officially end until 1943.[24]

IV

> The petty critical artifices and pretenses, the cultural frauds, the slavish cultural tourism of America's pre-war art will be in . . . wreckage. The monument rising out of it will shine with the light of a strong personal and cultural identity. It will shine also with the light of great art of which these are the prime constituents. Guided by it new Americans will find a way to speak and do in American terms. This monument will be made out of Grant Wood's works.
>
> —Thomas Hart Benton on the death of Grant Wood, 1942

Grant Wood was one of the first artists to embrace the Public Works of Art Project in 1933 as an unpaid regional director. He was also one of the first to leave. To the surprise of many, he turned down an administrative position in Federal One as it was being launched in 1935. He said he was too busy with his own work—and no doubt he was—but he probably knew something of the difficulties that lay ahead. Before he died of cancer in February 1942, the experiment was in shambles. Most of the guiding lights had either left (as Hopkins did in 1939) or compromised their own beliefs about artistic integrity in a futile effort to keep the programs politically safe and alive.[25]

In retrospect the New Dealers look naive for believing that art could mingle with politics without damage. "The Arts Project of WPA was, perhaps, one of the noblest and most absurd undertakings ever attempted by any state," wrote W. H. Auden. "Noblest because no other state has ever cared whether its artists as a group lived or died. . . . Yet, absurd, because a state can function only bureaucratically and impersonally—it has to assume that every member of a class is equivalent or comparable to every other member—but, every artist, good or bad, is a member of a class of one."[26]

It is not enough, however, to dismiss this venture as a naive enterprise or a failure. In one sense it was both, but the enormous outpouring of creative energy was itself a contribution. Many of the products of Federal One continue to enrich our cultural life, even though people often do not realize

that a particular mural or other artistic work originated in this depression cauldron.

The National Endowment for the Arts owes a familial debt to Federal One. In this case, however, the parent might hardly recognize the weakling stepchild. More important, an increased self-confidence about American art, music, literature, theater, and culture continues. Every time American artists trust their nature roots instead of adopting a derivative style, Federal One continues to live. In our long and tenuous process of trying to understand the possibilities and limits of democracy, this experiment surely offers both beauty from the past and lessons for the future.[27]

Notes

[1] The Grant Wood papers, Special Collections, University of Iowa Library, Iowa City, contain correspondence, newspaper clippings, and other material. See also James Dennis, *Grant Wood: A Study in American Art and Culture* (New York: Viking Press, 1975); Richard McKenzie, *The New Deal for Artists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Martha O. Cruz, "The Regionalist Triumvirate: Benton, Wood, Curry," (Ph.D., dissertation, St. Louis University, 1975).

[2] Jerre Mangione, *The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers' Project, 1935–1943* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 4; Monty Noam Penkower, *The Federal Writers' Project: A Study in Government Patronage of the Arts* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977); Dixon Wecter, *The Age of the Great Depression, 1929–1941*, A History of American Life, 13 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927–1948): 244–71.

[3] Francis Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 75–76; Forrest Anderson Walker, "The Civil Works Administration: An Experiment in Federal Work Relief, 1933–1934," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1962), p. 43.

[4] Edward Bruce, "Public Works of Art Project," *Congressional Record*, 78 (17 January 1934): 766–67.

[5] Walker, "The Civil Works Administration," p. 149.

[6] Hallie Flanagan, *Arena* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940), p. 12.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 18, 19.

[8] "Jobless Artists Clash with Police," *New York Times*, 6 October 1936, p. 1, col. 2; "WPA Executive Hurt," *New York Times*, 24 October 1936, sec. I, p. 7, col. 1.

[9] Wecter, *Age of the Great Depression*, p. 260.

[20] Peter Blume et al., "In Defense of WPA," *New York Times*, 30 April 1944, sec. 2, p. 7, col. 5; Cornelius Baird Canon, "The Federal Music Project of the Works Progress Administration: Music in a Democracy," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1963), p. 89; C. Vann Woodward, "History from Slave Sources," *American Historical Review* 79 (April 1974): 470–81; Flanagan, *Arena*, p. 435–36.

[11] "Unemployed Arts," *Fortune* 15 (May 1937): 111–12.

[12] Horace M. Kallen, *Art and Freedom: A Historical and Biographical Interpretation of the Relations Between the Ideas of Beauty, Use and Freedom in Western Civilization from the Greeks to the Present Day* 2 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942): 894.

[13] Sarah Simkins, "A Rhythm Band for Mothers," *Etude Music Magazine* 56 (June 1938): 401; Earl Vincent Moore, "Music for America," *American Teacher* 24 (April 1940): 14; Flanagan, *Arena*, pp. 90–92, 99, 109–12, 167; John P. Foley, Jr., and Ann Anastasi, "The Work of the Children's Federal Art Gallery," *School and Society* 48 (31 December 1938): 859–61; *San Francisco News*, 31 August 1938.

[14] Mangione, *The Dream and the Deal*, p. 4; "Dies . . . melodramatic charges of Communis-

tic activity and propaganda put his committee on the front page of every American newspaper and gained him the support of every Republican, conservative Democrat, and Philistine who had long been outraged by the New Deal's propensity for experimental ventures."

[15] Canon, "The Federal Music Project," pp. 63–67; and Emmett Lavery, "Who Killed Federal Theatre?" *Commonweal* 30 (4 August 1939): 351–52. Hallie Flanagan's account of the ending of the Federal Theater Project in *Arena* is excellent. For an example of offending plays see the two volumes *Federal Theatre Plays* edited by Pierre de Rohan (New York: Random House, 1938).

[16] Charles I. Glicksberg, "The Federal Writers' Project," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 37 (April 1938): 165; "Topics of the Times," *New York Times*, 28 February 1936, p. 20, col. 4; Gregg R. Narber and Lea Rosson DeLong, "The New Deal Murals in Iowa," *Palimpsest* 63 (May/June 1982): 86–96.

[17] August Raymond Ogden, F.S.C, *The Dies Committee: A Study of the House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938–1944*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945); Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 441, 457, 475.

[18] (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). The Workers Alliance of America, a union which enrolled a minority of the workers on the Federal projects and which figured very prominently in the committee hearings, definitely had several Communists highly placed in its governing councils and perhaps should be considered a Communist front organization. See Bernard Krash and Phillips L. Garman, "The Impact of the Political Left," Chapter 3 in *Labor and the New Deal*, eds. Milton Derber and Edwin Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957); and Samuel Appelbaum, "History of the Workers Alliance of America," *Work*, 24 September 1938, pp. 8–9. Also, Mangione, *The Dream and the Deal*, pp. 289–326.

[19] Martin Dies, *The Trojan Horse in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940), p. 298.

[20] Hearings Before A Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. on H. Res. 282. *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States* 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938): 857–60.

[21] Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 1st Sess. *Investigation and Study of the Works Progress Administration* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), Pts. 1–2: 204.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 266–67. The book referred to is *American Stuff: An Anthology of Prose & Verse By Members of the Federal Writers' Project, With Sixteen Prints By the Federal Art Project* (New York: Viking Press, 1937) written by members of the FWP on their own time and containing a good deal of social protest material.

[23] *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States*, 4: 2857.

[24] Ogden, *The Dies Committee*, p. 98; Euphemia Van Rensselaer Wyatt, "Uncle Sam Rings Down His Curtain," *Catholic World* 149 (September 1939): 727.

[25] Clippings in the Grant Wood Papers; on Flanagan's censorship activities see William F. McDonald, *Federal Relief Administration and the Arts* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 553–54; Mangione, *The Dream and the Deal* details Alsberg's efforts to appease the HUAC.

[26] "Introduction," *Red Ribbon on a White Horse* by Anzia Yezierska (New York: Scribner's, 1950).

[27] During the sixties concerted efforts began to reclaim and publicize WPA art. (See Josephine Ripley, "Interest Surges in WPA Art," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 September 1965, p. 15.) Fall 1982 also witnessed a New York dinner reunion in which many Federal Theater alumni took part. The debate between "elitists" and "populists" continues in the (Rockefeller) Commission on the Humanities, *The Humanities in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); "On the Third Realm—Elitism versus Populism: The Continuing Debate," is a perceptive editorial in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 16 (Spring 1982): 5–10.

The Mirror of Film: Is That Really Us on the Screen?

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When Edwin Porter's *The Great Train Robbery* burst across America's screens in the first decade of the twentieth century, it provided more than mere escapism; this ten-minute episode of a handful of desperadoes robbing a train was as socially relevant for movie audiences then as the circumstances surrounding *The China Syndrome* would be for filmgoers in 1979. After all, only the year before Porter made his little cinematic triumph Robert Parker and Harry Longbaugh (better known as Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid) had drifted down to Bolivia in order to continue a life of banditry.

Film has been hailed as *the* medium of our time largely because it allows viewers to transfer their identities to the screen. From *The Great Train Robbery* through *Casablanca* to *The Graduate*, movies have touched our cultural pulse by presenting images and motifs capable of embracing the stuff of our lives. Porter's little western drama was contemporarily definitive for people in 1903 because it was about a frontier that was currently in the process of slowly dying. *Casablanca* moved a generation caught up in the same wartime intrigue that was affecting the lives of Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman. Some quarter of a century later Mike Nichols's *The Graduate* evoked the poignancy, bitterness, and humor of American youth growing up and finding romance in a society appreciably more cynical than that of early World War II days. And it is not without some alarm that another Nichols film—*Carnal Knowledge*—managed to strike an all-too-familiar chord as it traced the sexual pleasures (and blunders) of college chums from youth through early middle age.

By the mid-nineteenth century the novel had entrenched itself in the American consciousness. James Fenimore Cooper's exciting tales of *The Deerslayer* and *The Pathfinder* and *The Pioneers* etched vivid images of an aggressive national character. Edgar Allan Poe's tales of mystery and terror probably intimidated his public every bit as much as the films of John Carpenter and Brian DePalma do theirs. Later in the century such "realists" as Theodore Dreiser, Frank Norris, and Stephen Crane produced narratives of an America that had lost its innocence, an America becoming brutalized by industry, economic growth, and attendant social malignancies.

The Victorian stage was an important form of entertainment—occasionally even bordering on art. And the first filmmakers, former theatrical performers like D. W. Griffith, utilized their knowledge of "live" drama in their earliest pictures. In *Birth of a Nation* and *Intolerance* Griffith used the camera in such a way as to duplicate the angle of vision that an audience watching a stage production would have. Only later, with such technical pioneers and Eisenstein and Lang, did the closeup, montage, and creative editing help to establish cinema as a truly independent medium. That independence has continued to manifest itself in many ways, largely technological. Film is a media mix; it reminds a pragmatic, scientifically oriented society like ours that here is an art form that relies on technology, a mode of diversion that proclaims our unique expertise. And that technological sophistication allows us to become intimate with those heroes and heroines up there on the screen via the zoom lens. Virtually nothing has been left to the imagination; film's continuous narrative provides all the sound, movement, and color that real life affords. It only remains, then, for movie people to document the issues that confront us, our longings, frustrations, and deceits.

George Lucas's delightfully crafted *American Graffiti* was like digging through a photo album or a high school yearbook, for persons who had grown up in the fifties and early sixties. The incredibly popular *Rocky* films have been appealing because of their down-but-not-out hero who struggles against heavy odds to reach the top. Rocky's climb from obscurity to wealth and fame is the old story of the American Dream told in Hollywood fashion.

Citizen Kane stands as a kind of archetype of the Dream—the American ethos enunciated by wealth, glamour, and a vision of political power. But *Kane* also underscored the importance that we have generally placed on tradition. Orson Welles presented Kane as a man yearning for the lost innocence of his youth, before affluence and other degenerations had set in. Critic Andrew Sarris has summarized the film's message in the nature of Kane's enigmatic character:

> [*Citizen Kane*] presents an intense vision of American life, distorting and amplifying its materialistic elements at the expense of human potentialities. . . . Kane emerges as an extension of the nouveau-riche American seeking a living culture in the dead relics of the past. Striving desperately to transcend his material worth, Kane is victimized by the power his wealth possesses to alter the moral quality of his actions. In the end, everything has been bought and paid for, but nothing has been felt.[1]

Sarris insisted that Welles's film spoke to the fear we so frequently harbor regarding emotional commitment, our puritanical heritage impeding psychological and social maturity.

George Stevens wove a tapestry of the American persona in a film trilogy from 1951 to 1955, an ouevre that constituted his personal view of our culture's coming of age. *Shane* and *A Place in the Sun* were filmed at about the same time, while *Giant* was made some years later; seen chronologically, the films should be arranged in the following order: *Shane*, then *Giant*, and finally *A Place in the Sun*. *Shane* took place in Wyoming Territory in the 1880s; *Giant* was in, and about, Texas; *A Place in the Sun* was set in California. These locations are mentioned because America's vast panorama has so often been used as backdrop by filmmakers who have wanted to dramatize the promises of Manifest Destiny. Similarly, Stevens's three films accented the dream of material prosperity, conquest of the elements, romance, and personal fulfillment.

Joe Starret, the beleaguered homesteader of *Shane*, equated success and happiness with his property, even willing to risk his life in a showdown with Ryker, the powerful cattle baron who insisted that Starret and the other "squatters" in his valley move on. Stevens thus struck at the very heart of the Dream's pursuit; for when Shane, gunfighter-turned-hired-hand, finds that only by reverting to his former trade can the Dream be preserved, its pursuit is dignified by his selfless altruism. "Are you doing this for me?" Starret's wife, Marion, asks the self-conscious Shane. He answers, almost in surprise that she should inquire, "For you . . . for Joe . . . for little Joe."

Stevens repeatedly referred to the hardships of frontier life: mud streets in a thrown-up township; Starret and Shane struggling together to uproot a stubborn tree trunk—and the pride registered in their faces when they finally manage to dislodge it. The Dream was reward to those who persevered. *Shane* reiterated the romantic view of the land, a view more than egalitarian—it was a divine call to achieve. Those who expected to inherit the Dream had to be worthy of its benefits, a worthiness revealed through the kind of respect that one engendered. Starret's fellow homesteaders looked to him for leadership, always congregating at *his* home to discuss strategy. Finally, it was Starret alone who came to Shane's aid when he was menaced by the cattlemen. Starret's bravery and loyalty obviously qualified him to inherit the Dream.

Giant's Bick Benedict is in some ways a counterpart to Joe Starret. Benedict is the owner of Riata, a sprawling ranch on the endless Texas plain. His wealth is counted in the thousands of acres of land and the thousands of Herefords that graze that land. *Giant* takes off in the 1920s, making it somewhat natural to construe Bick Benedict as a Joe Starret thirty years later, having finally realized his Dream. The toil has paid off. The future appears secure. Like Starret, Benedict accepts the responsibilities of family life. His nemesis is Jett Rink, a shiftless ne'er-do-well who painfully envies Benedict's wealth, his social position in the fraternity of Texas millionaires, and most of all, Benedict's bride Leslie.

When Rink at last strikes oil on a miniscule patch of land (itself a gift from Benedict's late sister), he can't wait to inform Benedict. But wealth fails to make Jett Rink a contented man. The hollowness of his life is a constant reminder that he has no real friends, only sycophants. He will always be an outsider after all. Rink's pursuit of the Dream has been little more than a charade because the real object of his pursuit—Leslie Benedict—has remained another man's wife. Rink's ambition, being tied to retribution and one-upmanship, has prostituted the Dream.

The altogether contemporary setting of *A Place in the Sun* suggests its role as denouement in Stevens's series. With overtones of Greek tragedy, this film now conveys a dated morality but is nonetheless almost unbearably melancholic—the tale of a young man caught up in a dilemma partly of his own making who finds himself ultimately doomed as a result of inherent weakness and personal flaws.[2] Underlying this film's theme was the noble effort of George Eastman to rise above his culturally squalid background to find romance and success. The opening scene finds George hitchhiking on a lonely stretch of highway. A beautiful girl driving a convertible whizzes by. George naturally notices her and her fancy car—and something else—a billboard advertisement for the swimwear manufactured by his wealthy relative from whom he hopes to receive a job. From the beginning, then, the audience becomes aware of George's ambitions, his simultaneous encounters with the multiple goals of his Dream: romance (the girl), material rewards (her car), and a career.

Although he is hired, George is initially put to work on an assembly line. With despair heightened by loneliness, he dates a fellow worker and in his spare time irons out an economic, labor-saving idea which the front office soon acknowledges. His potential at last recognized, George moves into the aristocratic strata of the Eastman Company and of Angela Vickers, the girl he had seen driving down the highway. Then Alice, George's pregnant girlfriend from the assembly line, insists that he marry her and George in desperation plots Alice's murder.

Stevens framed his trilogy around the *land* by presenting America as spacious and bountiful. The modest Starret farm introduces us to the Dream's challenges. Benedict's ranchhouse perches on an ocean of sagebrush, his Dream personified by acres of rangeland and a vast herd of cattle. George Eastman is introduced to us as he trudges down a highway that cuts through an expanse of landscape which suggests the Dream's enticement to him: Angela Vickers propelling her big car through a stretch of real estate on which rests an Eastman Company advertisement.

The characters in George Stevens's films were for the most part motivated by romantic love of family devotion. When Marion Starret found herself on the verge of admitting her attraction to the mysterious Shane, her husband

assured her that he would not have had the heart to fight for their rights had he not been convinced that she was "the finest girl in the world." Toward the end of *Giant*, Bick Benedict admits that everything he had accomplished since marrying Leslie had been to merit her love and respect. For George Eastman everything took a back seat to Angela Vickers. Rather than face the propsect of losing her, he even considered murdering Alice because she represented the sole obstruction to his happiness. All of Stevens's cinematic heroes had ambition; they were willing to fight or take risks for the Dream. If their motives were at times suspect, we can still admire them for their energy and determination.

John Ford was another film director whose favority motif was the American persona. His sentiment ranged from periodic use of Monument Valley as backdrop for many of his westerns to a more overt expression of the sanctity of the land in *The Grapes of Wrath*. For Ford, as for George Stevens, the Dream of America was inextricably allied with the land and all that it offered to those strong enough to embrace it. The first film directed by John Ford after the Second World War was *My Darling Clementine*, a folksy, sentimental retelling of the Wyatt Earp legend. Ford had just served with the American armed forces in the Pacific, making documentaries for the war effort, and in fact had narrowly escaped injury at the Battle of Midway.[3] Still imbued with patriotic zeal, he turned to the frontier fable of the Earp brothers forging a civilization out of rough-and-tumble Tombstone. And when virtuous Marshal Earp frees his town from the clutches of the evil Clanton gang, he earns the citizens' respect and Clementine Carter's undying affection. Thirty years after Ford made his classic western, Martin Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* presented an emotionally scarred Viet Nam veteran, now a New York cabby, weaving his hack through the concrete jungle of a modern "Tombstone," bearing witness to its corruption and eventually deciding to do something about it. Travis Bickle is fascinated by guns, magnetized by violence, and consumed by a need for recognition. He is cruelly rebuffed by a pretty but flighty campaign worker, and his undistinguished job gradually causes him to fantasize about being a hero to the downtrodden. Bickle kills a vicious pimp who is threatening a young prostitute's life and ends up in the good graces only of the girl's grateful parents. There is no glamour in Bickle's life. Instead of being a stalwart protector of society he is spurned or, at best, ignored by an indifferent public. No Clementine Carter for Travis Bickle, only a teenaged streetwalker. No admiring posterity to weave myths concerning his exploits, merely a paragraph on the last page of a daily newspaper.

For Scorsese the tortured Travis Bickle was a metaphor of tortured America; not the euphoric, victorious America of 1946 but the cynical, weary America of post-Watergate, post-Viet Nam 1976.[4] Scorsese's film

slaps us with the invective that John Ford's grandiose vision of America had at least partially disintegrated, that the Travis Bickles now outnumbered the Wyatt Earps.

The violence which atracts so many of us has been underscored in two pivotal films by Arthur Penn. Penn's first directorial assignment took place in the late 1950s, when he transferred Gore Vidal's play about Billy the Kid, *The Left-Handed Gun*, to the screen. Although the film was ostensibly about a mythic, angry-young-man type of desperado, Penn intimated the code of violence and sadism lurking just beneath the surface of American life. And too often that surface exploded in a torrent, as Penn dramatized with *Bonnie and Clyde*, a film made just eight years after he had directed *The Left-Handed Gun*. The public's fascination with violence found a nervous but enthusiastic outlet in the film's version of the slaughter of Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow by a posse of police officers. Penn's camera slowed down in order for audiences to savor his bloodbath, and it was a device that Sam Peckinpah used quite extensively in *The Wild Bunch*, as quirky a paroxysm of guns and gore as any major director or studio of the sixties dared to produce.

The major films about war to come out of the seventies had nothing to do with war's honor or glory, as had the vehicles of the forties and fifties. Michael Cimino's *The Deerhunter* and, even more so, Francis Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* spoke quite uncomfortably to the immorality and waste of war. Neither of these films leaves us with the warm glow of patriotic satisfaction that a *Casablanca* could provide. There is no idealism professed in *Apocalypse Now*; rather, it is a haunting film of strange—one could almost say surreal—contortions, a veritable apotheosis among cinematic interpretations of our involvement in Southeast Asia.[5] Its theses of psychic ordeal and moral stalemate were somewhat supported by Cimino's *The Deerhunter*. It, too, was an insightful study, and a more restrained examination of human conscience, ethical responsibility, and the purgative needs to which we all so desperately flee at such a time.

The movies' unique effort at ego-transference has never been more in evidence than in the Rebellious Youth films of the 1950s. Marlon Brando's role as the leader of a motorcycle gang in *The Wild One* did much to suggest the supreme anti-hero. Further sociopathic behavior could also be expected of James Dean, who mesmerized teenagers in the early fifties as troubled Jim Stark in *Rebel Without A Cause*. The nation's youngsters were assured that they were not alone in their parental conflicts, awkward peer relationships, and confusing identity needs.[6]

Throughout the Depression years American gangster films were popular, with Edward G. Robinson first achieving fame for his 1930 cinematic portrait of a loutish hoodlum in *Little Caesar*. Then James Cagney became

The Public Enemy and Humphrey Bogart played "Mad Dog" Roy Earle in *High Sierra*. Since this was also the era of real-life criminals—John Dillinger, Al Capone—and the newly-formed Federal Bureau of Investigation was beginning to excite imaginations, Americans accepted such movie fare as appropriately contemporary. Ironically, only moments before being shot down by federal agents, Dillinger had watched Clark Gable "die" in the electric chair in *Manhattan Melodrama*. So are the edges of life and art often indistinct.

The most exciting "gangster" film of our generation has been *The Godfather*. More than a big-budget, big-cast drama of the Mafia's nefarious activities at home and abroad, Coppola's epic tale of America's loss of innocence presented the felonious Corleone family as at times essentially indistinguishable from amoral corporate heads or shady government officials. *Little Caesar*'s Enrico Bandello, by comparison, had been a two-dimensional, cardboard figure. The Corleones were complex, interwoven in their private lives and their professional machinations with entertainment stars and businessmen. Roy Earle had been a loner. Vito Corleone was a dedicated family man. Perhaps the most chilling scene in *The Godfather* involved Michael Corleone, the new head of the clan, acting as his nephew's godfather (ironically appropo). As the camera switches repeatedly from the christening to staccato-like scenes of Michael's henchmen eliminating his enemies, we see the priest intoning his most reverential Latin, and almost instantly an image of Corleone "soldiers" machine-gunning the opposition cuts across the screen.

Coppola is telling us that ruthlessness has become a part of our way of life. Inferences to the corruptive power of politics or corporate management are especially evident in a crucial scene with Michael Corleone and Kay, his future bride. Michael has been trying to convince Kay that someday soon the family "will be completely legitimate." When he compares the Corleone "business" with that of being a president or a senator, Kay's reaction reflects her incredulity and distrust:

"Oh, Michael, presidents and senators don't have people killed!"

"Now who's being naive, Kay . . .?"

The musical team of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire was undoubtedly one of the most popular in movie history. Their elegance and grace on a ballroom floor made us temporarily forget the economic woes of the thirties. Rogers in tailored gown and Astaire in sleek tuxedo exemplified the good life, free from anxiety, untouched by the Depression. When comedian Steve Martin made his spoof of such innocence in 1981, he called it *Pennies from Heaven*, and it brutally satirized the optimism that had oozed from the celluloid pores of those old musicals. Martin maintained that the sharp discrepancies between those happy-go-lucky portraits of American life and

the harsh realities of the times deserved to be lambasted.[7] Martin's parody also typifies the pessimism of *our* time, as have *Taxi Driver* and *The Godfather*—all films (made by young filmmakers) reflecting the national traumas of the past two decades.

Film has become an active part of our birthright, reminding us of our past and suggesting a chart for the future. The "socialization" of the film medium has created a harshly realistic persona of the American character on one hand and, on the other, a mythologizing of our history; the ancient world had its Thucydides while we have Scorsese, and its Homer has become our John Ford. As did the Greeks and Romans, we wish to believe in our nobility, our élan. We cherish a heritage richer in romantic assumption that in reality, while simultaneously we search frantically for chinks in our national character. If *Casablanca* was a paean to our resolute courage and responsibility, *Apocalypse Now* is our confessional, for our heroism can no longer be rooted in innocence.

Notes

[1] Julius Bellone (ed.), *Renaissance of the Film* (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1970), p. 61.

[2] William Kittredge and Steven M. Krauzer (eds.), *Stories Into Film* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979).

[3] Documentary, *Hollywood: The Dream Factory* (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studio, 1974), narrated by Dick Cavett.

[4] James Monaco, *American Film Now* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 157–158. Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence, "American Assassins and Mass Murderers: Saints for a Civil Religion of Death," *Mission Journal* (August, 1983) vol. 17, no. 2, p. 5.

[5] Monaco, pp. 329–331.

[6] Danny Peary, *Cult Movies* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1981), p. 282.

[7] Interview with Steve Martin, *Playboy* (January, 1980) vol. 27, no. 1.

Instinctive Beliefs

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All human cognition, from the most elementary perceptions to the most exalted philosophizing, is carried on within the bounds of, and in the general directions set down by the constitution of the brain. The nature and construction of the human brain expresses itself in what we may refer to in a general way as "instinct." It is instinct that gives us our most fundamental beliefs. It is instinct also that guides the construction of our more elaborate systems and beliefs. This instinct may be modified by social pressures (themselves ultimately guided by instinct) and also by our own temperaments and decisions (themselves also loosely but really guided by instinct), but in the last analysis all of our thinking is guided and limited by our nature. This guidance renders suspect the mind's autonomy and unlimited freedom to scan the realm of possibilities for truth in an unbiased fashion.

Most human beliefs are obviously the result of experience and training. Hardly anyone would wish to deny this. Nor do we wish to argue for the notion of innate ideas. Our thesis is that there are innate *tendencies* to come to certain ideas. Some ideas are natural and psychologically attractive if not irresistible. We wish to argue that the very nature and constitution of the human brain imposes a *bias* upon how the world is perceived. The result of this is that from infancy we see the world from a given, shared human perspective which makes certain fundamental beliefs nearly irresistible to us. These highly attractive beliefs—made attractive not by training or socialization or particular experiences of any kind—we are here calling instinctive or natural beliefs. Space does not here permit an extended discussion of just which of our beliefs might be thus classified, but likely candidates for the title of instinctive beliefs would include such fundamental beliefs as (1) that there exists an outside world, (2) that other people and animals are sentient, (3) that the future is likely to resemble the past in its broad outlines, (4) that the world is organized into "things," (5) that events have causes and effects, (6) that cruelty to sentient creatures is somehow repulsive or wrong. Empiricists have taught us clearly that there is nothing about what we experience that forces us to believe any of these things. These beliefs are *interpretations* of phenomena, but interpretations so natural and irresistible that we may refer to them as instinctive. The innate structure of the human brain imparts a bias to our whole cognitive life, coloring everything from the way elementary sensations are organized and perceived to the directions the mind takes in searching for answers to the most arcane

questions in physics, psychology, philosophy, and elsewhere. Let us begin with the question of ordinary sense experience.

1. *Perceptual bias.*

Various skeptics have seen clearly that all our mental activity is and must be relative to the constitution of our brains. Montaigne, for one, observes that, for all we know, quite other senses than the ones we now possess would be necessary for a true picture of nature. He marshalls the classic Pyrrhonian arguments, and ends with this declaration:

> Now, since our condition accommodates things to itself and transforms them according to itself, we no longer know what things are in truth; for nothing comes to us except falsified and altered by our senses. When the compass, the square, and the ruler are off, all the proportions drawn from them, all the buildings erected by their measure, are also necessarily imperfect and defective. The uncertainty of our senses makes everything they produce uncertain.[1]

Since what we perceive is manifestly controlled and limited by our sense organs, and since our abstract thinking is much influenced by our sense organs, and since our abstract thinking is much influenced by our cumulative perceptual experience, the limitations and emphases of our perceptual experience may be supposed to exercise a pervasive influence over the whole of our thought life. Furthermore, our sensory limitations are certainly innate. Babies are born into this world with eyes and ears and taste buds, all preadapted to the sort of world we have. As Karl Popper says, "... theories or expectations are built into our very sense organs."[2]

Research reveals that the eye of the frog is enormously stimulated by any bug-like shape making bug-like movements. The frog's optic nerve records an avalanche of signals pouring from the eye when such a shape comes into the field of vision, whereas other sizes and other motions, be they ever so much larger, set off far fewer discharges. This is all happening in the *eye* of the frog. The experiment makes it plain that the frog is preadapted to see bugs with an extraordinary intensity and vividness. "Such studies apparently support the ethologist's contention that the way in which the brain is innately shaped is highly important to the development of the particular responsiveness of animals to certain attributes of their sensory worlds."[3]

Since examples like the above could evidently be multiplied almost endlessly,[4] the suggestion is strong that human beings likewise perceive what nature inclines us to perceive. And even with our instruments we are still only looking at those aspects of nature so far suggested to us by our senses, instincts, interests. There could be many elements of nature of which we are wholly ignorant, and some elements even beyond our capacity for understanding if somehow we were informed of their existence. Besides,

our instruments do not provide us with an independent criterion showing us that *their* readings are bias-free. N. Chomsky writes, commenting on Lettvin's work on frog perception:

> There is now good evidence from such investigations that perception of line, angle, motion, and other complex properties of the physical world is based on innate organization of the neural system. . . . Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that what has so far been discovered is anywhere near the limit of complexity of innate structures.[5]

Pragmatists, typified by William James, are in agreement that our mental life has its roots in adaptive reactions. For James our most common-sense notions such as of "thinghood," same and different, space, time, causality, etc., are nothing but ". . . sublime tricks of human thought, our ways of escaping bewilderment in the midst of sensation's irremediable flow."[6] "Were we lobsters, or bees," James says, "it might be that our organization would have led to our using quite different modes from these of apprehending our experiences."[7] Speaking not only of the deep structure of the brain but also of the way our thought life is colored by ulterior motives of all sorts, James summarizes with an unforgettable line: "The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything."[8]

2. *The "pure given" of sense data.*

On a yet more fundamental level than that of ordinary perception, we may briefly consider the allegedly pure "given" postulated by and relied upon by most empiricists. Empiricists of nearly all stripes have looked to the "given" in sense experience as a rock-solid, nonsubjective basis upon which to build knowledge. It was their equivalent to the rationalist's "intuition," something just known, behind which it was impossible to go. But it became plain even to empiricists that all observation is theory-dependent and that the most primitive sensations are already the product of the synthesizing activity of the mind. Empiricists continued speaking of "facts," "experience," "the given," and "observations," while at the same time

> admitting that the character of the allegedly indubitable basis was in actual fact controversial. This devastating admission was passed over by assurance that settling the question was unnecessary "for present purposes," or by taking "observation" as a basic, undefined term, i.e., by leaving the given uninterrogated.[9]

Hiram Caton continues,

> In what is perhaps one of the most remarkable pieces of question begging in the history of philosophy, Carnap undertook to salvage an

> empiricism which was admittedly tottering by assuming "observable" to be an undefined term in the observation language.[10]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The subsequent career of logical empiricism was thus an extended begging of this fundamental question.[11]

Now we see even the most hard-nosed of modern empiricists speak of scientific theories as "chapters in the history of ideas," and of the scientific tradition as one of "critical myth making" (Popper). They admit that scientific laws are theory-laden and depend on induction which is mysterious as to its logic (Feigl). Poincaré, Dingler and Carnap admit that the construction of physics requires stipulations that rest on free choice. The manifestly subjective criterion of simplicity enters in (Carnap). And if "the given" itself is synthesized, yielding sensations, these are further synthesized, yielding objects, and only then does science come in transforming this, our ordinary world of things, into scientific entities, "fictions," "arbitrary constructions," which constitute scientific theory.[12] Three-dimensionality is, for Carnap, a fiction, as is causality. Mach was tempted to solipsism. And Comte "recognized that what counted as fact depended upon the stage of the progress of science."[13] Israel Scheffler, an important defender of the alleged objectivity of science,

> states that the liberalization of the criterion of cognitive significance has resulted in its dissolution; that the attempt to base the objectivity of science on a conceptually "unalterable phenomenal base," i.e., on a given independent of categorizing observation, "breaks down decisively"; that objectivity presupposes the "moral impulse" of responsibility in belief as well as an "ontological vision" of an independent reality constraining belief.[14]

Thus Scheffler, a supposed champion of objectivity, "is tainted with the iniquity of the enemy."[15]

Karl Popper says,

> Classical epistemology which takes our sense perceptions as "given," as the "data" from which our theories have to be constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are in fact adoptive reactions, and therefore interpretations which incorporate theories and prejudices and which, like theories, are impregnated with conjectural expectations; that there can be no pure perception, no pure datum; exactly as there can be no pure observational language, since all languages are impregnated with theories and myths.[16]

Rigorous empiricism is thus driven to admit the mind's absolutely crucial role in the process of knowing—or must we now say constituting?—reality.

It is driven to the admission of an unknowable thing-in-itself, or even worse, to a phenomenalism close to Berkeley.[17] Empiricism now admits at the level of both sense data and ordinary perception a brain-born bias inclining the mind in directions biologically useful but which would therefore have no necessary connection with objective truth. One would as little wish to draw conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality based upon biologically adaptive features of the brain as upon biologically adaptive features of other parts of the body, such as an opposable thumb or the presence of fingernails. Even formal logic, trusted alike by the rationalist and the empiricist, has evolved, according to Henri Bergson, for purely adaptive purposes, and though it is most useful for dealing with the material world, it may be wholly misleading when applied to ultimate reality, or even when applied to the biological sciences which, according to Bergson, cannot successfully be understood on the mechanistic terms implicit in mathematics and formal logic.[18]

3. *Peirce and others on instincts, "divination," and intuition.*

C. S. Peirce was an early and brilliant champion of the idea that even the most primitive sensations are results of inferences, that not even "red patches," "sweet tastes," etc. come to us unmediated. A sound, for instance, must be *inferred* from the nerve signals, which act as premises.[19] Even our perceptions are thus of the nature of hypotheses. Peirce argues also that not merely our sensations and perceptions, but also the whole of our "higher" cognitive activities are guided at every step by deeply pervasive instincts. In the process of investigation we must go on a kind of "automatic control."[20] For Peirce, the associative process which underlies creativity must be considered as under some guiding influence, else it would be totally blind and impotent. (Compare Hume's "blind and powerful instincts."[21]) The mind must have some power of divination[22] which enables it to home in on likely answers amidst the infinitude of irrelevancies. In the end, reason, according to Peirce, "for all the frills it customarily wears, in vital crises, comes down upon its marrow-bones to beg the succour of instinct. . . . Reason, then, appeals to sentiment in the last resort."[23] At another place Peirce declares that instinct "is to argument what substance is to shadow, what bedrock is to the built foundations of a cathedral."[24]

Poincaré says that the subliminal self "is not purely automatic; it is capable of discernment; it has tact, delicacy; it knows how to choose, to divine."[25]

Karl Popper endorses much the same point, saying, "the method of trial and error elimination is largely based upon inborn instincts."[26] Popper gives also what he calls a "fundamental theorem": "All acquired knowledge, all learning consists of the modification (possibly the rejection) of some form of

knowledge, or disposition, which was there previously, and in the last instance of inborn dispositions."[27]

Ernst Mach says:

> An *instinctive*, irreflective knowledge of the processes of nature will always precede the scientific, conscious apprehension, or *investigation*, of phenomena. The former is the outcome of the relation in which the processes of nature stand to the satisfaction of our wants. The acquisition of the most elementary truth does not devolve upon the individual alone: it is pre-effected in the development of the race.[28]

Arthur Koestler, in his book *The Act of Creation*, is sympathetic with these sorts of themes. Koestler quotes Max Planck as saying that "the pioneer scientist must have a vivid intuitive imagination for new ideas not generated by deduction, but by artistically creative imagination."[29] Koestler comments that such quotations "could be continued indefinitely, yet I cannot recall any explicit statement to the contrary by any eminent mathematician or physicist."[30] Koestler's monumental book is an attack on the simplistic regnant empiricism, which dominates so much of psychology and philosophy, and which imagines that everything can be explained in terms of pure experience and the law of association or stimulus-response.[31]

4. *Some psychologists.*

Among psychologists the Gestaltists saw that it is the mind which attempts to organize the data of sense into forms agreeable to its own nature. Wolfgang Köhler, in his classic work, *Gestalt Psychology*, offers a wealth of experimental data in support of this conclusion. According to Köhler, the data of sense pour into our minds with no organization of their own. It is the mind which imposes organization upon these data. Furthermore, the mind does so in obedience to its neural structure: "Sensory organization appears as a primary fact which arises from the elementary dynamics of the nervous system."[32] According to Köhler, all our cognitive activity is directed by "vectors" imposed upon it by the physiology of the brain; in other words, by instinct.

Jean Piaget's work with infants and children seems clearly to demonstrate that certain kinds of cognitive operations can only be performed after the brain reaches a certain stage of development.[33] This refutes the view that a baby's brain is like an adult's, only much less experienced. The child could be given all the experience of a certain kind you please, and he would still never grasp the concepts involved until his brain had reached a certain further state of development. Certain kinds of understandings of spatial relations, quantity comparisons, etc., are just not possible until the brain has had a chance—not to gather yet more experience—but rather to develop the

requisite facilities, physical facilities as well as conceptual facilities. It is fairly obvious that as we go backwards in a child's development, it is not a matter of his becoming gradually and continuously dumber and dumber until his intelligence fades down to zero. The growth of his intelligence is not like a light growing brighter and brighter but like an automobile being put together. Its capabilities come into being by leaps as different systems are completed and all the necessary components of a system finally fall into place. There can be no vision at all, for example, until every element in the visual system has developed to a working stage. Philosophers have tended to look upon the intelligence as a simple matter of degrees. This would perhaps put an end to skepticism, since, although our investigative light may be dim, we can eventually look at everything in a large room even with a dim light. On the other hand, if the grasping of certain elements of reality requires capacities of the brain which are complex systems, and if those elements of reality can never be grasped failing the presence of even one essential part of the cognitive system, then we are not examining one large room with a dim light but rather nature may be for us a mansion with many rooms, each requiring a different key to enter, such that if we do not already have the key, we have no way of getting one.

5. *Kant and Hume.*

Among the philosophers, Kant is the most famous for pressing the theme that perceived reality is the result of sense data and the synthesizing activity of the mind. But he did not appreciate the skeptical effect of his doctrine. Kant wanted to show how knowledge of the world was possible, but succeeded in showing at most only how the world must necessarily appear. But we did not need Kant to tell us that the world appears to us the way it appears to us; we did not need him to tell us that we have already a host of *apparent* truths delivered to us by science and math.

We wanted to know—the skeptics wanted to know—what the world is really like, not just how it must appear. But Kant no more than Hume can answer that question. The world as noumenon is beyond our ken.

Hume's skepticism was more thorough than Kant's because where Kant thought we at least had certain knowledge of appearances, Hume was not even persuaded of that. On this point, Hume, more consistently than Kant, saw no good reason for supposing that the laws governing appearances (be they in our own minds or whatever) would remain constant. Of course Hume *believed* they would remain constant, since nature overcomes all skeptical doubts to the contrary.

In any case, it is an insight of revolutionary importance for philosophy that the nature of our thinking is inevitably influenced by the nature of the instrument or medium of this thinking. In spite of Kant's fame, empirical

philosophy is ever prone to lapse into periods of forgetfulness of this crucial truth. During those periods of forgetfulness, philosophy takes up the instrument of thought, passing judgments of all sorts the most confident, forgetting to give any thought to thought, assuming all the while that the mind has no inherent limitations but needs only time and experience to garner all truth. As soon as the assumption is stated, its improbability is apparent.

6. *Reason's "divine" function.*

Hume did not neglect to think about thinking. He saw very clearly that we have no good reasons for trusting reason's power to take us to truth. This is an element of Hume that his empirically inclined successors have chosen to neglect. This neglect to consider the medium of our thinking, this implicit faith in the objectivity of our cognitive processes, can be nicely illustrated in the following remarks of Bertrand Russell:

> Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realms, it is insight that first arrives at what is new.[34]

We plainly agree with Russell's main point. But even here he gives a role to logic and reason that cannot really be justified. He assumes that reason can transcend its biological limits or determinants, can survey all things, compare, "harmonize and control" all things. Reason is the naturalist's divinity: it is that to which he gives divine attributes. Reason for him is potentially if not actually omniscient and omnipotent. It is assumed that, given time, reason could see all, understand all, regulate all. For the naturalist, reason is quite literally his *deus ex machina*. From out of the machine of the physical universe, from the chance agitations of matter which have given rise to man, arises—Reason. Deliverances of sense experience or of "insight" may, according to Russell's view, be critically, divinely scanned by reason, which may then control, harmonize, accept, reject them—fulfilling thus the kingly functions of the gods.[35]

Perhaps we could be persuaded to accept to a degree this view of reason. But if we do, it would have to be from a background or a perspective other than that of pure naturalism. And even if we accepted the notion that the mind can to some extent transcend the limitations of the body and the brain, and if we accepted that the mind has some real freedom to control and regulate and harmonize our thoughts, still I would raise all the skeptical objections and limitations of which this discussion largely consists. That is, reason would still be exercising this freedom within bounds set by the nature

of the brain and in directions suggested by instinct. Strange that it remains to those of us who in our metaphysics have some room for a body-transcending mind and who can with some plausibility believe in such—strange it is left to us to point out the possible limitations of the mind, and call the naturalist back from his "theo-pological" conception of the mind. The mind *is* related to the body; it is *not* completely free and unbiased; it works within the bounds set for it by human nature; it is guided by subtle—and sometimes not so subtle—instincts, which give it direction and put it on the trail of those things which will satisfy it.

Naturalists are well aware that mental activity is closely associated somehow with the brain. They are loathe to accept free will with its implications of some nonphysical, nonmechanical operation of the mind. But they go right ahead thinking and reasoning, urging upon everyone the virtues of logic, without pausing to consider that upon their own most cherished principles, all of their thinking must be brain-biased and brain-limited in such a way that may, for all we know, completely vitiate thinking as a truth-gaining process. Naturalists pay lip service to Hume. But they absolutely refuse to take seriously his most fundamental conclusions. They think of him as having destroyed the claims of metaphysics and religion, but his strictures on science and reason they take as curiosities, puzzles to be toyed with.

7. *Conclusion.*

We see that from the lowest to the highest levels our cognitive activities are guided by instinct, i.e., by constraints imposed by the structure of our brain. Whether our cognitive activity is *completely* determined by the nature of our brain is another question; but that our mental activities are *guided* by the innate structure of the brain seems to us all but obvious. What we perceive, how we perceive it, what interpretation we place upon our perceptions, and in fact all our thought, no matter how abstract and abstruse, is moulded and guided by the nature of the knowing instrument itself. Our cognitive activity is also guided by our decisions and stipulations, but that is a topic for another occasion. But even in that regard, our decisions are not wholly arbitrary, but are themselves influenced by the inner light of instinct.

Notes

[1] Quoted in Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 52.

[2] Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 146. Also see p. 72.

[3] *Psychology Today: An Introduction* (Del Mar, Calif.: CRM Books, 1970), p. 97. No author listed.

[4] Karl Popper cites some experiments performed upon cats in *op. cit.*, p. 72. Popper also cites in this connection Konrad Lorenz's *Evolution and Modification of Behaviour*.

[5] N. Chomsky, "Linguistic Contributions to the Study of Mind: Future," in *Language and Thinking*, Parveen Adams, ed. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 356.

[6] William James, "Pragmatism," *Pragmatism and Other Essays* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 82.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[9] Hiram Caton, "Carnap's First Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 28, no. 4, June 1975, pp. 648f.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 649.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 627.

[12] These quotations are cited in *ibid.*, p. 632. In the sentence to which this note is attached the word "fictions" is Carnap's; the expression "arbitrary constructions" is Caton's.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 637.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 658.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 145f. Also see p. 71.

[17] Caton, *op. cit.*, p. 646n.

[18] Henri Bergson, "The Nature of Intellect," *Creative Evolution* (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), pp. 167–182.

[19] Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), 5.221ff.

[20] *Ibid.*, 6.462.

[21] David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," *The English Philosophers From Bacon to Hume*, Edwin A. Burtt, ed. (New York: The Modern Library, 1939), p. 680.

[22] Peirce, *op. cit.*, 6.307.

[23] *Ibid.*, 1.630–632 *passim*.

[24] *Ibid.*, 6.503.

[25] Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation," *The Creative Process*, Brewster Ghiselin, ed. (New York: The New American Library, 1952), pp. 35–39 *passim*.

[26] Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[28] Ernst Mach, *The Science of Mechanics*, Thomas J. McCormack, trans., Sixth edition (LaSalle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1960), p. 1.

[29] Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), p. 147.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] See Noam Chomsky, "Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas," *Innate Ideas*, Stephen P. Stich, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 129–130. See also Karl Popper's fierce attack on associationism and related notions, *op. cit.*, pp. 64ff., especially p. 67: "To put my position clearly and radically: *there is no such thing as association or conditioned reflex.*"

[32] Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York: The New American Library, 1947), p. 118.

[33] For a good summary of Piaget's work along with an extensive bibliography see Ruth M. Beard, *An Outline of Piaget's Developmental Psychology* (New York: New American Library, 1969). See especially pp. 29–31.

[34] Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (New York: New American Library, 1960), p. 25.

[35] Actually, if we wish to look in man for especially god-like attributes, we should look rather than to reason, to man's *will* and *imagination*.

Rectification: An Ancient Solution To a Modern Problem

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"To enlarge himself, he enlarges others; to enlarge others, he enlarges himself." This concise description of his paragon, the jen man, by the Chinese sage, Confucius (551–478 B.C.) probably constitutes the oldest definition of a professional known. Confucius also offered advice to those seeking professional growth: "If names be not correct, affairs cannot be carried out successfully. If I were engaged by a monarch to administer a state, the first thing I would do is rectify the names."[1]

After twenty-five centuries the most populous nation in the world still follows Confucius' moral code. On the basis of this achievement, he deserves to be ranked with Christ, Buddha, and Socrates as a consummate teacher. On the basis of the service he rendered in restoring moral order to the society he cherished, he also merits the respect due a professional. He further secured an honored place in the history of human education by conceptualizing—in the sixth century B.C.—sequencing, inquiry learning, individualized instruction, performance-based evaluation, and small group discussion. Since education in the Western world rarely includes a study of Oriental history, it is not surprising that contemporary educators consider these practices innovative.

Impressed by these remarkable credentials and undaunted by Western disdain for their ancient and Oriental source, I will illustrate a technique which Confucius called "rectification" or "correcting the names." Given the crucial role of terminology in educational communication, I believe rectification can serve as an effective tool for professionals seeking growth not only as individuals but as institutional staffs. It seems to me that the practice of attributing ineffective performance to a "breakdown in communication" is, like "computer error," all too often a "cop-out." It seems more likely that breakdowns occur when professionals fail to exert the energy necessary to reach agreement on the meanings of concepts central to their enterprise, e.g., discipline, evaluation, coordination, etc.

In this article, I will analyze three sets of related but conflicting concepts—first, behavior, acting, and conduct; second, labor, work, and acting; third, power, influence, and authority. The potential of a clearer

perception of these concepts for clarifying the teaching role recommended them for analysis.

The first analysis distinguishes behavior from acting from conduct. These distinctions are critical to educators who aspire to greater professionalism since they isolate its fundamental disciplinary element, moral conscience. Preoccupation with legal accountability has tended to obscure the fact which Confucius makes clear, that educators render service to society in moral situations.

The exertions of human beings can be classified as behavior, acting, or conduct. Behavior, which they share with plants and animals, refers simply to movements. Acting is the process by which human beings actualize their potential. It expresses uniqueness. It always begins anew in the sense that the situation never existed before and someone new is its source. Tai Chi master Huang captures the situation generated by acting when he says:

> Every lesson is the first lesson. Every time we dance, we do it for the first time. We haven't forgotten what we know. It is new because we are doing it for the first time.[2]

Since a man's potential is unknown, the someone new is unqiue. Acting is open and spontaneous, irreversible and unpredictable. Potential energy is undetectable until it is transformed.[3] Man's fallibility dooms it to some error. Without error, however, there would be little need or basis for learning. With error, there is need for forgiveness. Otherwise there could be only punishment. The former focuses on the welfare of the sinner, the latter on the event.

If action is open and spontaneous, whence does it derive direction? The answer is in promise. Forgiveness is appropriate when the commitment undertaken in a promise is not honored. As a fallible being, man is unable to rely on himself. As a social being, he cannot remain his own unique master. Promise mitigates both deficiencies by binding people together, enabling them to act in concert. It allays the fear of the dark of uncertainty not by eliminating it, as systems science chauvinistically purports to do, but by projecting beams of hope along the path into the future. Contracts, treaties, covenants promise. Courses of study also promise. On the strength of the promise that defines the substance of the professional's commitment, society grants them autonomy. In the classroom, the teacher's promise provides students a basis for anticipation and thereby a means of directing their conduct.

Forgiveness and promise make beginning again possible. A promise on which one defaults provides a pretext for forgiving. Absolution wipes the slate clean. Promising anew launches beginning again.

Conduct may be defined as acting with moral intent, morality being viewed as rule-oriented. Teaching is a service to society. As an irreversible

intervention into the lives of students by fallible teachers, it takes on moral dimensions. Teachers become professional to the degree that they subject their acting in the interests of students to moral rules. They become professional to the extent that they conduct themselves appropriately.

Analysis of the second set of concepts—labor, work, and acting—seems appropriate in view of the introduction of the industrial model into contemporary schools with the consequent danger that the teaching role will degenerate to that of technician.

Teachers presumably work for a living. But do they? It might be productive to examine this presumption in the context of distinctions among labor, work, and acting. One may view labor as behavior dedicated to survival. As such, it is closely allied to the biological processes of staying alive. It yields no product. It proceeds until terminated by death. Since it is repetitious and private, it is painful. It is painful to the extent that preoccupation with the labor of staying alive deprives one of the opportunity to actualize potential. Labor, therefore, tends to dehumanize. It is irreversible.

Work, on the other hand, provides stability and focus to living by producing. Production begins and ends, and its products tend to outlive it. It is reversible. Work, therefore, provides reference points within process and gives at least the illusion of durability and possibility of control. Unlike labor, which cooperates with nature, work destroys nature in order to mine the raw material from which it fashions products.

Work is unlike acting in that blueprints guide its course. Engineering restricts the play of the random as much as possible. Work flourishes in an atmosphere of no suprises. It can do this because almost universally it deals with things. While labor expresses mere otherness, work, being role-oriented, distinguishes. However, unlike acting, work does not individualize. Teaching and learning assume labor and blend work and acting in the sense that teachers and learners produce new selves.

The third set of concepts—power, authority, and influence—warrants attention since it relates to what teachers consider their most difficult problem, discipline. The symmetry of the word discipline inheres in the matter of control. Whether in art, music, literature, science, or sports, the discipline of the practitioner refers to the ability to control himself in relation to the medium. Sports resembles teaching in that the athlete, like the teacher, must control his body, thoughts, and passions.

The pervasive and frustrating problem of classroom control can be clarified, and perhaps obviated, by explicating the mode in which teachers seek to gain it. Current thinking seems to center on authority as the key. It isn't.

Three modes are available: power, authority, and influence. Translating each into grammatical form makes critical differences apparent.

Power translates to: "If you do (or do not do) 'X,' I will do (or will not do)

'Y.' " The agent threatens or withholds something of significant value as a condition for compliance. The mode is personal and exploitive.

Authority translates to: "Do it" or "Don't do it." The agent issues the command in the context of the privilege granted him by an institution on the condition that it is used to serve the ends for which society created the institution. The mode is institutional and therefore impersonal.

Influence translates to: "If you do (or do not do) 'X,' 'Y' will probably happen." Teachers can predict the incidence of "Y" because they are trained to. However, the degree to which students believe in the teacher's expertise and the extent to which they trust that it will be used in their interest determine teacher control for learning purposes. Here the role is both institutional and professional.

In the context of the classroom, then, discipline would be defined as a set of influences used by the teacher to establish, maintain, or restore a situation in which effective learning can occur. In the same context, misbehavior would be viewed as any behavior which inhibits effective learning, the achievement of teaching objectives.

These rectifications seem to justify the following distinctions in delineating the teaching role.

First, teaching is a form of conduct. It is a moral activity. It therefore renders teachers subject not only to legal and administrative constraint but to the ubiquitous constraint of moral judgment.

Second, teaching must rely on influence generated by trust and expertise in order to serve the student. Teachers may lean on authority when influence fails to maintain an effective learning situation. Because power is personal and exploitive, it is unacceptable in the classroom.

Third, teaching is acting rather than work. In the classroom, teachers actualize their potential in a process which is irreversible and unpredictable because it is unprecedented. Their potential, since they are human, may actualize in forms which jeopardize student welfare; idiosyncratic personal needs which conflict with student needs may press for gratification. Only pervasive professional discipline born of a commitment to service can safeguard the students' welfare.

These insights yielded by rectification attest the potential of this process for exposing to critical scrutiny fundamental aspects of education. It would seem, therefore, to have considerable promise for helping educators enhance their competence by clarifying the nature of their commitments.

Notes

[1] James Legge, trans., *Confucius* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1971), p. 305.

[2] Gary Zukav, *The Wu Li Dancing Masters, An Overview of the New Physics* (New York: Bantam, 1979).

[3] J. W. N. Sullivan, *The Limitations of Science* (New York: New American Library, 1933).

The Mind/Body Function: Not One, Not Two, But a Process

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Introduction

Recent research in psychosomatic medicine points to a need for revision in traditional psychological categories called mind and body. The intimate relationship between mind and body, seen in the connection between stress and illness, between personality patterns and cancer, and in the physiological basis for such severe pathologies as schizophrenia, all suggest mind-body mutuality rather than a dichotomy. In short, the conventional categories of mind and body are in need of a radical overhaul.

To suggest some fruitful ways of overhauling ancient and misleading dualism, I should first like to reframe the entire mind/body problem. This will involve not only a proposal for an unconventional usage of language and issues relating to the mind/body problem, but also unfamiliar analogies taken from such disparate fields as music and physics. I contend that such a reframing would carry significant implications for fields as far apart as biology, learning theory, medicine, personality, and therapy.

In order to reconceptualize an alternative to traditional mind/body formulations we need a brief survey of the history of the problem. We shall approach the history of the mind/body category from the simple standpoint of chronology, taking the oldest position first. In order of development, the categories are the original conception of mind as substance, the materialist, idealist, and epiphenomenalist positions; the Cartesian theory of interactionism; and a modern, organic theory which attempts to achieve a synthesis of mind and body.

Traditional Approaches to the Mind/Body Problem

While most recent research emphasizes the inseparable relationship between mind and body, an examination of the traditional mind/body positions reveals an ancient history of separation and dualism. The most ancient mind/body position that is based upon the separability of the two comes from Plato.

Plato took mind as the ultimately real substance in the universe. Material entities are shadow-like projections of this substance into the world of sensibility. The body, its organs, and its functions are therefore mere traces left by ideas and forms—the primary entities in a Platonic universe. Plato sometimes refers to these physical manifestations of mind substance as limitations that are imperfect or flawed and subject to decay. Because the physical body exists only as a derivative of the mind, the body cannot by nature make any substantial contribution to the development of the mind. Taken to its logical conclusion, this position leaves us in the awkward posture of arguing that physical experience is largely inconsequential in determining what a person comes to know or understand. Experience can only elicit the pre-existent knowledge already present in the mind. The view of mind as substance thus sheds very little light on the role of learning and experience in the development of cognitive processes and is therefore not regarded by psychologists and educators as very useful.

The second position, essentially an inversion of the mind-as-substance view, is the materialist theory which places matter as the primary stuff of reality and mind as a derivative, secondary phenomenon. This view, expressed first by Democritus and later developed by British empiricists, can now be found at the core of both modern behaviorism and Marxism. In part the materialist view can be understood as a reaction to the epistemological dead end left by the mind-as-substance approach. Because of its influential role in modern behavioral science, I would like to discuss the materialist position in more detail, focusing on its present manifestation, behaviorism.

Behaviorism, which started as a housecleaning effort in psychology, is built on the premise that reference to private mental events violated the canons of science. From the standpoint of radical behaviorism, the only essential variables appropriate to scientific inquiry are units of overt behavior. Material states, notions of "mind," self-reports, data gained by introspection—are all seen as un- or pre-scientific, as nonempirical, hence useless, constructs. However, what was initially a methodological prescription quickly became an ontological doctrine: whatever could not be reduced to the language of behavioral description could, for scientific purposes, be ignored. But as seductive as this conception was, some investigators discovered objections. Built into most—but not all—variants of behaviorism is the notion that all behavior can be reduced to concepts of either classical or operant conditioning, either stimulus substitution or response modification within contingencies of reinforcement. Some contemporary behaviorists emphasize cognitive purposiveness, as for instance Bandura's concepts of social learning. Chomsky[1] and Miller, Galanter, and Pribam[2] argued that it is not possible to reduce mental experiences to purely behavioral terms, for the empirically observable behavior is, to use an analogy, the tip of the

iceberg. Much in human experience does not manifest itself in empirically observable behavior. Demonstrably, human beings have wants, wishes, and goals, and these do not always or necessarily express themselves as isomorphic behavior. Indeed, most cognitive processes such as memory and thinking are unobservable and have only a loose correspondence with observable behavior. Thus, the materialist position—represented in the last century by behaviorists—is the logical opposite of Platonism and is faulty on the same grounds: it ignores or obscures a valid realm of human experience.

Interactionist Approaches

French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes rejected monism, the belief that the universe is composed of one substance, and proposed that a human being must be some kind of union between two distinct substances, a soul or mind, and a body. Here the body is seen as a mechanical system whose function could be described purely in terms of material causes and forces. The mind is regarded as a pure thinking entity. There is in this system the provision that mind and body can interact. Thought, that is, rational deliberation, can alter the course of the body or mechanical system, and sensations can be perceived by the mind once they have been rendered in the brain. The value of the Cartesian thesis is that it ascribes substantial reality to both mental and physical aspects of existence, something which neither of the two monistic views permits. But the Cartesian dualism presents more problems than it solves.

One problem is in explaining how two entities, mind and matter, so alien to each other, could possibly interact in the intimate way Descartes envisaged. The behavior of bodies viewed as mechanical systems must be reducible in principle to descriptions based upon physical laws. But since thought is neither a physical substance nor a force, and since it is not subject to physical laws, in what sense is it possible for thought to interact with a physical entity? How then does thought, which is not subject to the same laws that allegedly govern matter, change the course of events of totally dissimilar entity? Thus, Descartes' formulation leaves us with a mystical solution that is not really a solution.

In contemporary research, Penfield[3] and Eccles[4] remain wedded to a Cartesian formulation. Each has tried to pinpoint brain centers which mediate the interchange between the two entities, but their efforts take us no further than Descartes' basic philosophical problem. The generic problem of relating two disjunctive universes, a mental and a physical entity, is left untouched.

The basic logical problem of explaining systematic interaction between two entities without reference to a common principle has led some to abandon altogether the view that mind and body possess any ontological

status. Rather, it is held, mind and body ought to be taken as abstract characterizations of something more fundamental. To gain a clearer apprehension of this more fundamental reality from which our everyday distinctions between mental and physical are constructed, we must turn to that branch of science concerned with formulating our basic concepts about matter—physics.

Implications from 20th-Century Physics

Though it may seem far removed from the arena of mental experience and biology, data from physics is relevant for several reasons. First, the mind/body problem is a special case of the more generic mind/matter problem about which physics has always had the final say. Second, if human experience is to be taken as an event *in* rather than an exception *to* nature, then the agencies which give rise to human mind should in some general way be exhibited elsewhere in the natural world. If mental process can be seen as a natural phenomenon, then its particular expression in human nature becomes less enigmatic.

Physics in the twentieth century has so radically changed our view of physical matter that it hardly bears any resemblance to the common-sense notion based on the classical Newtonian world view. Whereas classical physics takes physical reality as made up of ultimately solid and inert particles, the "new" physics implies a universe in which process, activity, and change are the ultimate matters of fact. Inasmuch as a process implies a movement in time, we are led to deduce that without process there is neither time nor actuality.

The implications of this reformulation are far-reaching. Process is not merely an added dimension of change superimposed upon a basically stable substance, analogous to wave motion through an otherwise stationary body of liquid. Rather, process *is* the very substance itself. All the observable properties of a physical system—mass, momentum, energy, space, and time—are partial manifestations of an underlying process evoked by the scientist's interpretation through instruments and cognition.

Putting the observer/scientist back into the picture places important epistemological constraints on the way experimental results are interpreted. The observer and the observed are not ultimately separable; they are interdependent variables in a system. Consequently, rather than portraying nature in any direct sense, theories are confined to explaining relationships between the observers and the observed that pertain to a certain context of investigation. This shift may seem subtle but it marks a major change in the way theory and reality are related.

To view theories as ways of representing relationships between the observer and the observed implies that different investigative contexts may

predictably give rise to different theories. A plurality of theories, then, may correspond to a plurality of contexts which together refer to a single unmanifest reality. This state of affairs is an established pattern in physics, an example of which is coexistence of both a particle and a wave theory of light. The peaceful coexistence of different theories, each explaining the same reality in different observational contexts, has been given statutory recognition by making it into a principle known as "complementarity."

If complementarity has proven useful in physics, could it not also prove helpful in understanding the mind/body problem? It may, of course, but complementarity introduces yet another problem. Mind or mental experience may describe human behavior in one context, while chemistry and biology may describe and explain it in others. Here we have traded one form of dualism, dualism of substance, for another, dualism of description and theory. Appealing as the trade may seem, complementarity does nothing to resolve the basic logical problem inherent in Cartesian dualism.

Though unsatisfactory from a logical standpoint, parallel and complementary theories may be useful and constructive, as long as the contexts to which each theory refers are distinct and unrelated. As a case in point, the properties of light to which wave theory refers are not usually relevant to those contexts to which particle theory pertains. But in the case of mind/body explanations, the situation is very different—events to be explained by the alternate theories are often identical (e.g., psychosomatic phenomena, voluntary motor control, memory). Alternative unrelated descriptions in such instances make for incoherence by fractionating or bifurcating a single, undivided whole. The real problem remains: to find a common ground of principles which can systematically restore the integrity of apparently disparate mental and physical descriptions of human behavior.

Though the principle of complementarity itself may not be applicable to the mind/body problem, the basic narrative of nature given by modern physics is of enormous importance. Some basic implications of physics for the mind/body problem can be drawn by returning to the seminal notion that the most meaningful facts of the physical world are processes.

The notion itself is ancient, the best-known Greek exponent being Heraclitus. However, despite its ancient roots, process philosophy, as the tradition has come to be known, did not greatly influence the course of scientific thinking until quite recently. Instead, the process view has long been eclipsed by another ontological doctrine, atomism, which has dominated nearly all Western scientific formulation since medieval times. It was not until the twentieth century, with the revolutionary, paradigm-shifting developments in quantum theory and relativity, that the grip of atomistic thinking in physics began to weaken. The old concepts of a space filled with aggregations of inert, dead bits of material could not be reconciled with the

new vision of a universe populated by a community of energetic events, each inextricably linked with the rest in a vast cycle of creative activity.

By the 1920s a systematic exposition of a complete cosmology based on process philosophy could be found in a A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*,[5] a book which, despite its broad significance, is rarely studied outside a small circle of Whitehead scholars. In philosophy, Whitehead's work has never enjoyed the attention accorded mainstream developments in the discipline, and aside from a few notable exceptions, his work is scarcely cited in the natural sciences literature.

I contend that this neglect signifies a subtle yet fundamental problem surrounding the assimilation of revolutionary scientific knowledge by the scientific community. Put simply, the problem is that the language used in scientific discourse has, over the centuries, been so profoundly shaped by the atomistic world-view that it becomes difficult for one to think and speak in terms which do not implicitly reflect this view. For example, the world view of classical mechanics, of Descartes and Newton, assumed a world of geometric order fully reducible to three-dimensional space. Of course, the displacement of objects in space is expressible in a fourth dimension, time, but the entities themselves are ultimately spatial. Spatial order and spatial structures are the product of visual perception.

It is perhaps not coincidental that common language also is biased toward the framing of experience in static visual terms. We depict things in diagrams, visualize relationships in space, see the point of an argument, and view problems from many perspectives. Even the word theory comes from Greek, "to look at." So deeply entrenched are visual metaphors that we may be blind to their inherent shortcoming: they ignore the fluidity and continuity of the physcial world, which both quantum physics specifically and process philosophy generally imply. If we are to formulate approaches to the mind/body system which are coherent with our most recent understanding of nature, then new models and metaphors must be found which adequately reflect the essential characteristics of reality as a process.

Implications from Music and Improvisation

Physicist Milic Capek suggests that auditory experience may provide a medium of representation which more faithfully reflects the kind of entities implied by a process view. Specifically, he invites us to consider a musical phrase, a "thing" which can manifest itself only through time. Capek writes:

> At each particular moment a new tone is added to the previous ones (of the melody); more accurately each new moment is constituted by the addition of a new musical quality. The quality of a new tone, in spite of

> its irreducible individuality, is tinged by the whole antecedent musical context which, in turn, is retroactively changed by the emergence of a new musical quality. The individual tones are not externally related units of which the melody is additively built; neither is their individuality absorbed or dissolved in the undifferentiated unity of the musical whole. The musical phrase is a successive differentiated whole which remains a whole differentiated in spite of its dynamic wholeness. Like every dynamic whole it exhibits a synthesis of unity and multiplicity, of continuity and discontinuity . . . .[6]

Musical metaphors, therefore, provide a better descriptive language for reality conceptualized as a process than have traditional spatial and visual metaphors. Specifically, musical metaphors address the following features:

1. *Quantum unity*. There is a minimal duration necessary for the structure to exist. A note of music cannot be instantaneous—it requires a definite minimum duration to manifest itself. Neither a note nor a melody can be subdivided *ad infinitum* without being destroyed.

2. *Mutual causality between whole and part*. Study of living organisms requires an explanation of the extent to which the behavior of a system is determined by both the constituent and separate parts and by the emergent qualities of the whole. In music, part-whole characteristics are mutually defined. In a musical phrase, the last tone of a melody is joined to the antecedent musical context by short-term memory. In this way, the preceding whole defines the nature of the constituent parts. Conversely, the new tone can change the meaning or redefine the antecedent context in various ways so that the part exerts an effect on the whole.

3. *Indeterminacy*. Process systems are characterized by a measure of uncertainty. The outcome of a subatomic event or a cellular change is not wholly predictable in all its apsects, in spite of a complete knowledge of its past behavior and present conditions. This phenomenon is not accurately accounted for by purely visual metaphors. Indeterminacy, however, is a natural feature of musical wholes. At any stage in the unfoldment of a musical sequence the next element may be related to a definite class of notes rather than a single note and still meet the requirements set up by the constraints of the particular musical context. Thus, a musical structure is not determined in the sense that only one outcome is possible; rather there are any number of possible resolutions. Whitehead once observed that any process (variously termed an "actual occasion" or an "actual entity") arises as "an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future." This statement also holds true for each new note in a melody—assuming that "cause" is used not in a deterministic sense but rather as a discrete point, that is, a temporal way station.

4. *Being and becoming*. According to process philosophy, existence is manifest only in the activity of development. In music, being is sustained only through becoming. Becoming is assumed as a precondition of being. It is plainly evident that if a sequence of vibrations ceases, then the music no longer exists. In transcending any dualistic discontinuity between being and becoming, we move closer to describing the kind of actuality characteristic of living beings.

The inseparability of being and becoming is even more evident in musical improvisation. Improvisation requires the composer/performer to generate music which meets the criteria of form, coherence, and clarity within the moment(s) in which the piece develops. One therefore cannot go back and correct mistakes. The mistakes, compositional accidents as well as blunders of performance, must somehow become transformed from aimless perturbations into purposeful elements integral to the meaning of the music. Consequently, one of the paramount conditions of improvisation is the capacity to seize upon the unanticipated and the fortuitous and incorporate it into the evolving pattern.

Unlike prepared composition in which the piece often is conceived in circumstances unrelated to those of the performance, improvisation occurs entirely within the boundaries set by the performance occasion—to borrow from computer jargon, in "real time." These boundary conditions include all the unforeseen variables of mood, readiness, audience, etc. present at the time.

Improvisation is not a purely random form of composition. While it may involve exploiting the unforeseen, the music is also systematically shared by an abstract set of rules or formulae known to the composer/performer. These formulae have to do with certain principles of melodic construction, harmonic progression, counterpoint, rhythm, etc. In the language of information theory, such principles may be classified as *algorithms*, or generic injunctions about relations among notes, rather than analogs, which name specific notes. At this level of abstraction, such injunctions make no mention of specific notes or duration—they have no concrete tonal or temporal dimensions. Mathematicians will recognize that such a set of musical algorithms has a parallel in group theory.

Thus, in improvisation we have music produced by the interaction of two determined systems. The algorithms are definite and the musical occasion is definite, yet the particular outcome, the actual music, is not predictable in detail.

The improvisation model thus elucidates a crucial distinction rarely made in static forms of representation so pervasive in nature: between causing an event and strictly determining it. For the most part, the two have been regarded as equivalent in principle. Even if in practice one could not predict

the specific result of a cause-effect sequence, in principle, the outcome was assumed to be determined precisely by "hidden variables." Unpredictability, it was held, merely reflects the observer's ignorance of all the operative causes and/or their precise values. As we have already noted, quantum physics has struck at the very root of this assumption. "A causes B" can no longer be taken to imply, "A precisely determines B." Rather it must now be understood to mean that A determines a *class* of possible outcomes, B_1, B_2, B_3, . . . B_n. But the specific *instance* of that class which materializes is not determined by A.

Finally, improvisation suggests a spatio-temporal sequence which develops a momentum of its own, a momentum which produces a new source of order. As it unfolds, the music develops an historical identity. This identity becomes a third source of direction which guides the course of composition at each subsequent moment. Thus, in a limited sense the music creates itself—an expression which improvising musicians themselves sometimes use in describing what happens when they compose.

To sum up, music provides an alternative model for representing the elementary qualities of actual things as processes. Musical wholes (a) more faithfully reflect the basically temporal dimension of processes, (b) clarify the reciprocal causality between part and whole, and (c) coordinate the seemingly irreconcilable coexistence of causality and indeterminacy within a single occasion. Furthermore, improvisation as a genre of musical activity (a) suggests a way of understanding the intractable relationship between being and becoming implied by process metaphysics, (b) provides an illustration of how a dynamic structure can evolve out of the interplay between adventitious events and abstract algorithms, and (c) suggests a scheme whereby a self-determining system can evolve from externally determined antecedents.

By looking for parallel structures in music and physics, a certain depth or perspective may be gained. The comparison takes a rather abstract set of relations derived from the esoteric world of quantum physics and points to these relations in terms of ordinary experience. Through this analogical exercise, important concepts in process philosophy are given an intuitive ground of meaning, and thereby begin to influence ways of perceiving and thinking about other phenomena. The principles can then be employed as instruments which may profitably aid inquiry into other problem areas where fresh insights may be useful—problem areas such as the relation of mind and body.

A Non-traditional Definition of Mind

The application of principles derived from an improvisational model to the mind/body problem begins with a definition which bears upon some of

the more crucial limitations inherent in traditional metaphysical approaches to mind. This definition will lead to a much-needed distinction between *mind* and *consciousness*.

Because mind is sometimes viewed as a kind of force which turns the laws of entropy upside down, I want to begin with a definition by negation: mind is not a source of energy. Sentient beings, like all biological systems, are subject to the conservative regularities of physics and chemistry. The "energy" which is involved in intelligent activity is fully accountable in terms of the laws of mass and energy that apply to all physical systems. If not a source of energy, what status does mind have in a system whose thermodynamic and mechanical components are understood in physico-chemical terms?

First, a thermodynamic description tells nothing about that aspect of an intelligent organism which is most important: structure and patterns of energy expenditure. For us to be content with a physico-chemical account of intelligent behavior is comparable to explaining computer function by measuring the electrical energy it consumes while ignoring the way it handles information. There is clearly a need to account for the informational structure, both differentiation and integration, which exists in cognitive activity.

It is thus proposed that mind is the symbol we employ to signify the algorithms for encoding the activities of the nervous systems. As organizing principles, these algorithms must necessarily be very general. Gregory Bateson suggests they may involve something like logic in the broadest sense: the building up of tautology to create theorems which code and integrate changes in the nervous system, changes generated by the interaction of the body with the environment.[7]

Defined in these terms, it becomes clear that there is a fundamental distinction between mind and consciousness. A recurrent failure to make this important distinction characterizes 2,000 years of traditional theorizing on the mind/body problem. Ironically it is this very failure to differentiate what are logcially distinct categories that has led to the perpetuation of mind/body and mental/physical dualisms. My position is that the difference between *mind* and *consciousness* is as great as that difference usually thought to exist between *physical* and *mental*.

The distinction can be drawn in terms of process and product. If mind describes the *forms* of process, the constraints pertaining to the coding of brain activity, then consciousness is the resulting product. But if consciousness is the product, then the process-system which generates it must necessarily be unconscious, or more precisely, preconscious. There is some evidence to support this assertion. Studies of processes of image formation, depth perception, and perceptual constancies indicate that the processes themselves are not accessible to introspective analysis, and, more often than not, operate quite independently of conscious intention.[8] There is also

evidence that the learning of motor patterns involves, to a large extent, processes which do not operate at the conscious level.[9] Introspective study of the learning as it occurs may actually interfere with the learning. The implication here is that the forms of mental process are primarily unconscious, though not necessarily in the manner Freud thought.

From Mind to Consciousness: The Link of Memory

To understand how consciousness may be infinitely variable among persons while mind may be so lawful, impersonal, and abstract, it is necessary to examine different types of memory and their respective functions in the mind/body system. We can begin by describing the simplest form of memory found in any biological system, physical memory. Physical memory is nothing more than the simple retention of a difference made by some event. At this level, there is no reconstruction or representation of the event, only the simply residual effect of the event on the system. The past is significant only in what it contributes to present physiological activities. These are circumscribed by cyclical phases of activity and rest within which differences will be recorded. It must be emphasized that a memory at this stage consists of multiple quantum events which are non-extensive in space and time. A scar is an example of physical memory: it shows the effects of, but does not reconstruct, the occasion which precipitated it.

Cognitive memory and consciousness, which Whitehead characterized as the fringe of memory tinged with anticipation, is a symbolic reconstruction of space and time derived from grouping characteristics of a large number of accumulated bits of physical memory. This grouping, once constructed and coded, can, in turn, become a new datum, to be integrated along with other coded groupings. The assimilation of these new internally generated data greatly extends the scope of past events that can now be made relevant to the present cycle of activity. A cognitive reconstruction of past events may even include remote occurrences for which the original traces in physical memory have long since vanished. Thus, to continue the analogy, I may remember an injury which occurred in childhood yet the scar may have disappeared.

However, the longevity and precision of cognitive memory is achieved partly by changing the nature of what is stored. The coding and integration of physical memory traces is necessarily more abstract, several stages removed from the original data. Thus, while more of an organism's past is preserved, the nature of that past is now more symbolic. Perhaps it could be said that the generic feature of all cognitive activity is the coding and integrating of organism-environment interaction into analogical propositions of a higher logical type. These propositions in turn become new sources of data for progressively more abstract and extensive representations of the original interactions.

While cognitive memory involves reconstruction in space and time, the algorithms which propose the patterns of coding and integration—for which the shorthand term is mind—are not themselves reducible to temporal-spatial dimensions. Like Kantian *a priori* categories, the algorithms are prior to space and time and therefore cannot be described in such dimensions. Without any mass-energy, and transcending any spatial-temporal status, mind is every bit the empty construct it is given to be in Buddhist metaphysics.

If mind has now been identified as that *form of process underlying cognitive activity*, the basic difference between mind and consciousness seems to follow. Consider the status of mind which follows from the premise that organizing principles at any level in nature will be general. For example, the organizing principles of epigenesis (embryonic development) are the same for hamsters as for humans. In fact, the very possibility of a science presupposes the existence of general principles. But consider consciousness—a uniquely personal construction. No two individuals construct in exactly the same way.

However, such infinite variability does not create an unbridgable discontinuity between a theory of mind and the phenomenology of consciousness. Mind, as the system proposing the forms of process, the algorithms which code and integrate events, may well be as universal and invariant as any other system of natural laws. But the product resulting from the interaction of these algorithms with a particular sequence of neurophysiological activity will likely be unique for two reasons. First, the number of specific states that can be produced and offered for coding by the nervous system must be vast, given the complexity of the system itself. Second, as consciousness is a temporal structure, the sequencing of states becomes a critical factor in its formation, just as the ordering of notes in a melody is essential to its character. Changing note order changes the melody completely—even if the actual notes remain the same. Were it possible for neurophysiological states to be identical between two individuals, it is highly improbable that the sequential context would be identical as well. This alone seem to preclude the likelihood of duplicating the uniqueness of a conscious personality.

What is proposed then, is an alternative to a simplified monistic view on the one hand, and a dualistic conception of mind and body on the other. I propose a three-sided interaction.

The first component of the interaction includes the body-environment interactions as the sum total of quantum neurophysiological events. These events arise and perish from moment to moment.

The second component involves the algorithms which selectively code and integrate the quantum traces of these events. The selective nature of the

coding evokes a parallel with random processes in evolution: chance mutation yields innovation while epigenesis and natural selection dispose of all but those changes which conform to internal constraints in the first instance and survival in the second.

I suggest that algorithms of mind bear a resemblance to the selective criteria of epigenesis and natural selection. Not all bodily events will be coded and integrated to form consciousness. Some will fail to fit within systematic constraints.

The third component, called psychosomatic unity, is the synergistic temporal whole generated from the interaction of the first and second components. This component refers to the entire field of conscious and potentially conscious experience, including imagery, memories, feelings, intentionality, and percepts. While initially derived from the first two components, the psychosomatic unity, by virtue of its characteristic extensiveness in time can become self-determining. Thus, consciousness cannot be viewed simply as a function of the momentary state of the body, but rather must be understood as a function of the entire history of experienced states.

Conclusion

The intimate reciprocity between mental experience and physiological activity implied by the three-way interaction is consistent with findings in psychosomatic medicine and psychiatry. Confirming evidence points in two directions. On the one hand, there is the corpus of studies relating psychological stress and illness[10] and the preliminary research indicating correlation between personality patterns and cancer.[11] These investigations are taken as illustrating the predictable influence of psychological states over physiology. On the other hand, we are confronted with an expanding base of evidence indicating biological correlates, if not causes, for many of the more severe forms of psychopathology such as schizophrenia,[12] depression,[13] and even possibly phobic reactions.

Studies stress the dramatic effects of subtle changes in an organism's physical state on both cognitive and affective processes. To be sure, investigative procedures demonstrate a bewildering variety of links between psyche and soma, but, taken as a whole, all strongly suggest a mutuality of cause and effect that defies the traditional view of mind and body as separate.

I have argued that this mutuality is not adequately expressed in traditional formulations of the mind/body problem. The inadequacy of most traditional views of this ancient problem can be traced to their reliance on archaic and misleading assumptions of a static and substance-filled universe. Moreover,

these same assumptions are built into the idioms of the English language—idioms which continue to structure our perception and understanding of mind as a static, bifurcated substance. But, as I have attempted to argue, static, visual-spatial representations of fluid events ignores the fluency of mind as process. As an alternative, I have nominated metaphors, assumptions, and constructs from 20th-century physics and from music, especially musical improvisation. This provides a medium which more accurately reflects the interactive mind-body process.

An important implication of this admittedly novel view of mind/body is that mental processes are seen not as mystically separate from, but as coterminous with, nature. Human mind thus is not taken as the chief *exception* to nature but rather as its chief *exemplification*. Whitehead's summary of the problem bears repeating:

> Any doctrine which refuses to place human experience outside nature, must find in descriptions of human experience factors which also enter into the descriptions of less specialized natural occurrences. If there be no such factors, then the doctrine of human experience as a feat within nature is mere bluff, founded upon vague phrases whose sole merit is a comforting familiarity. We should either admit dualism, at least as a provisional doctrine, or we should point out the identical elements connecting human experience with physical science.[14]

Recognition of a generic mental aspect in the natural world saves us from the profound alienation between the "objective" world of the scientific observer who peers at nature (including human nature) from without, and the "subjective" world of the actor who looks from within. This may be the most pernicious dualism of all.

Notes

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The Scientific Destruction of Humanity and the Educational Project of the Humanities

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There is probably no more often perceived and widely discussed problem today in educational theory and, more fundamentally, in our view of the world than the dualism between science or technology and the humanities. This dualism makes it seem impossible to gain a coherent view of either the purpose of education or the proper way to lead a human life. It is probably the greatest reason for our declining concern with educational excellence, because it keeps us from being able to articulate convincingly why intellectual pursuits are good for human beings. It is also the reason for the "decline of the West" or, more precisely, of the hold the Socratic tradition has on our minds and hearts. We no longer really believe that the assertion that forms our political order—that reason can provide moral and political guidance for human beings—is true.

Neither the consistent scientist nor the consistent humanist can really remain satisfied with this dualism. Modern science, when its presuppositions are coherently articulated, does not claim to be a "partial" view of the world at all.[1] A defense of the humanities and, as shall be seen, humanity itself require that the view of the world put forth by science be thoughtfully opposed. Fundamentally, there can be no coexistence between technology and the humanities as "world views." Nor can there be a "synthesis" that will encompass them both.

The scientific distinction between "facts" and "values" is sometimes understood as creating a sphere in which the humanities can operate free from scientific determination. But the assertion of this distinction in a way which preserves the autonomy of values is, in truth, an inconsistent one. For today's scientist, it is an illicit residue of decayed and discredited Kantianism. Today's "behaviorist" or "Marxist" social scientist refuses to give the realm of values any autonomy; he asserts that he can explain the growth and decay of values as determined by some impersonal force. They can, in other

words, be explained by their subrational psychological or historical origin; they are chained in some way to physiological and hence scientific necessity. The assertion of the autonomy of "values" from scientific "facts" can be traced to Max Weber's desperate—and, from a scientific perspective, unreasonable—attempt to save the spheres of religious and political life from scientific "disenchantment."

Modern science asserts that the universe can be explained by some principle of homogeneous materialism that leaves no room for human distinctiveness. This understanding of universe is true because it "works"; it generates unprecedented amounts of power. There is no certain way of showing the truth of a theory except through its ability to generate power. The argument is familiar: knowledge is power; science is technology. It is not really science (*scientia*, knowledge of the way things really are) until it is "applied." Reason is not autonomous; its task is simply to be an instrument for the acquisition of power.

The obvious and often posed question to the scientist is what is the purpose of all this power, all this knowledge? Why is it good for human beings? The answer given by the early defenders of modern science, and one which is still widely accepted today, is comfortable self-preservation, to keep human bodies in pleasurable motion. While the modern scientist is compelled to acknowledge in some way or another the problematic (for the materialist) fact of human self-consciousness, he can argue that this fact is not evidence for the freedom of the human being from materialistic concerns. Candid self-analysis reveals that one is, in the decisive sense, enslaved to bodily need.[2]

Nevertheless, any materialistic "world view," however intelligently or methodically put forth, is manifestly insufficient for *human* beings. The ultimate purpose of technology is to eliminate human contingency, to make human beings free from the ultimate necessity, death. Given the necessary presupposition of an infinite universe by any proponent of homogeneous materialism, this goal is impossible. One cannot imagine bringing the entire universe under human control. One can imagine the elimination of death as a necessity, but not as a possibility. If this elimination were accomplished, the result would not be a reduction, but an immeasurably large increase, in the amount of human fear.

Death would no longer be an inevitable necessity, but an avoidable possibility. Knowledge of the inevitability of one's own death allows one to risk one's own necessarily finite existence for an ideal one imagines to be of infinite worth: a friend, one's family, one's country, a principle, or even reputation. If death is not necessary, then it seems impossible not see one's own death as the only real evil and hence the preservation of one's life as the only "ideal." One would live in a lead house and never go outside; there

could be no courage, no honor, no glory. These could no longer be considered virtues, ways of making the best of the human condition, but only as insanity purely and simply. The imaginable limit of technological success would result in the contraction of human experience to nothing but fear.[3]

Perhaps this contraction of experience is the ultimate liberation from "illusion." But it is easy to see why partisans of a more comprehensive definition of humanity oppose unbridled technological progress. It causes one to wonder whether genuine humanists can be partisans of "total liberation" or whether the rhetoric of progress or liberation—whether technological in the obvious sense or capitalistic or Marxist—is nothing but propaganda for the technological "world view."

But the partisan of technology is not simply a propagandist. He can present a powerful argument for the superiority of his perspective. Its power cannot be understood without looking at its most profound opposition, the view of death put forth by Socrates. According to Socrates, fear of death is unreasonable because it implies knowledge of something about which the living mortal could have no experience. In any case, death is a necessary part of human existence. It is unreasonable to act as if one could overcome necessity. Personal and political projects based on such unreasonableness lead inevitably to monstrous self-destruction.

Socrates' "reformed" poetry opposes, above all, the angry fanaticism of Homer's warrior, which is his wildly unreasonable attempt to negate or at least gain revenge against the allegedly terrible fact of his own mortality.[4] Similarly, from the Socratic perspective, it would also be unreasonable to view reason as primarily a technological instrument, as a means of somehow conquering death.[5] One ought to face one's own death with the greatest openness, as the occasion of greatest curiosity, and not allow one's irrational fear to keep one from standing one's ground in support of truth and virtue. Fear of death is both ignoble and irrational; without it neither courage nor philosophy would be imaginable. Death could not be the greatest human evil because, without it, we could not experience the two particularly *human* ways of life, the one devoted to the pursuit of truth (philosophy), and the other, to the pursuit of honor (politics).

The technological view of death as put forth by Bacon, Hobbes, and others asserts that it is perfectly reasonable to view death as the primary evil. The Socratic view is incredible and inhumane; who can deny that life is the precondition for everything else we hold dear? The philosopher cannot philosophize; the gentleman cannot manifest his nobility, no "greatness of soul" whatsoever is possible without the cooperation of a living body. Those who assert that the soul is somehow autonomous are guilty of fraud or self-deception. In truth, we know nothing certain about the soul. Consequently, given the connection between reason and self-love, there will be

as many opinions concerning its character as there are human talents and ways of life. We have every right to suspect that Socrates' opinion that the properly ordered soul is the soul of the philosopher philosophizing is merely one of many instances of the inevitable confusion of "one's own" excellence with "human" excellence.

From this perspective, the intelligent approach to the fact of one's own death is the technological one. One applies knowledge or "science" to the eminently practical tasks of candidly acknowledging one's fear, deducing its consequences, and acting "methodically" on the basis of those consequences. Technology is the only way to effectual human freedom, and its proper use presupposes enlightenment concerning the true consequences of human embodiment. In other words, in a way reminiscent of Christianity, one must come to grips with one's enslavement (worthlessness) and hence humbly concede that all pride is vanity before one can be truly free.

From the "classical" perspective of pride or "greatness of soul," the objection to this understanding of death is its vulgarity. It takes its bearings from what most human beings believe to be the greatest evil and what is, only in most cases, the most powerful passion. It obliterates the distinction between the many and the few. It unjustly and incorrectly denies virtue its autonomy. It chains greatness to common opinion. It makes science become technologial, by refusing to acknowledge the existence of the rare but real human desire for "pure" theory.[6]

The technological response to these objections is that common opinion is right. Those who vulgarly prefer solid success to empty words and lost causes sensibly require "empirical" evidence to justify their preferences. Methods of science must be "intersubjectively verifiable," because there is no certain way to justify any assertion of the distinction between the few and the many. Because this distinction has no justification, it must be understood as a "rationalization" of the self-interest of a narrow group or "faction." It is nothing more than propaganda used by vain tyrants to impose their will on human beings who, in the decisive sense, are no different from them.[7] Human beings are all "embodied"; they all die and are aware of their mortality. They would all prefer to avoid death if they could. This generalization *may* have its exceptions, but they can be safely ignored as "deviant" cases of no scientific significance. Even they can perhaps be eliminated by the progressive improvement of the method of science.

The technological view of the world begins with the assumption that God or nature gives humanity only "formless" matter, an infinite universe. Human beings impose order on matter through their "rational will"; they create in response to human need. The "primary" needs are of course bodily; human beings create to enhance their prospects for comfort and survival. In their creations, they seek to become "godlike," to overcome the

limitations of their embodiments. They impiously seek to become "god-like" precisely because they "know" there is no God, because they know all "empirical" evidence points to the fact of each individual's mortality as his own ultimate evil. Because, in the decisive sense, God or nature has given humanity nothing, it cannot be supposed that this gift imposes any obligations or limitations on human striving. Salvation can only be achieved through hard work—both mental and physical—or technology. According to the technological perspective, the "theology of liberation"is the tale of humanity's progress from a brutish and penurious existence almost completely chained to necessity, to one in which humanity completely frees itself from this necessity through its own labor. The "Kingdom of God" comes to earth when "the realm of necessity" gives way to "the realm of freedom" at "the end of history." Having won complete freedom through his own "rational will," man becomes God.[8]

The theology of liberation, however, is ultimately incredible. As has been seen, the imaginable limit of technological success points not to uninhibited human freedom for "self-realization" but to a contraction of human experience to nothing but fear. Despite his intoxicating vision of his own and humanity's god-like future, the partisan of the theology of "scientific" liberation can succeed only, finally, in reducing humanity to "brute" equality, to a homogeneous mass composed of Alexis de Tocqueville's "gentle, peaceful" slaves or Nietzsche's "last men" who care for nothing except bodily security. They are free to do whatever they please with their easy, indefinitely long existences, but nothing at all will please them except the total avoidance of any sort of risk.

This conclusion can be stated more completely by considering more systematically the "metaphysical" presuppositions of the technological view of the world. It identifies humanity with self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is consciousness of one's own death as the ultimate evil. To be aware of one's own death is to be full of fear; it is to be unhappy. Humanity or self-consciousness is unhappiness (or "alienation"). The purpose of reason is as an instrument to overcome this unhappiness through intelligent or methodical labor. History is the results of this labor. If a human being is really self-conscious or rational, then history will be a record of man's progressive eradication of this unhappiness. As long as history continues to be made, humanity is still essentially unhappy. At the end of history, human beings will be happy, and the technological project will be vindicated; reason will be shown to have been really capable of satisfying human desire.[9]

At the end of history, human beings will be satisfied. This can only mean that they will no longer die. If it can mean nothing else, Marx, for example, must be wrong. Marx says that human alienation has an economic cause.

Hence, at the end of history, when economic scarcity is definitively overcome for all human beings, everyone will be happy. Alienation, in other words, will disappear. There will be plenty of "products" for everyone with very little work.[10]

Human beings, however, will still die, Marx suggests, and they will be aware of it. There will not really be complete freedom from necessity. Consequently, although there will be "plenty," there will not really be "enough" from a materialistic perspective. The ultimate scarcity is scarcity of time, and, as long as human beings are still both self-conscious and mortal, scarcity will continue and so will alienation.[11] History cannot come to an end on a Marxian basis.

Marx's vision might be saved with just a few alterations in the name of consistency. It identifies humanity with the making of history. At the end of history, therefore, those beings heretofore called human should properly be called something else. They become either Gods or beasts. They are not Gods because, according to the technological view of the world of which Marxism is a variant, it is impossible for human beings really to become immortal. They must be beasts, that is, they must lose that which makes human being distincive: self-consciousness. If human beings were no longer aware of their mortality, they would no longer be unhappy. They would be happy, or, better, content, as humans today call the animals content. If history has an end, if technological striving has a purpose which can really be achieved, it must be the elimination of self-consciousness, the abolition of man properly so-called.[12]

This conclusion, of course, is recognized to be true by behaviorist psychology, which attempts to abolish freedom and dignity or humanity in the name of survival and contentment of a certain type of organism. After a moment's thought moreover, it is not difficult to see that the goals of Marxism and behaviorism are essentailly the same. Both aim at the creation of docile, cooperative, "species beings" which will be totally content with their environment. Surely *the* enemy of this contentment is "individualism" or self-consciousness.[13]

The destruction of self-consciousness is perfectly compatible with the homogeneous and materialistic view of the universe of the technological perspective. Self-consciousness seems to be a problematic exception to this general view, and the partisan of technology cannot explain it. He might attempt to explain it as an evolutionary product of the species' instinct for self-preservation. But this explanation is not very scientific, because the experience of history teaches the incompatibility between the consequences of self-consciousness and self-preservation. The discontent with self-consciousness expresses itself in history through bloody conflict, and all the technological propaganda in the world is not able to eradicate this conflict.

The proper explanation of self-consciousness is as a mysterious "accident"; no "theory of evolution" can satisfactorily account for the emergence of humanity.[14] (A development of this point is the basis for a cogent, reasonable opposition to "evolutionism.") How and why humanity came to be is not known. From the technological perspective, humanity is an "error," an example of "deviant behavior" about which the "scientific method" cannot give an account. It is the task of science to eliminate error with knowledge; hence, it is the task of science to eliminate humanity or self-consciousness. If it cannot, then science is not truly science.[15] The scientist must *make* homogeneous materialism wholly true and bring alienation to an end.

The manifest desirability of the destruction of self-consciousness within the context of technological perspective can also be seen through a reflection on the purpose of labor. Technology is "mental labor"; it is the methodical imposition of human purpose on formless nature. The labor itself, strictly speaking, cannot be understood as choiceworthy for its own sake, but only as a means to an end. The ultimate end, to repeat, is the conquest of death. Given its impossibility, however, it can be argued that human beings can still enjoy the technological product of "free time." Through the conquest of necessity it allows one to live a long, prosperous life without working very hard or very long. It gives one the time to pursue whatever is one's own unique form of "self-realization."

The view that "free time" is a human good can be traced to Aristotle's classical account of the goodness of leisure. Aristotle connects leisure with self-sufficiency, and he argues that leisure is superior to every form of labor because of its freedom from bodily and temporal concerns.[16] The purpose of leisure is contemplation, both of the intelligible order of nature and of one's own place within that order. Perhaps contemplation is of necessity primarily self-contemplation, and it is a good when it is a pleasurable recognition of one's own freedom and excellence.[17] It is a severe enjoyment of one's own self-consciousness, which involves a certain forgetfulness of one's indebtedness to others and even to one's own body.[18] The connection between leisure and self-consciousness must involve one's ability to somehow transcend the perspective of time.[19]

For the partisan of technology, such transcendence is, in truth, impossible. The experience to which Aristotle refers is not self-consciousness but an illusion. The genuine experience of self-consciousness is consciousness of one's mortality or consciousness of time. It is a miserable experience, and it reveals nature's *hostility* to humanity and the universe as a terrible place. Contemplation, which is, to repeat, essentially self-contemplation, is the experience to be avoided.[20] The "uneasiness" it brings us sends us immediately back to work. Indeed, it reveals that no amount of labor will ever

be enough to reach our goal. Human beings struggle endlessly until death. Life brings us no joy except as an imaginative ideal toward which we constantly strive but which we never reach.[21] Technology, then, cannot really give us "free time," because we are never free from time's necessity. It makes us hate leisure. Modern human beings are constantly on the move, and they know no genuine serenity.[22]

The technological perspective allows us no freedom from the experience of time. All such experiences of freedom—such as the one of the Socratic philosopher, the courageous warrior, the gentleman of honor, or the person of faith—are dismissed as illusions, as "values," which cannot be true because there is no "empirical" evidence that they truly conquer time or death. By showing that human freedom is, in truth, impossible, and hence that humanity itself is consciousness of desire that cannot be fulfilled, this perspective leads one to conclude that humanity itself is an evil to be destroyed.[23] This conclusion is the primary source of the "nihilism" or theoretical and political fanaticism of our time.

The project of our time, then, seems to be the "deconstruction" of the West, with its view that Socratic self-consciousness ought to be the model for human striving. Socrates was deluded or lied when he said that pursuit of such consciousness is the greatest good for human beings and could be the foundation for genuine virtue or nobility. The "effectual truth" of the Socratic way—"the will to truth"—has been to destroy those illusions which made self-consciousness once seem good and to leave nothing left but the terrible experience of our fundamental misery and the meaninglessness of our transitory existence.[24]

This vision must be replaced by another one. According to Nietzsche, the fundamental source for all the variants of all the "existentialist" responses to the technological perspective, the definition of humanity as a rational being must be replaced by one rooted in physiological strength and courage. Nietzsche affirms that science has told the truth about God and nature. Reason is capable of negating all illusions human beings have about the worth of their existence. God is dead; humanity is a human creation with no cosmic support. Only the strongest courage can support a defense of the worth of humanity in this light.[25]

This defense is necessarily fanatic; it willfully chooses the blindness of Dionysian intoxication as the only way to overcome the nihilism of rational vision. It wills the total destruction of the West. Indeed, it prefers to will the end of all existence than not to will at all. The most profound question to be asked is whether this affirmation of the will is really a defense of humanity at all—or will not its "effectual truth" be the replacement of the human being, not by the superman, but by the "blond beast"? Does not Nietzsche's teaching, in its own way, point to the abolition of self-consciousness and so

of humanity as surely as does Marxism and behaviorism? His opposition to "Socratism" or self-consciousness, it seems to me, is rooted in his view that he cannot, after having experienced all that is implied in "the death of God," give an argument concerning why he opposes the technological destruction of the human will.

The "existentialist" intellectual, following Nietzsche's lead, claims to find his humanity in his total commitment to a cause or "ideal," ignoring willfully the "empirical" questions concerning the practical consequences of the attempt to actualize it. With this commitment he loses his individuality in the solidarity of revolutionary fraternity, and he forgets his "natural" concern with the empirical question of the fate of his own and others' bodies. Is ignoring the brutality of revolutionary means in the reverie of its imagined ends a sign of human excellence?[26] Or is it a sign, again, of a desperate desire to lose one's humanity by imaginatively negating everything connected with reason or self-consciousness?

It is especially revealing to reflect on the typical choice of Marxism as the source of commitment by existentialist intellectuals. It is nothing new to observe that Marxism, today, rarely exists in its purely scientific form; it has been "humanized" through infusions from the thought of Nietzsche and perhaps Nietzsche's only real student, Martin Heidegger. The materialism of Marxism might seem to be radically antagonistic to the willfulness of existentialism, but, upon reflection, they can be viewed as different roads to the same goal. To affirm the truth of Marxism is, from a certain perspective, to affirm as a human being that humanity is an evil to be overcome. Perhaps it is the perfectly human reaction to the fundamental truth revealed by the progress of science.

Nietzsche and Marx are linked together by their common experience of the radical alienation of contemporary man which, as Heidegger says, is rooted in his "homelessness." His existence, in other words, is absolutely unsupported and contingent. He experiences himself as absolutely worthless and miserable.[27] It is no wonder that he no longer desires to be human. He either surrenders his will or self-determination to some principle of technocratic determinism, or he surrenders his reason to the frenzy of unbounded, incredibly destructive anger. His great enemy, to repeat, is the self-consciousness which is the pre-condition for genuine self-control.

The primary task for "humanists," partisans of humanity, is to determine how to defend the continued existence of humanity in our time, when there are powerful arguments and political movements working for its destruction. This task must be undertaken with full awareness of two not easily answerable questions. Has humanity, in principle, come to an end? Is the history of our time nothing more than applying this principle globally? Remember that Hegel and Marx argue that history has a *logos*; such a *logos*

could only be available to time-bound beings if every human possibility has manifested itself in time. The exhaustion of such possibilities would logically mean the end of time, the end of history, the end of humanity.[28]

Nietzsche denies that history has a *logos* or a *telos*; how could an accident like humanity have rational significance or ultimate purpose?[29] But he also says that the West or the "Europe" which is rapidly become global in scope has a history with a dialectical structure. It is the dialectic of nihilism; the "Socratic method" has, over time, destroyed the credibility of the ideals that made humanity possible as an "in-between" beast and God. Whatever the future might bring, it will not be made by human beings. Of necessity, we will become less than or more than human. In the decisive sense, then, both Marx and Nietzsche, who appear to be the authoritative teachers of our time, are Hegelians; both see the history of the West as the logical destruction of humanity.

Those who defend humanity must oppose this omnipresent Hegelianism by asserting the possibility of humanity in our time. They must show a greater capacity for human choice than does the historicist, who contends the possibilities for human experience are fundamentally limited by the constraints of time and place. Given the incredible dangers involved in the poorly grounded and hopelessly vague project to somehow transcend totally the horizon of the West, it also seems that the humanist's defense of humanity must find its argument within the Western tradition. Is it so clear that the West is, of necessity, dead?

Theoretically, the West comes to an end when it is determined that Socrates was wrong. Self-consciousness and leisure are shown to be neither noble nor pleasurable. Socrates and Nietzsche seem to agree that *logos* is worthless unless it can support human nobility or pride. Socrates says that it can; Nietzsche says that it cannot. This difference here, as we have suggested, may ultimately be traced to differing opinions on the significance of human mortality. Nietzsche thinks that the culmination of rational progress is the technological view that death is the ultimate evil. Consequently, self-consciousness is equated with consciousness of time and its terrible ability to erode and finally destroy the foundation of every assertion of human excellence. Socrates thinks that there are greater evils than death, and that *human* beings can face death freely and rationally as a part of the human condition, and as the way of preserving one's own humanity. Reason is more than a technical instrument; it is the basis of a "complete" human life.

We may find it impossible to agree with the extreme version of the Socratic view, to say that to hold death to be evil is to be dogmatic because we really know nothing of it. We know enough, surely, to say that death is *an* evil. But cannot we say that it is an evil we freely and rationally accept as a condition for preserving our humanity? Is not self-consciousness more than

consciousness of time? Is it not also consciousness of one's own human excellence, something for which one is justifiably proud? Such excellence is possessed neither by Gods nor by beasts, but only by human beings who are neither totally free nor totally chained to necessity. Is not the humanist still able to move human beings by challenging the view that human life would be better without death (or suffering) by wondering whether such a life free from necessity would be human at all?

Should we not consider the possibility that Socratic or Platonic "poetry" expresses a truth which is relevant for human beings in all times and in all places? Cannot reason and courage, truth and nobility, self-consciousness and happiness coexist harmoniously within the same particular human being? Is not any account of human experience which denies this possibility needlessly reductionistic? The acknowledgement of this possibility may well be the foundation for the tranquility which makes genuine leisure and political moderation once again possible. This affirmation of the Socratic faith, I think, is certainly necessary to show that intellectual excellence is choiceworthy for human beings. How to make this possibility credible within the context of a science-dependent, mass democracy is *the* educational challenge of the humanist.

Notes

[1] Consider, for example, Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in D. F. Kress, ed., *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 287–88: "Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology."

[2] Thus Hobbes exhorts in the "Introduction" to the *Leviathan*, "*Read thy self.*" Much of my exposition of the technological perspective is indebted to the *Leviathan*, which is a much greater influence on contemporary thought than we like to admit.

[3] See Michael Platt, "Would Human Life Be Better Without Death?" *Soundings* 63 (Fall, 1980), p. 331. Also, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "A World Split Apart," in R. Berman, ed., *Solzhenitsyn at Harvard* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1979), pp. 6–7 on the connection between "The Decline in Courage" and "Well-Being."

[4] See Plato, *Republic*, 386a–392c.

[5] See the remarks on technology in Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 37.

[6] Each of these "aristocratic" points is made in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume 2, Part 1.

[7] See Robert Kraynak, "Hobbes's *Behemoth* and the Argument for Absolutism," *American Political Science Review* 76 (December, 1982), pp. 837–47.

[8] The classic text here is Locke's "Of Property" in the *Second Treatise of Government*. Consider, in particular, its rhetorical structure in light of the remarks made by Richard Cox in his "Introduction" to his edition of the *Second Treatise* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982), pp. xxxiii–xv. Locke, of course, does not speak of an end to history.

Consider, however, Alexander Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, A. Bloom, ed., J. H. Nichols, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 57.

[9] This is a crude but accurate account of Kojeve's interpretation of Hegel.

[10] See the excerpt from Volume Three of *Capital* in R. C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 320.

[11] See George Friedman, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School* (Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1981).

[12] See Kojeve, p. 160, note 6. Also, Tom Darby, *The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time* (Toronto: Unversity of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 172, on the distinction between contentment and happiness. Darby's book, as a whole, is profound commentary on both Hegel and Kojeve and hence on "the end of history."

[13] As Rousseau first showed systematically in *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality*.

[14] As Rousseau also suggests, *ibid*.

[15] As Frazier remarks in B. F. Skinners's *Walden II* (New York: McMillan, 1948), p. 152: "if man is free, then a technology of behavior is impossible."

[16] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b6–18.

[17] In its purely divine form, according to Aristotle, contemplation is "thought thinking itself," and it is still "very pleasurable." (*Metaphysics*, 1072b24.)

[18] See the description of the "Magnanimous Man" in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1123a24–1125a17.

[19] *Ibid.*, 1174b5–9.

[20] Consider Pascal, *Pensees*, fr. 139, 397.

[21] See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 250–51.

[22] See Tocqueville, pp. 535–38.

[23] Consider that Rousseau's understanding of his own greatest happiness as a "reverie" amounts to a forgetfulness of his humanity. (*Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, Walk Five).

[24] See Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Book One, "European Nihilism."

[25] My interpretation of Nietzsche from this point onward is greatly indebted to the work of Harry Neumann. See particularly Neumann's review article in the *Independent Journal of Philosophy* 3(1979), pp. 139–41 and his "Science and History: A Nietzschean Interpretation of the History of Philosophy," *Nietzsche Studien* 6 (1977), pp. 64–74.

[26] See William A. Galston, *Kant and the Problem of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 24.

[27] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Basic Writings*, pp. 219–20.

[28] See Kojeve, p. 160, note 6.

[29] See Nietzsche's early fragment, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense."

Book Review

Psychoanalysis and Education: An Essay Review of Janet Malcolm's *Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession*

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 174 pp.

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Janet Malcolm's idiographic journey into the shadowy, labyrinthine world of psychoanalysis offers certain parallels for comparison with the field of education. As Freud himself once put it:

> It almost looks as if analysis were the third of those "impossible" professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which have been known much longer, are education and government.[1]

Malcolm's journalistic chronicle of a single, very *orthodox*, analyst ("Aaron Green") should not be taken as a comprehensive treatment of the entire psychoanalytic profession. However, it does artfully tie together bits and pieces of its tradition and, in so doing, reveals how its circle of practioners falls into rigid (and less than fully rational) patterns of (1) professional recruitment; (2) identification of clientele; (3) almost sacramental exegesis and defense of doctrine; and (4) those same inevitable strands of pettiness in status and organizational politics which beset any other profession. This sets the stage for high irony in that the ideal of psychoanalytic characterology, i.e., Freud's mature, civilized "genital" personality, is largely viewed without its Emperor's clothes. As Graham Greene learned in his *Travels with My Aunt*, "Perhaps a hint of weakness is required to awaken our affections."[2]

Malcolm's book demonstrates that the mystique of psychoanalysis may lie in its ability to persuade outside publics of its mission—one which is compatible with an era in which people seek after ways to translate "hysterical misery into common unhappiness" (Freud). This aim also indicates the despair (or realism?) of its program and its curious attraction for a dislocated society. (Since ordinary people come into daily contact with teachers, the latter suffer from a lack of any such distancing mystique.) Public misery may have served to obviate, to some extent, the need for psychoanalysis to build a solid foundation of ongoing scientific research to substantiate its often airy, speculative theories. Indeed, as Malcolm notes, that small coterie of "pure"

psychoanalytic researchers works mostly alone and "mostly without the respect of their patient-seeking colleagues" (p. 83). This should come as interesting news for educators, since theorists in their profession, from Dewey to Harry Broudy, have long cited the absence of a systematic base for pedagogy as a primary explanation for the relative failure of teachers to win wider public respectability.[3]

Malcolm fails to scrutinize fully the larger socio-economic and political trends which psychoanalytic practice seems to reflect. She does point out that psychoanalysis appeared to be most appealing to the thriving consumer society of the 1950s. However, she does not add that it has only been in recent decades that psychoanalysis, facing bleaker professional prospects, has intensified efforts to incorporate community psychiatry and family therapy into its highly individualistic, self-contained analytic ideal.[4] Yet Malcolm does present a fascinating "behind-the-doors" account of the small, hidden, and tightly organized micro-society of psychoanalysis itself.

The psychoanalytic "establishment" in America, explains Malcolm's analyst Green, is composed of institutes recognized by the American Psychoanalytic Association, founded in 1911. The American association has "stricter" and "stiffer" regulations and standards than its parent International Psycho-Analytic Association, which was organized by Freud in 1908. Freud himself disavowed any need for medical education as a prerequisite for full induction into analytic training.[5] The American association stipulated such a pre-condition to ensure more respectability for a struggling new profession, also, of course, restricting access to the field. Prevailing recruitment practices in psychoanalysis do assure the profession a certain mystique, one which assumes magical qualities and which importunes the outside public to believe in its importance and its seeming unmanageability in ordinary human hands.

There are, and have been, counter-trends to this movement. Early in the history of psychoanalysis, the apostate Alfred Adler and his followers sought to open the ranks to lay people of all kinds. Adler was interested in attracting practitioners with larger "social interest" and sympathies toward social reform and social equality. (To this day, the North American Society for Adlerian Psychology requires no explicit analytic, or Adlerian, training for its membership.) Contemporary studies in human resource development indicate that lay persons, given certain levels of empathic understanding and relatively brief skill training, often perform certain helping tasks as adequately as more fully trained, professional psychiatrists and psychologists.[6]

Recent applications of critical social theory also disclose the relative refusal, or inability, of psychoanalytic theory to incorporate sociohistorical contexts.[7] Such gaps create a curious kind of "schizoid" vision for policy-makers who use psychoanalysis to justify public rationales for or against

certain social programs. Its self-contained, individualistic frame of reference permits policy-makers to blame the victim for any larger social, economic, or political constraints which s/he may not be able to overcome.

These doctrinal neglects do bring a mixed sense of lightness and dread to Malcolm's account. My own favorite anecdote (not mentioned by Malcolm) is related by the British analyst Ian Suttie. He once questioned Melanie Klein (a major, if occasionally "heretical," figure in English child analysis) on the ground that her defense of Freud's theory of death-instinct lacked empirical validity or clear clinical utility. Klein's pithy response to Suttie's complaint: "What does it matter?"[8] Like Klein, Malcolm's Dr. Green tends to engage in flights of fantasy which hinge upon grounding in orthodox analytic doctrine. Yet he takes these flights as if they were excursions into self-evident reality—an atmosphere seemingly immune to questioning. The irony is that Green makes analysts appear to be locked into the same lifelong patterns of infantilism which their theory propagates. In fact, this characterization is his explicit idiographic description of "successful" psychoanalysts who limit their own practice to "healthy neurotics":

> Analytic education is inescapably an infantilizing experience. Interesting, isn't it? That a profession which gears itself so much to progressive maturation should conduct its education as an infantilizing experience. (p. 63)

Green's ultimate *reductio ad absurdum*, thrown back on himself, is a case example on the question of accepting fees from patients who have to cancel a session, however apparently rational their reason. One patient terminated therapy because Green wanted to charge her for any sessions she missed while on vacation. Her refusal is taken, by Green, as a symptom of transference:

> I didn't point out to her that she was taking flight because she couldn't face her painful feeling of love toward me. I didn't convince her that the money she wouldn't part with was the phallus-child she wanted from me. (p. 157)

As narrator Malcolm points out, who is rationalizing, projecting, or engaging in wish-fulfillment—patient or therapist? Who is reducing theory to the limits of a tenuous rationality? Finally, who judges the judges? In their closed micro-society, psychoanalysts don the cloak of Platonic guardians, i.e., no one is judged suitable to check their dictum. This, of course, tempts one to want to unmask any underlying politico-psychological motivations in their own practice. In Mannheim's terms, we may perhaps uncover another implicit ideology, i.e., that "ruling groups can in their thinking become so

intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination."[9]

Analyst Green also describes how conflicts of interest within psychoanalytic circles breed certain hierarchical channels of organization. Predictably, he casts these patterns in his ubiquitous, almost obsessive, genre of infantilization. Promotion within the profession is thus seen as a matter of power politics, Oedipal drama, and, ultimately, impotence:

> This kind of hierarchy and infantilization exists in every profession. It's in law, in business, in science, in education. There are Oedipally significant positions in every profession, and when people are up for them it creates a crisis that infantilizes them—causes grown men to squabble like kids about trival things. (p. 66)

The manner in which potential clients are weeded out for treatment also reveals much about the "cutting-off" efficiency and sympathies of psychoanalysis. Eighty-nine percent of the people interviewed for therapy at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute (perhaps the most "prestigious" institute) are turned away as inappropriate for analysis. (p. 68) Public school teachers, of course, serve no such selective audience. Given this highly selective feature, this recollection of one of Green's patients five years after she had completed analysis is somewhat surprising:

> You know, . . . maybe my life wouldn't be much different if I hadn't been in analysis. To tell the truth, I don't remember much of the analysis. . . . I guess the experience was O.K. But I can't say what helped me and what wouldn't have happened anyway. (pp. 161–162)

Or, as analyst Green interprets it (once Malcolm brings up Shakespeare's summertime play):

> At the end of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, the human characters wake up and rub their eyes and aren't sure what has happened to them . . . they don't know what caused the change. Analysis is like that for many patients. (p. 162)

Nor, it appears, do analysts, somewhat like classroom teachers and educational and psychological researchers, always know what caused any such change.

After reading Malcolm's book and ruminating about Freud, Klein, and Green, educators should feel at least a little better about their own profession. Not that they need have unrealistic cause for hope, for that, too, is a lesson gleaned from psychoanalysis. Its goal of self-insight does not necessarily promise glad tidings of making men and women wise, happy, or good. As Henry Perkinson argued a decade or more ago, school personnel may

have promised more than any institution can possibly deliver, thus opening their profession to untoward public criticism.[10] Like school-teachers, psychoanalysts are mere men and women with clay feet who bear ancient Greek gifts and imperfect panaceas. Given these inevitable imperfections, we may want to draw upon a lesson from Rudolf Dreikurs, Adler's major disciple:

> To be human does not mean to be right, does not mean to be perfect. To be human means to be useful, to make contributions—not for oneself, but for others—to take what there is and to make the best out of it.[11]

Yet vast differences in salary and the amount of time each profession can give its clients (assuming they are are not on vacation) would seem to place a somewhat larger share of accountability on the shoulders of psychoanalysts. This is not to say that the standard should be an "impossible" one, particularly in light of the obstacles already mentioned. However, in the even more narrow cost-benefit terms sometimes applied increasingly to education, psychoanalysis might have an even more difficult task in responding to the issue of time and money spent for its services—which are easily the longest and most expensive, in psychotherapy. This is especially relevant in view of its highly questionable track record.

At the same time, we may need to ask a critical negative question: Which of the professions does more or less harm? Therapists can assist breakdowns as well as the recovery of well-being.[12] There are tragic casualties in therapy, some hidden away, never to be heard from again or retrieved for questioning. There are also known and unknown casualties in education—some of whom may be forever unaware of their place on the casualty rolls.

In the end, though, education and psychoanalysis may also be "impossible" professions in the sense that they are extremely difficult to *practice* as well as to assess with any fair degree of certainty—given the fact that their personal and social parameters are seldom subject to clearly controlled study. Accordingly, any final adjudication of their warrantable effects becomes exceedingly problematic. And, like any kind of contrived manipulation of one's manifold experience, schooling as well as psychoanalysis may often "say nothing about what one ultimately does." (p. 103) This set of pessimistic conclusions about psychoanalysis and education largely parallels Freud's own quaintly realistic projections. As Malcolm's study makes us aware, they are as timely today as when they were first postulated by their "revolutionary father."

Notes

[1] Sigmund Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), in James Strachey, ed., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* 23, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1966), as cited in Malcolm, prefatory note.

[2] Graham Greene, *Travels with My Aunt* (New York: Viking Press, 1969), p. 69.

[3] See Harry S. Broudy, *The Real World of the Public Schools* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1972).

[4] A notable exception to this rule is the family analyst Nathan W. Ackerman, a psychoanalyst who criticizes the Freudian model in *The Psychodynamics of Family Life: Diagnosis and Treatment of Family Relationships* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), especially chapters 2 and 3.

[5] See Freud, "The Question of Lay Analysis" (1926), in *Standard Edition* 20. Had the following creative persons (coincidentally, some of the greatest psychologists in history) been American, rather than European, they would have been denied full candidacy in psychoanalytic institutes: Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, and Ernst Kris, among others. (Incidentally, all were *lay* analysts. Anna and Erik met under casual conditions of the need for a babysitter, which led to the latter's interest in analysis. A bearer of no formal academic degree, Erikson, an artist later hired by Harvard, briefly matriculated at a Montessori training school for teachers but never completed his certificate. Jean Piaget also studied under Anna Freud, who was educated as a grade school teacher. Piaget also would have lacked proper credentials in America, i.e., his doctoral dissertation was devoted to a study of mollusks.)

[6] See Robert R. Carkhuff, *Helping and Human Relations: A Primer for Lay and Professional Helpers* I & II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[7] See David Ingleby, ed., *Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of Mental Health* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Mark Poster, *Critical Theory of the Family* (New York: Seabury Press, 1980); and Edward E. Sampson, "Psychology and the American Ideal," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35 (1977), pp. 767–782.

[8] Ian D. Suttie, *The Origins of Love and Hate* (New York: Matrix House, 1966).

[9] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Louis wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 40.

[10] Henry J. Perkinson, *The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education, 1865–1968*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1977).

[11] Rudolf Dreikurs, "The Courage to Be Imperfect," in *Articles of Supplementary Reading for Parents* (Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute, 1970).

[12] See M. A. Lieberman, I. D. Yalom, and M. B. Miles, "The Impact of Encounter Groups on Participants: Some Preliminary Findings," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 8 (1972): pp. 29–50.

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

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